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THE BODY-MIND RELATIONSHIP AND PARAPSYCHOLOGY
'V.. --7 ., ^  Summary : " * y V-; ’ " rj' . ; ' ' ' . iv: '- *;
This study seeks to establish that: V7' 'lW  V:'V’V>
(a) there is a current Western paradigm or conceptual framework;
(b) this contains important misconceptions; V;:;i !V« • %/
(c) these stem primarily from failures to distinguish conceptual 
levels. V k:' V^VVlv^V.V . . ?\ A - V  V.*VVVV-'V:v''v! ■
The most basic misconceptions concern the body-mind relationship 
and perception where sense experiences and the physical world are 
typically regarded as at the same conceptual level, the latter 
being dominant. v/V •; V-
The study seeks to establish an alternative interpretation at three 
conceptual levels: . • ‘ V.'Vv;. V 'V. . • •*
(a) a sensory/physicali world of which we are parts and which in 
' us is self-“intimating; .fv .
(b) our sense experiences; V ' . '
(c) deriving from different aspects of our sense experiences, our
concepts of consciousness and mind and of the external and 
physical worlds. 5V W  ' '• '-.I- . : * ? . 1 ' 'f' ' 'f.: ■ J > V .
This is a double-aspect;theory supplemented by the concept of a
more basic sensory/physical world. -Vv V..; J *; V V V - '
Ontologically, there is a sensory/physical world of which we are 
parts; which in us is self-intimating; and of which consciousness 
and mind and the external and physicaljworlds are aspects.
Similar paradigm misconceptions apply to memory and the role of the 
unconscious. From this aspect, the brain is seen primarily as a 
processor of sense experiences whereby they are rendered meaningful: 
a processor which itself develops in the light of experiences. The. 
memories themselves are;retained in a collective or interpersonal 
unconscious. ’ • • . VI-’ V , . ‘‘ V.;;;-'Vr-V‘ .. .’. '. /, ’ ~
Given the role of associations, evidence relating to memory and various 
parapsychological phenomena are re-assessed and an explanation offered. 
The outcome is a monistic view of a timeless collective unconscious 
having within it past and future events,which are activated by.an 
evolving 'wave’ of energy which constitutes our sensory/physical world 
of which we are parts and through which the unconscious is becoming 
self-conscious. V :/-r---V;' . ... /•..
This study offers the basis for a further study developing and completing 
this monistic interpretation in terms of a top-level concept.
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*He deliberately renounoed philosophy only to submit; to it 
without being. aware • .^ :His philosophy was just this, that by 
not taking thought a cubit would be added -to his stature*. •
Hoping to find something without looking for itf expecting 
to obtain final answers td^^ by resolutely ;
refusing to ask questions - it was surely the most romantic 
species of realism yet invented, the oddest attempt ever 
made to get some^ihg‘for/hdthing^*'f • • *'•'• • •
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PREFACE ■
•7.,/ This study: is concerned primarily with certain limitations and 
misconceptions in our current Western conceptual framework or paradigm 
which have, I claim, been responsible for conceptual impasses in a number 
of areas of Western thought, v Ofthese the .most fundamentalv far-reaching 
and intractable is the relationship of body to mind: -a relationship which 
involves not only problems■of;perception but also of memory. Philosophers 
have lived for hundreds of J years with -the honbeplnial•, problems of the body- 
mind relationship and its many implications ,and ramificationj^but with,
I believe, a growing sense of impasse. ’• Indeed, in 1974 Sir ^ Carl Popper 
suggested that the problems 6f how such interact ion.-takes place was insoluble1 
though he and Sir John Eccles have more recently written a valuable book of 
some 600 pages on the subject.^ As regards memory, psychologists and 
neurophysiologists are still disposed to regard their long search for 
memory traces in the brain;as primarily a problem of understanding its 
neuronal organisation for the complexity, of the brain and the vast scope 
for further discoveries prevents the sense of impasse becoming dominant 
here, notwithstanding muchJconflicting evidence, .-Neither problem is .. ; "
normally seen as bringing our Western paradigm into question,'^ The growing 
evidence of parapsychological phenomena, however, so blatantly conflicts 
with the preconceptions ofl the paradigm thatjsome:people still seek to 
deny the evidence outright! ; Professor;J Taylor met this problem in an 
acute form. He made full and valuable scientific investigations, notably 
into psycho-lcinesis, and documented thesej.with photographs and references, , 
in his book Superminds. He failed, however, to find any explanation for 
the phenomena within the normal:scientific.’tenets of the paradigm and was 
faced with disowning the paradigm or the evidence. He chose the latter,^
I seek to show in the course of this study how that apparent conflict 
resolves itself. •• . /'v - • . *' •- “• 1
.Each of these problem areas, like others within our.Western paradigm, • 
is marked by a proliferation of theories,^often without any conclusive 
evidence to confirm or deny them: and the theories in each area normally
have little or no regard to the problems or theories of the others. As 
I seek to show, however, none of these problems can be solved without 
bringing into question basic features of the paradigm^.and I seek to 
establish strong grounds for doing..this. In so5 doing, on© major philosophibal 
tool which I have sought to use at many points is the distinction of 
conceptual levels. - Necessarily, however,; many'problems still remain,
A;V> ’'II?'••?•/?C^ V.:' V !'7':/ •
• - particularly empirical 'problems, for I Have had to use.a wide range of
U y  - . >T. . ; ;empirical evidence, the interpretation of some of which cannot but be
VfA; speculative. ; My conclusions and my argirnents are . therefore tentative but
: I hope that they will be felt to warrant’closer scrutiny and investigation. ,
As the impasses tackled in this study are so largely conceptual, it is
. V appropriate that this study should be mainly from the point of view of
philosophy: .. but inevitably, evidence from other disciplines has had to 
be deployed with all the risks of misinterpretation that this implies.
* I can only hope that wherejthis has happened, resulting misunderstandings
will not have seriously undermined the argument./. . . ■» ' ’ '
As regards parapsychological evidence, this study has not attempted 
. , to prove that such events occur. When the preconceptions of those assessing
the evidence can differ so,widely, nothing approaching proof is possible: 
but references are given to books and papers;where the evidence is recorded.'; 
This is an area where fraud, conscious and unconscious, and misunderstandings 
have often occurred and cdution in accepting evidence is essential: but
most of the evidence used in this study is paralleled in large numbers f ,
[ o f  different reports and I|think at no point does the evidence of individual^
cases provide decisive support: for the argument as a whole or,for the many 
detailed arguments within it. , Indeed, the parapsychological evidence as 
a whole only serves to amplify and support an argument which is much more 
• * . . widely based.._ 7- v /. 1 V ''•*• *f.'• .'/ '* b
This study has been in incubation for many years but it could not j
have been brought to fruition without the tolerant guidance and under- ■■}
standing of Professor S C Thakur whose wide knowledge of Western and 
Eastern philosophy:and of parapsychology is probably unique. There are 
references to his published work at various points in this study but his 
guidance was much more deeply pervasive than these suggest. I am grateful 
also to many others who have advised on points relevant to this study and, 
in particular, to Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, Professor D P  Lawden,
Professor Roy, Dr D V Canter, Dr E j Dingwall' and Dr G Carpenter as well as ' ■
to those whose published works are referred to throughout this study and
the far larger number whose works, though unrecorded, have helped to mould .,4?
. my thought. . ./ V ,
We live in a,n age of doubt and uncertainty* In, the Western World 
the sapping of the great belief systems of the main religions and the 
disintegration of social philosophies is plain to see. Monism, with its 
presumed certainties, is very unfashionable, . whereas great virtue is seen 
in pluralism, 1 The implications of this trend are such that William James 
considered the dispute between pluralists and monists to be the moat 
fundamental intellectual issue. * Sir Isaiah Berlin has noted that 'One of 
the deepest human desires is to find a unitary pattern in which the whole 
of experience is symetrically ordered, There is little need to stress that 
monism, and the faith in a:single criterion, has always proved a deep 
source of satisfaction. 1 But Berlin claims that this leads to 'an attempt 
to preserve absolute categories or ideals at,the expense of human lives .... 
Whereas in contrast, 'Pluralism seems to me a truer and more humane ideal 
.... because it does recognise the fact that human goals are many.'
Indeed, Wittgenstein and the linguistic philosophers have sought to free 
us from the urge towards any unitary explanation. As I shall note later, 
Austin explained the use of the idea of sense data by some philosophers 
as a matter of 'unpicking, one by one, a mass of seductive (mainly verbal) 
fallacies.'^ And Malcolm remarked that 'It is generally true that when 
a philosopher enters into the study of a concept (such as knowledge, belief, 
intention, memory) he assumes that the concept has a unity which can be
disclosed by "Analysis"   In some of ,my^previous'writing on the topic
of memory I was influenced by this idea. In the present work I believe 
I have freed myself from it. If I make an assumption, it is the opposite 
one. Wittgenstein's remark about the concept of "thinking" and the 
employment of that word in our language, is very apt here. "It is not to be 
expected of this word that it would have unified employment:we shall 
rather expect the opposite".
Belated to the virtues seen in pluralism is the vd.de recognition 
accorded to the importance of belief systems or paradigms, each with its 
own conceptual framework and values. On this, the work of Evans Pritchard 
has been influential. As he said about the Azande, "They reason excellently 
in the idiom of their beliefs, but they cannot'reason outside or against 
their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to express their 
thoughts.'^ And in similar vein he said, 'In this web of belief every 
strand depends on every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its 
meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external
structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and j
7 •'*••■ ■" v.' * • - . . .he cannot think his thought is wrong.' Evans Pritchard goes on to add,
however, that Zande beliefs, are not absolutely set but are variable and
i.;u > 
X .
fluctuating to allow for different situations and to permit empirical 
observations and even doubts. In comparison with the framework of the 
thinking of the .Azande, our current Western belief system is more all- 
embracing, and its content; is very different, but its fluctuating, pervasive 
and necessarily restrictive nature is not. These different belief systems, 
however, present a problem for the pluralist. Either all such systems 
of thought are equally satisfactory: either ;that,of the Azande with
their witchcraft, oracles and magic is as satisfactory as that of Western 
science, or there must be some criteria by which we judge one system to 
be better than another: ;and this means judging them on a unified, monistic 
. basis. ;■ ‘ 'A  ‘
It might, of course,.be answered that we can never judge another 
belief system except in terms of our own:, but such belief systems have 
rarely been closed for long to outside influences and today barriers are 
breaking down fast with world-wide flows of information and cultural 
interchange. Of course,.the difficulties of even partially divesting 
ourselves of our own belief systems and getting inside the skin of another 
are great but some measure"of choice or combination of belief systems is 
clearly possible. People choose and select from alien cultures, albeit 
partly unconsciously, for throughoxit the world syncretism is rife and 
such choices must be made on the basis of some criteria or other. Yet 
: once we admit that judgements can, and in some circumstances must be made 
on some general basis, recourse must be had to some wider criteria of 
selection and these then lead back towards some form of monism. ’
There are other forces in Western culture tending towards a unification 
of concepts and one fashionable theory of the body-mind relationship 
seeks to promote that unification process by accounting for mind in terras
of brain states. Yet, on good grounds, as I shall show, there remain many
dissentients from this theory.' •
Even within the field of science, however, the idea of steady progress ,; 
by the expansion of knowledge and its increasing unification under more 
and more all-embracing theories is greatly over-simplified*; Kuhn hasQ ’ .‘.x. ; - • •
shown that the process is rather one of the development of belief-systerns
as ‘ ' •  .-.I...,,.s. .or paradigms, and,^expanding knowledge reaches their conceptual bounds,
they begin to crumble. Then, after a peripd of conflict, they are replaced
by new paradigms that fit the then state of knowledge better: and the
process then tends to repeat itself. . - ; v. .1 . •:
In his study, Kuhn used the word ’paradigm' in a number of different
• _ ’ • •AA. - • •
senses. This was pointed out by Margaret Masterman who reduced these senses 
to three ma’iriv&roups, v and Kuhn, in his 1969 poatscrip fc to the second edition 
of his work, reduced t h W  to two. As he there said:U'On the one hand,' - [
(the word ’paradigm*) stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community.
On the other hand it denotes an element in thht constellation, the puzzle 
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules 
as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal soience."
In the first and wider sense, Kuhn was concerned chiefly with the shared 
beliefs of a scientific community in the sense of the practitioners of a 
scientific speciality: yet it will be obvious that even as so defined, the
term 'community1 can be taken at various levels of specialisation, depending 
on the range of implications of any point at issue and he at times used the 
. term in its widest sense:,'-[for instance in his chapter on.'Revolutions as 
changes in World View' where he discussed^'the transformation of vision* 
separating Galileo from Aristotle or Lavosier from Priestley.
Kuhn recognised but refused to accept the widely held view that with 
such a change of paradigm, what changes 'is !only .the scientists' inter- V
probation of observations that themselves are fixed once and for all by
* . '-p... ' • . - ll'Y 11the nature of the environment and the perceptual apparatus.* ., ;He went on
to claim that this view was itself an essential partiof a philosophical
paradigm initiated by Descartes and developed at the same time as Newtonian
dynamics. He claimed instead that a change of paradigm involved living
in a different world and he illustrated this in various ways, including
from the work of the gestalt psychologists. The essence of this point was
that what we see we not only see - we see it in meaningful terms and in a
world as complex as ours, a change of significance means that we notice and '
concentrate on different aspects as well as understanding them in different
terras. • -'J'.-’' ' 4‘ \ V-'V'; * //. :'-y' Y 1 1*
This could easily be -read as pointing to the pluralist view that two : 
competing paradigms are simply different and that there is no way in which 
one paradigm can be regarded as 'better* tha^ another. , This, indeed, is 
the claim of some of Kuhn's critics.;, Gellner, for instance, argues that 
'if as Kuhn teaches, we can only apprehend reality thanks to the mediation 
of some 'paradigm' or other, it is not clear in what sense any paradigm 
could be closer to reality than any other. In order to pass such a judge­
ment we should first of all need to be able to see reality as it is on 
its own, without any paradigm - a possibility which, of-course, dramatically
contradicts Kuhn's central ■ doctrine. 1 , .\y.Kuhn himself; however, rejeel'3 . 
the view that his position" mere relativism and:argues that 'Later 
scientific theories are: better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in 
. the often quite different environments to which they are applied. This is 
not a relativist's position, and it displays the sense in which I am a 
convinced believer in scientific progress.'•/He admits, however, that 
'There is, I think, no theory-^independent way to reconstruct phrases like 
'really there'f the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory 
and its 'real* counterpart;in nature now seems to me illusive in principle. ' 1
The fact that there is no theory-independent way to see 'reality 
as it is' does not, however, necessarily condemn us to a purely relativist 
position for, as I shall show presently, the theories themselves are 
developed from uniformities in our sense experiences which thus have an 
objective basis." And as Kuhn himself recognises, when paradigms crumble 
under expanding knowledge,; we do not totally abandon them. By far the 
greater part of their content remains substantially unchanged though 
.there are"changes in perspective. There are changes in the observation 
base, too, from which we build our conceptual models, for some features 
become prominent while others fade in significance. But the steadily 
growing data base of Western culture, though always open to shifts in 
interpretation, of itself imposes an increasingly tight constraint upon 
acceptable and indeed tolerable changes in the conceptual paradigms or 
models that we build and in the light of which we view the world. Pupfcher- 
more, such paradigms or conceptual models form the very structure of our 
minds which operate as 'open systems' seeking all the time to achieve and 
attain coherence and stability: whereas all conflict implies some measure
of neurosis. There are thus continuous pressures for consistency and 
coherence in the paradigms or models and these pressures tend to ensure 
that, though we cannot directly match the models to the world 'out there', 
indirectly, despite - and as a result of - the readjustments that changes 
of paradigm entail, these paradigms or models become progressively more 
comprehensive and coherent and more consistent with, a wider and wider, 
range of consistencies in our experiences. I,The large role of science in 
our current paradigm, with its pressures actively to seek out areas of-.,/.-, 
obscurity and uncertainty in our experiences and to seek to explain them 
in terms of hypotheses which are open to refutation, is of especial importance 
for each surviving hypothesis adds to a,nd may affect the balance of our 
developing conceptual structures. ./■ i'-/-''-v. .
:X ' *
The very process of seeking explanations entails structure building, V 
as Gellner has stressed:"^' and this is a response to deep- creative forces 
in each person. As X shall show, these explanatory structures are built 
at many levels in terms of- consistencies in our experiences. It is these 
pressures to explain our experiences in terms of consistencies in our 
experiences by a process of discriminating, classifying and conceptualising 
them, that have been harnessed and organised by science and it is just these 
creative pressures which have been renegued by many contemporary philosophers 
They have rightly rejected inadequate simplifications by generalisations, 
reductions or by meaningless conceptual inflation: but, as the quotations
from Wittgenstein, Austin and Malcolm make clear, they have in the process 
given up-any attempt to explain our experiences in terms of more adequate 
higher level concepts. .Indeed Wittgenstein went so far as to say 'We must 
do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place’ -:
. a view which led Bertrand Russell to say that ’The later Wittgenstein ..... 
seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a 
doctrine which would make serious thinking unnecessary.f As Kenny notes 
of the view of Wittgenstein: ’The aim of philosophy is a therapeutic one,
to cure us from talking nonsense and being tormented by problems for
• 16 ' -• ' which there is no solution.’ . - v,: . *. .
’No solution': this soimds like a counsel of despair but it is
understandable for, as I shall seek to show, many of the problems facing 
modern philosophers really are insoluble within our current Western 
•paradigm. That paradigm is now itself beginning to crumble. As Kuhn notes, 
the philosophical paradigm initiated by Descartes and developed at the V 
same time as Newtonian dynamics has served both science and philosophy 
well. ’Its exploitation, like that of dynamics itself, has been fruitful 4. 
of a fundamental understanding that perhaps could not have been achieved 
in another way. But as the example of Newtonian dynamics also indicates, 
even the most striking past success provides no guarantee that crisis can 
be indefinitely postponed,• Today, research in parts of philosophy, *' 
psychology, linguistics and even art history, all converge to suggest
that the traditional paradigm is sqraehow askew.* '
llie symptoms of such a breakdown of a paradigm,.are described by - .,
Kuhn in terms of science, though they have wider application. As he says, 
’Once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is 
declared invalid only ifan -alternate candidate is available to take .its 
place. No process yet disclosed by historical study of scientific
development at all resembles tlie methodological stereotype of falsification 
by direct comparison witfr nature. %  Vi. /^Defenders of the old paradigmJ  
will devise numerous articulations and ’ad hoc1 modifications of their 
theory in order to eliminate any apparent.conflict*'liL/ Kuhn,shows that 
• r .  there are always difficulties, in fitting a paradigm to.experience and that 
it is only when they become a source of concern and attention does a 
paradigm become at risk. ' Solutions begin to proliferate and scientists 
begin to turn to philosophical analysis as ’a device for unlocking the 
riddles of their field.’ -Yet this malaise need hot range across the
entire field of science, As Kuhn says, ’Scientific revolutions are 
inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow sub­
division of the scientific community,;that an existing paradigm has ceased
to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which....;. . . . . . 20 that paradigm itself had previously led the way. 1
Where does the need for a change of our current Western paradigm 
show itself? In the physical sciences it shows itself in cosmology and 
even more in quantum physics, in both of which scientists have extended 
their quest furthest from their base of observation and experiment. In 
these areas speculation about fundamentals is prevalent and it would 
probably be admitted by many specialists that the conceptual framework 
that has served science excellently so far, is here breaking down. In the 
biological sciences, too, the problems of reduotionism and the extent to 
which some form of ’purpose* is to be seen in nature raise fundamental 
questionings., But it is in problems of cognition and particularly of 
the body-mind relationship that many of these problems come to a sharp 
focus. This problem, Schopenhauer’s World Knot, raises issues concerning 
not only philosophers, psychologists and neurophysiologists, but all of >;
us, for it involves the relationship of mind to the external and physical 
worlds in which we live. And to some extent on the fringe of, science, but 
increasingly disturbing in its implications for our current paradigm to 
those who face the evidence, are the various manifestations of para- 
psychological phenomena which, if that paradigm were true, could not ,7
Occur, but do. And behind all this lie ultimate questions which are /
‘ ■ 21 1 * • * \ ' v* ;largely foreclosed by the prevailing paradigm' - questions of the survival 7  
of death and even wider issues which are not .the concern of this study, such 
as whether there is a God and the basis of personal and social values.
• !■• y vYY.: 5V;
^ As T. have shovm* JxiYis" difficult, for Yihose|whose thought ,de:Y7v.vv;'y..'.
embedded firmly in this or any other paradigm to realise even in principle 
the extent to which it conditions their view of the world and it is even 
more difficult to apply such insights to specific problems: . and this is 
true whatever the cultural;;level involved. 7*1 have quoted Evans Pritchard 
who, in his classic study of witchcraft, oracles arid magic among they 
Azande, noted that 'They reason excellentlyYin the idiom of their beliefs, 
but they cannot reason outside, or against,-their beliefs, because they1 V -vv '• Y Y Y  22 ;have no other idiom in which to express their thoughts.' . It was his 
arguments that led me to call my own book, published in 1956, The Idiom 
of Contemporary Thought. YFrom quite a different angle, Kuhn himself makes 
the same point about the hold of paradigms when he says about the historians 
of science, 'The more carefully they study,; say, Aristotelian dynamics, 
phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel 
that those onceeurrent views of nature were, as a whole, neither less 
scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncracy than those current 
today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can 
be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of 
reasons as now lead to scientific knowledge;-;,. If* on the other hand, they
are to be called science, then science has included, bodies of belief
' - ■ Y  ■; ' . - ■ ' Y  23 ■ ' ' .Y:> Y*quite incompatible with the ones we hold today,* ;;,And, as I note later,
Thalcur,. with a background firmly established both .in Western and in Indian
philosophy, has been pointing in the sameYdirection \7heh he has suggested
how many of the intractable problems raised by parapsychology might be
resolved by looking outside our Western framework of thought and learning
from or even adopting some of the concepts of the highly developed tradition
of India: concepts which have been consistently regarded not only as the
expression of the personal;experiences of.sages and seers of antiquity
• 2.A ' 1 . «: ■ a-,. ' “ Y  *; ' tbut as practical. Y :Y ■■■% '.;>YYYYY'YY 7Y'’ Y-: ‘ • Y Y
How, then, can any variant or alternate paradigm be made convincing? 
Ultimately, by showing some of the areas where the existing paradigm 
breaks down and showing that,- without jettisoning the .advantages of the 
\ old paradigm, an alternative works better.Y But, as will be clear, this 
Is not a simple matter. As Kuhn says, 'The prbpbnents of competing“paradigms 
ax*© always slightly at cross purposes. Neither will grant all the non- 
empirical assumptions that;the other needs in order to make'his case. ...
Y;7_.,f;i:l ..Y.Y'j.'^ Y ' ';Y:.[;Y.13 .Y*-;' ; ’■ '7 - r \
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Though each may hope to convert the other to hie way of seeing his nedhnee- 
; and its problems neither may hope to prove his case, V The competition •
between paradigms is not the sort of battle thatvcan be resolved by proofs. 1 
; And he goes on to list the reasons for the lack of contact with each 
other’s viewpoints, ’In the first place,T'the proponents of competing 
paradigms will often disagree about the list,of problems that,any; candida te 
for paradigms must resolve, >Their standards'; or definitions are not the 
same.’ More is involved,, however. ’Since new paradigms are b o m  from old 
ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, 
both conceptual and manipulative, that -the", traditional paradigm had v 
previously employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed elements in 
quite the traditional way.;, Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts
and experiments fall into new relationships With one another. ,25 Indeed,
as I have already noted, Kuhn goes on to claim that, the proponents of - . 
competing paradigms practice their trades in,different worlds: though they
both look at the same world, , even when they look from the same point in 
the same direction, they may see different I things in different relations 
to one another. ■ All this,fas Kuhn shows, accounts for the difficulties 
of communication between the proponents of two competing paradigms and why, 
while many supporters.of the old one vehemently resist conversion to the 
new, to others, the new paradigm may seem intuitively obvious. All this 
should be well illustrated in the discussion which follows for,^inevitably, 
it is from the basis of the current paradigm that a case for a shift in view 
must be built. Yet there can be no implication in all this, however 
great the change of perspective, that a new paradigm can or need displace 
or seriously alter the vast and growing corpus; of, knowledge that is both 
the basis and the achievement of Western Civilisation. Over this vast 
field, the perspective and foc\is may change but over most of it the same 
features, the same laws will still be there. Only in limited areas do *• 
quite new explanations emerge, and even these explanations normally have 
precedents. Obviously, a new paradigm, when.first formulated, is crude: 
its explanations need then5 to be refined,-:-to., be tested in' detail and their 
falsification sought: and in this process no doubt hew areas of obscurity, . 
of misconceptions and errors will emerge. Yet, asfKuhn says, this is ,not 
a purely relativist position. Though each new paradigm displaces*its 
predecessor, it builds on.and absorbs most"of.its achievements., The analogy
14
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drawn by Kuhn with biological evolution' r-is (close. • /
To try at this point to delineate in detail;the main areas where the 
prevailing paradigm is inadequate would involve pre-empting much of what 
is said in the following pages.^ It involves consideration of the 
predominant position given in current thinking,to" the external and physical 
worlds: to their priority over or parity with;mind:j/to the/.cognitive
processes involved and the; pervading dualism that conditionsbpur;thinking 
about them. It involves consideration of the status, of time arid space 
and, more specifically, of the relationship of mind to brain. /Current 
knowledge of the brain leaves the parameters of a solution of the body-mind 
problem very wide but increasingly strong evidence from many aspects of 
parapsychology narrows them dramatically and their explanation provides 
stringent tests of the validity of the argument as a whole. ..This is one 
world but, as I shall show, it is a world at many levels of reality. It is 
many and one and any adequate account must be both pluralistic and monistic* 
Throughout the history of philosophy these views have been in conflict.
In this study I hope to lay the foundations for their reconciliation:, 
and for this I need to start at the very heart of the problem with the
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1 This trend is discussed in E Cellner The legitimation of Belief
0974)t ©speciaily,(Chapter 1. - ;
2 See e g his Pragmatism C1907  ^ ~ ;' V V v\,
3 Four Essays on Liberty (1969) pp 106, 170 and 171.
4 Sense and Sensibilia * (1962) pp 4-5ik :;V. . ; ■
5 N Malcolm Memory and Mind (1977) P 16. ,The quotation is from 
Zettel -para 112. v v /'■' %;./ /
6 Witchcraft. Oracles and Magic among the Azanfle (1937) P 338
7 " . " " " " pp 194-5
8 T Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd edn. (1970)
9 M Masterman "The Nature of a Paradigm* in Criticism and the Growth
of Knowledge ed, /1 Lakatos and A Musgrave (1970') P '^1
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15 Philosophical Investigations I 1 0 9 V V V  . ///V* ,s ...
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•The prevailing' paradigm'is not*-, of pours©* inonolithio. ' Each person 
holds a more or less different version as: differing views' - oh 
the priority or parity .of the physical world,in relation to mind 
show. Nor are our paradigms entirely self-consistent., . ‘
•E G Evans Pritchar<l, op*: pit* y^^y-'u
T Kuhn op. cit. <p 2 \ ‘
See e.g. ’Parapsychology .iri Search iof; a Paradigm’ in The Philosophy 
of Parapsychology..eds. 13 Shapin & L Coly (1977) and * Telepathy, 
Evolution and Dualism* in Philosophy and Psychical Research ed,
S C Thalcur (1976). . . . , , - ; • v , . *
T Kuhn op. cit. pp ,148-9 V,f ‘'.'Cv-y 4-• i .&•*• - -u
C D Broad set out in his Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research
.  Y iwn xam w ^ M t mnwwn m fifwwmfmmmww'i n iw  nr" w *wroiw»«w»»»wiyH*-(1 9 5 3) certain ’very general principles, mostly of a negative or 
restrictive kind,which practically everyone who has been brought up 
within or under the influence Of Western industrial societies assumes 
without question nowadays. They form the framework within which the 
practical life, the scientific theories and even most of the fiction 
of contemporary civilizations are confined.’ He-; reiterated the most 
important of these in his Leetures on Psychical Research (1962) from 
which this quotation;"is/taken/Cp ">$)T4;These f ’basic limiting principles’ 
provide a useful characterisation of our: Western' paradigm, '"X shall i 
have cause to question a number of them in this study.
THE BODY-MIND RELATIONSHIP: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM . .-'.V*. YY; -
The relationship of body to mind has been a problem certainly 
since the time of Descartes and arguably since the time of the Greeks.^
It is probably the most important problem facing philosophers. In 
itself it appears a fairly narrow and specialised issue, but its 
significance runs far wider, for our view of body and more particularly 
of brain, reflects the views we hold about.the physical world generally; 
and similarly, our view of mind depends upon our views about mental, 
spiritual and moral issues. Indeed, as I shall try to show, our
Y ’ • v - 'preconceptions about the nature of the relationship are built into our 
Western thought, and it is because some of these preconceptions are 
misconceptions that the problem has proved so intractable. The body-mind 
relationship is thus the hinge, the nexus, where these wider issues come 
into a sharp and critical focus: so it is not surprising that the
incoherence of our views on the narrower issue reflects directly a deeper 
incoherence in our views about the world as a whole.
The body-mind problem is in part a problem of science and in 
particular of neurophysiology. We know that our awareness of the world 
around us and consciousness are dependent on extremely complex events 
occurring in the brain and in the sense mechanisms leading to it. We 
know, for instance, that when we look around us, what we see depends on 
events occurring in the eye, and that an; interruption made at any point 
in the chain leading from the eye back into the brain can prevent our 
seeing. More generally, we know that if the brain is deprived of oxygen, 
even for a very few moments, unconsciousness will follow, and unless 
rapidly restored, so will death. It is normally, assumed that the events 
in the brain that form the immediate counterparts of consciousness: are 
the patterns of discharging neurones but how these relate to, or 'become' 
our sensory and other mental experiences presents a problem that has so 
far eluded any generally acceptable solution. Sir Charles Sherrington who 
won the Nobel Prize for his studies of reflexes and of the integrative 
action of the nervous system could only say at the end of his long career 
that 'We have to regard the relationship of mind to brain as still not 
merely unsolved but as still devoid of a basis for its very beginning.' 
Some thirty years later we are still not significantly further forward.
Our knowledge of the brain is growing very rapidly as a result of the 
enormous amount of research work being undertaken all over the world, 
but it is a measure of the complexity of the brain and nervous system
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Yv’Y, that many basic features" of its organisation and functioning still
remain unknown. Yet while more knowledge of the brain might enable us 
to eliminate some theories about these physical events and their mental 
counterparts, it is not at all clear that such further knowledge would .. > C  ^ . * ’ ' \
of itself explain the nature of the relationship,.for the difficulty is
in large part conceptual: - as even a brief consideration of the main
traditional and current theories shows. ;Y • , • v. ' -
Attempts to solve the problem of the body-mind relationship can
be variously classified. Most of those since the seventeenth century can
be seen largely as a reaction against dualism which was stated in its
starkest form by Descartes. As he said:, 'This I (that is to say, my
soul by which I am what I am), is entirely and absolutely distinct from
2my body, and can exist without it. 1 Dualism is not just of historical 
interest, however, for, as I shall show, it lurks behind most current 
thinking and has been openly espoused by,,for instance, Popper, one of 
the most outstanding modern philosophers, as Well as by several of the 
most distinguished modern neurophysiologists and brain surgeons, notably 
Sherrington himself, J C Eccles and Wilder Penfield. For them, though 
our experiences may ultimately be correlated with events in the brain, 
brain and mind are ultimately different in kind. Y:Y
There have been many attempts to overcome or eliminate such 
duality. Spinoza saw the universe as two systems, one.of extended things,
the other of ideas, both being aspects of a single inclusive reality
. 3 > ’-• . .which he termed God or nature. Berkeley reduced this picture to ideas4 i - : • . . ’■in the mind of God. During this century, much more influential have
been attempts to reduce mental states or events to actual or potential
behaviour, Such theories have ranged from attempts to identify thinking
with sub-vocal movements of the larynx to much more subtle and elegant
attempts, notably by Ryle, to explain talk of mental states as a way of
referring to actual or potential patterns of behaviour. 1 Y y  >
More' fashionable at the present time are the brain-mind identity
! - • * * ' ... 
theories which claim that mental and physical events are strictly
identical. The apparent differences are sometimes explained by the
fact that whereas I have direct access to my own experiences, others
. can (in principle) observe them piily by using their own sense mechanisms
The various versions of these theories are, like the behaviourist
theories, materialist in inspiration, for the attempt is to reduce our
- understanding of the mental to the physical, an attempt which links with
attempts to explain biology in terms of physics. Thus Feigl, asking
whether the Identity Theory simplifies our conception of the world,,>
replies: TI think it does. Instead of conceiving of two realms or V
concomitant types of events, we have only one which is represented by
two different conceptual systems - on the one hand that of physics, and
on the other hand, where applicable (in my opinion only to an extremely
small part of the world) that of phenomenological psychology.* And
earlier he says:'I am indeed in agreement with one main line of traditiona
materialism in that I assume   that the basic laws of the universe
7are the physical ones. 1 The issue is put even more starkly by 
D M Armstrong in the Introduction to his influential book A Materialist 
Theory of Mind where he says that the object of his book is to show that 
’there are no*, good philosophical reasons for denying that mental'- 
processes are purely physical processes in the central nervous system
and so, by implication, that there are no good philosophical reasons
’ ‘ ' ' ’ * ft \for denying that man is nothing but a material object.’
A look in rather more detail at the views of J J C Smart who is 
another leading supporter of the psycho-physical identity theory casts 
more light upon these issues. Near the.beginning of his essay 
’Sensations and Brain Processes’, Smart explains why he seeks to resist 
the suggestion that mental events are irreducibly psychical. ’Mainly 
because of Occam’s razor. It seems to me that science is increasingly 
giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as 
physiochemical mechanisms: it seems that.even the behaviour of man himself 
will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms. There does seem to be, 
so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly 
complex arrangement of physical constituents. All except for one place:
in consciousness......... So sensations, states of consciousness, do
seem to be the one sort of thing left outside .-the physicalist picture,
and for various reasons I cannot believe this to be so, ....  ; Such
sensations would be M nomo^logical danglers’* to use Feigl’s expression.’  ^
Smart is attracted to the idea which he attributes to Wittgenstein, 
that there are in a sense no sensations: that man is a vast arrangement 
of physical particles, but there are not, over and above this, sensations 
or states of consciousness. There are just behavioural facts about this 
vast mechanism.’^  Nonetheless, Smart does not feel that this will quite 
do the trick. ’.....It does seem to me as though, when a person says 
"I have an after-image", he is^  making a genuine report, and when he says 
"I have a pain", he .is doing more than "replace pain behaviour" and that
"this more" is not just to say that he is in distress. I am not so
sure, however, that to admit this is to admit that there are non-physical
correlates of brain processes. Why should not.sensations just be brain
, . •* *• «• . : 11 - » ' >V . ••V/ , , V- * ' - ■processes of a certain sort?’ Smart goes on to stress that the thesis
is not that 1 "after-image" or "ache" means the same as "brain process
of a sort ’x* ". ; It is that, insofar as an "after-image".or "ache" is
the report of a process, it is the report of a process that happens to be
a brain process. 1 He goes on to make it clear that the psycho-physical
13;identity doctrine asserts identity in the strict sense.
To illustrate this further he speaks first of the example of 
’morning star’ and ’evening star’. This example, I may interpose, offers 
a nice example of levels of concepts which I discuss later, for we can 
observe the morning star and the evening star but it requires a fairly 
advanced understanding of the relationship of,their movements to realise 
that there is one star,; Venus. Once this;is understood, we can call the 
morning star and the evening star by those names or we can call them 
Venus, for ’morning star* and ’evening star’ are different concepts at 
the same level: Venus is a concept at a higher level embracing both,,
and when its behaviour is understood, explaining both. However, having 
offered the illustration, Smart then merely notes that morning star is 
in a sense not the very same thing as evening starbut only spatio- 
temporal ly continuous with it and is not a case of strict identity 
claimed for. sensations and. brain processes .v\V 7 ■ : - V  r . ’
Smart then uses what he regards as a more plausible example by 
considering lightning and an electricaT discharge from the clouds.
Again these are concepts of the same phenomenon described at two 
different levels though Smart does not so describe them. Smart-does 
not press the analogy bqt his claims need to be pursued further here.
As I have“already noted, it is generally assumed that the events in the 
brain which form the physical aspects or counterparts of sense experience 
are the patternings in the immensely complex neuronal patternings.in 
the brain. These neuronal events comprise the exchange of ions across 
the neuronal membrane accompanied by a small voltage change and a minute 
electro-magnetic field .7 , Smart is not specific about the brain events 
of which he is speaking. It is to be assumed, however, that he is 
claiming that the relationship of lightning and the electrical discharge 
is analogous to the relationship of a mental event - say, my seeing
lightning - and the corresponding pattern of ionic/voltage/field changes.
20
But to be strictly identical they must be able to satisfy the same
tests. The test of the Voltage of the lightning flash would be the,test;
of the voltage of the electrical discharge: but where could electrical
or chemical tests appropriate to my brain be applied to my seeing
lightning, or seeing anything else, for that matter? The test in the
brain could serve for them both if they were identical by definition,
but their identity is claimed to be contingent. To record the voltage
change of my seeing lightning or, say seeing my dog, makes no sense in
ordinary language and Smart has shown no special sense for the idea.
But if contingent identity does not involve sharing common properties,
14what does it involve? Smart replies to an objection on these lines that
he is not arguing that an after image is a brain process but that the
'• ■ ' 15experience of having an after-image is a brain process. But there are 
no after images which are not experienced. Perhaps he. might more 
plausibly jiave said that the having or experiencing of a sense experience 
is a brain process: but such an assertion would be neither! demonstration
nor proof and in any event involves a fallacy to which I shall presently
be drawing attention: the fallacy that we experience our experiences.$ * / , If)
As Malcolm says, ’Smart avoids the false only by incurring the meaningless
It seems clear, then, that Smart has reached a: position in which
his theory, as he has presented it, has collapsed into senselessness or
incoherence. What is more, he has not begun to show what makes the
ionic/voltage/field events special, and whether such events occurring
outside the brain would similarly be identical with mental events which
could then, presumably, be unrelated to any living person. Alternatively,
he would have to show within what parameters this identity operates, and
if this were pursued, I suspect the simplicity of the theory would vanish
and it might well finish up in some form of pan-psychism. As I shall, * " • ‘ ■ ' . » seek to demonstrate more fully presently, the basic fallacy in the psycho­
physical identity theory is that it seeks to telescope two different 
conceptual levels. •
There are, however, difficulties faced by all theories which deny , 
an active role to miqd, and regard physical events in the brain as 
providing a necessary and sufficient explanation of all human actions. 
These face not only psycho-physical identity theories:but also theories 
which see mind and brain operating in parallel without interacting, and 
epiphenomenalist theories which see brain as influencing mind but not vice 
versa. For all these theories the physical world.is closed to mental 
influences and they therefore provide no adequate account of consciousness
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the problem why, if there is consciousness,)it should have emerged and >
developed in the course of evolution. Indeed these theories face an even
. :'v’ ' K* 18more serious objection, for as Popper has noted, if our beliefs and our
logic are only by-products of physical events or are unrelated to them,
• 19standards of rational argument cannot apply to them. All such material­
ist and epiphenomenalist arguments, and indeed the theory of evolution,
itself, must then be equally illusory. Other grounds claimed to support
■ 20such materialist theories are not strong. * Ideas that the physical worl<
is causally self-contained, ought now to be dead and views that it could
be entirely explicable in terms of the basic laws of physics look
increasingly unrealistic. The whole pattern of evolution suggests that
21the world has always been inventive or creative. The unpredictable 
nature of the processes involved in the emergence of life and of its 
various forms have been stressed by Monod, as I shall show. At the higher 
levels, the various units that have emerged impose major constraints upon 
the dynamics of the constituent units of which they are composed, and 
despite many attempts to show that these higher-level units can be explaim 
in terms of physics, it seems quite clear that they have to be explained 
at their own levels. As Popper notes, for instance, stars can be looked 
on as undesigned machines for putting atoms and elementary particles 
under terrific pressure, and a computer works according to rules 
independent of the laws of physics and chemistry which apply to its parts. 
In other words, higher order patterns can emerge whose dynamic activity 
cannot be explained by, but in no way conflicts with, the laws or 
consistencies shown by the basic units of matter when taken on their own. 
Indeeds at the very roots of matter, there is the indeterminism of quantum 
physics and without this indeterminism, evolution to the complex and 
stable forms at higher levels would itself have been impossible. 
Indeterminism is basic also to the operation of the brain, for the 
operation pf the neuronal networks takes place at levels so minute that 
the uncertainties of the quantum state ijiust apply to them: and these 
uncertainties in turn leave room for mental influences to operate, as I 
shall show. In a later chapter I shall have to discuss the possible role 
within the quantum theory of consciousness and the will in influencing 
physical events. It can reasonably be claimed, however, that the idea of; 
a closed and deterministic physical world fails to meet the facts and that 
this allows full scope for the interaction of mental and physical events ;7  
on whatever basis. 444;-4 ;-- ‘ •’ ’ '• :4'V' ’ *••_
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Interactionist. philosophers themselves face serious problems,
however. If we are to treat mind and brain as separate, there are
problems, not only in understanding how precisely mental events influence
physical events and vice-versa, but also in deciding just where the bounds;• ■ ■ • .! • 
between them may lie. The more the brain is seen as a self-contained
system, the more passive must be the role of mind, yet the larger the role 
of mind, in, for instance, integrating the various activities of the brain 
which have themselves a strong integrative role, the more arbitrary must 
the division appear. These points can be well illustrated by the inter­
actionist philosophy put forward by Popper and Eccles in The Self and 
its Brain.
The idea of the mind influencing :the operation of the brain is
22discussed by Popper both m  The Self and its Brain and elsewhere.
He claims that the difficulties seen in the idea of such interaction are 
a problem only because of a hangover from the Cartesian distrust of the 
dissimilarity of the two substances of body and soul; and he expresses 
surprise that it should still be so regarded by contemporary philosophers 
of outstanding merit. 'Even if we were to presuppose the idea of 
ultimate explanation based on ultimate essentialist substances, evep then 
the dissimilarity of substances would not necessarily create an argument 
against the possibility of their interaction; but from the point of view
■ 93of conjectural explanation, this difficulty simply does not arise.’
This, however, is to treat the problem too lightly. We know that we can
will a book to come to our hands from nearby shelves and that we can will
rain clouds to blow away: but we know also that most of us achieve
nothing by doing so. I shall argue presently that the mind can exert
some such influence but that it is normally at,quantum levels, and, though
effective in the extremely sensitively poised brain, it is normally
ineffective against larger forces. Popper notes the argument that the
mind selects courses of action within the area of indeterminacy at
. 24-quantum level but says he does not like it. I do not find his alternat­
ive very clear. In Objective Knowledge he says that 'Consciousness ....
is, we may conjecture, produced by physical states; yet it controls thdm
25to a considerable extent. 1 In earlier editions of that book he 
claimed also, by regarding consciousness as a product of evolution from 
physical states, to have solved the classical Cartesian body-mind problem: 
but in a note added to the 1974 edition, he acknowledged that he had not
solved the problem of how such interaition takes place and suggested that
26
the problem was insoluble.' I shall hope to show that this is unduly
;Y ‘ 23
pessimistic, but apart from the problem of the actual mode of inter­
action, this dualism of mental and physical raises other problems. These 
become clearer when the division between body and mind proposed by Popper 
and Eccles is considered, Y, ; • V,Y- ..vYY:i;*Y’-Y
Eccles, in his section of the book, gives a clear and concise 
account of the working of the brain in the light of latest knowledge.
On the basis of recent work by Szentagothai, he shows that in both 
structure and function,.in all areas of the cerebral cortex, there are 
modules, each comprising up to 10,000 neurones of different types, which 
operate as units. There are perhaps one or two millions of these modules.
Eccles then shows with regard to visual perception, how, on the basis of 
7 8some 10 cones and 10 rods in the retina of the eye, the retinal picture 
is broken up into the independent responses oi: these myriad punctuate 
elements. The start of reconstitution of the picture takes place in the 
retina of the eye with the abstraction of the elements of the pattern 
and this continues in the many stages in the visual cortex. However, 
so far as the organisation and location of the synthesis into our 
ordinary visual field is concerned, Eccles claims that this remains 
mysterious and unknown. ; This therefore leads him to the view that such 
synthesis cannot take place in the brain, and is carried out in the self- 
conscious mind which reads out from, and interacts with, the multitude of 
modules in the highest levels of the brain, and so selects, according 
to attention and interest from moment to moment, integrating the result 
into the unity of our conscious experiences. On this basis, therefore, 
integrative activity takes place both in the brain and separately in the 
mind, the former at lower levels, the latter at higher levels. Yy
This view of the split of the integrative functions presents a 
number of difficulties. In particular, the boundary between the two 
levels of integration appears to have no clear rationale; and indeed, it 
is not obvious that any natural brealc-point can be found. YSo far as 
visual experiences are concerned, our visual field may be occupied at one 
time by, for instance, a modern work of art comprising a simple shape on a 
plain background: at aiiother time, we may be looking at some detailed
and changing scene such as a foofball stadium where a match is in progress 
The work of art may mean little to one observer— a lot to another. The 
football match may be a highly emotional and meaningful experience to one 
observer; a matter of indifference to others. These examples involve very 
different levels of complexity and significance. Yet presumably in all 
cases the final synthesis of visual fields, according to JSccles, lies in
the mind; the synthesis of the. elements of which it is composed lies
in the brain. So far as meaning is concerned, this is discussed by
• :* ■ y '' 97Popper and Eccles with special regard to ambiguous perspective figures.
Popper suggests that the learning of the interpretation of perspective
has become so well established that it has sunk from our psychology into
the physiology of the brain: and as regards the emotional colouring of
our sense experiences, Eccles notes that 'one can think of the pre-frontal
cortex as being the area where all the emotive information is synthesised
with somaesthetic, visual and auditory to give conscious experiences to
28 ' the subject.’ All this suggests that not only Is the division they
propose between brain and mind somewhat arbitrary but that even their own 
views are not fully consistent. ' ; - k  :
The dilemma that they face is, however, clear. The more functions 
that are attributed to mind, the more arbitrary/does the division appear. 
Yet, as they recognise,- the more functions that are attributed to brain, 
the more mind has to be seen as passive, and the more they are driven to 
a parallelist or epiphenomenalist position. Not only, however, do such 
positions go against all ordinary experience and our understanding of 
our ability to vary these experiences: they virtually rule out extra­
sensory processes for which, as I shall show, the evidence now is very 
strong. .• * _ ' ‘ ’
What this comes to, therefore, is that none of these explanations 
which have been put forward to explain the body-mind relationship appears 
fully adequate. Those interpretations which deny the existence of mind 
or deny it any influence on our behaviour fail to do justice to 
experience; the claim that there is complete identity of mental and 
physical, though ingenious, is demonstrably untrue; and dualism, while 
recognising the role of mind, fails adequately to recognise the apparent 
intimacy of the relationship, it fails adequately to explain the precise , 
nature of the relationship, and it fails also to justify the precise 
position of the interface between them. On the other hand, the 
reluctance of psychologists and neurophysiologists to admit any necessity 
for postulating the intervention of some kind of extraneous non-physical 
force appears on current knowledge to.be reasonable - though we still 
know too little about the operation of the brain to be sure. Yet the 
case for recognising the role of mind on our bodies equally seems too
strong to ignore. In other words, it seems that if mind intervenes 
in the functioning of the body, it must do so with a subtlety and 
intimacy that does not compromise the unity and integrity of the 
physical system of the Brain and nervous system: a demand which, if
we are to give mind and brain a completely different status seems 
impossible to satisfy. The question thus arises whether the 
assumption that mind and body have such separate and independent 
status can be true. As I want now to show, accounts by psychologists 
of how, as we.grow up from infancy, we come to develop our view of 
the world, cast light on this question and on much related discussion 
by philosophers. . . 7 . v ; ■ '// •
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THE NATURE OF THE lMLATIONSHtr
In recent years psychologists have cast much light upon the nature of 
the intellectual processes of the mind, and how they lead to its development 
from infancy. Piaget and his colleagues, working mainly in Geneva, have done 
particularly important work on this subject.. A clear distinction has, of 
course, to be dram between questions concerning the origin and development 
of concepts and their epistemological status, and it is with the latter that 
this study will be particularly concerned. Yet a brief sketch of the ways in 
which such concepts develop will show the significance of such studies for 
understanding the relationship of mind to the external world. As Piaget, shows 
learning involves neither simply registering information received through our 
senses from the world around us, nor imposing innate ideas on that information 
It involves a complex process of discriminating uniformities in our experience.; 
and building them up into concepts which provide, in effect, a model of the 
world based on these uniformities, in the light of which we interpret each 
new experience and, in particular, distinguish ourselves as subjects from the 
world around us. Some quotations from his work to illustrate this process • 
are needed despite the obscurity of his style.
Piaget starts a recent essay on the implications of his work for genetic
epistemology by posing a problem. 'Limiting oneself to classical statements
of the problem, one can only ask whether all cognitive information has its
source in objects, so that the subject is instructed by what is outside him,
as traditional empiricism assumed; or whether, on the contrary, the subject
possesses from the start endogenous structures which it imposes on objects,
\ 1as is maintained by varieties of 'a priorism' or innatism.: His answer is ele
'On the one hand, knowledge arises neither from a self conscious subject, nor
from objects already constituted (from the point of view of the subject) which
would impress themselves on him. .... Starting from the point of contact
between the body itself and external things, /"development takes place/7 bn
the two complementary directions given by the external and the internal, and
it is on this twofold progressive construction that any sound elaboration
pof subject and object depends,' As he says, 'Knowledge cannot be conceived 
as pre-determined either in the internal structures of the subject ~ they are 
due to o,n effective and continuous construction; or iii the pre-existing 
characteristics of objects, since they are known only, through the mediation 
of these structures and the latter enrich them (even if only by placing them
within a system of possibilities).2 Piaget is thus insistent that 'no .form 
of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge, constitutes a simple copy of 
reality ... As he shows, the mediating structures which eventually develoj
are concepts, the importance of whose role will have to be stressed at many 
points throughout this study. , •> ,
The process of learning about the world starts in the infant not with 
perception but with action. *It is not perception which plays a mediating
role, as the rationalists have too readily conceded to empiricism, but action
5.,itself with its much greater plasticity.1 ■ The importance.of the sense of
touch will thus be readily apparent. Piaget shows that the basic processes
involved have three important features: (i) the successive and progressive
discrimination of uniformities in the sense experiences; (2) the classificatioi
of these imiformities; (3) their integration £ at the higher levels into 
6 , . c o n c e p t s . - A n  example may help to make this clearer. A child looking at
the sky from his pram may see clouds and also smoke drifting across the sky.
In effect, he discriminates the subtle differences in their behaviour;
sub-consciously he classifies their differences and gradually he develops
concepts of clouds and of smoke having regard to these and many other
experiences, and taking account of their similarities and differences. In
the same way, though at a far more advanced level, a student of the brain,
faced with the baffling intricacy of the neurones and seeking to identify
their fibres and the networks that they form, has to trace them in the light
of various hypotheses which enable him to distinguish relevant from countless
irrelevant differences of form and behaviour. He has thus, in effect, to
discriminate relevant from countless irrelevant characteristics; he has to
classify them; and he has to build up concepts and hypotheses in the light of
which he can interpret what he sees before him. These discriminating and
conceptualising processes take place continuously in the life and development
of each person, having regard to new experiences and at progressively more
abstract and comprehensive ^Levels. ,
These processes are basic to the development of-the young’ child's ideas
about himself and about the world around him. Piaget notes that 'J M Baldwin
long ago demonstrated that the young child does not exhibit any consciousness
of self or of a fixed boundary between data given internally and those given
externally, k /'• \ - The inf ant relates everything to its body as if it were
the centre of the universe, but unconsciously, for all its actions are not as
yet coordinated nor are they consciously referred to the body as a whole'.-, 
Gradually, as the child becomes conscious of himself and of objects around 
him, he comes to see himself, not as the centre of all activity but as one 
object among others. ’Thus from the sensori-raotor level onwards there axe 
two aspects of the growing differentiation of subject and object, vis^ the 
formation of coordinations and the distinction within them of two kinds: 
on the one hand, those which relate to the actions of the subject, and on the' 
other, those which concern the actions of objects on each o t h e r , Y e t  this 
differentiation is at thiustage still related ‘bo action. .'In other words, 
the schemes of sensoii-motor intelligence are,not yet concepts, since they 
cannot be handled in thought and only come into play at the moment of their 
practical and material utilization.* ^ .
As conceptxialisation proceeds, the child’s concepts develop so as to 
cover all aspects of objects and events to which they relate and he no longer* 
has to keep relating his thoughts and actions to the concrete. By this stage
i
he has concepts sufficiently, developed to enable him to deal with hypotheses
instead of objects, in a, kind of second order operation, and to relate these
hypotheses to each other. 'It is the power of forming operations of operations
which enables knowledge to transcend reality, and by means of a combinatorial
system makes available to it an infinite range of possibilities, while
operations cease to be restricted, as are concrete operations, to step by
10step constructions.'. , In other words, 'It is at thin stage that operations
finally take on the extra.-temporal character which is the peculiar!■ by of
1 1 -pure logico-mathematical relationships.' w/’-?' /•
Gradually, therefore, the child develops a complex conceptual model 
of the world, including of himself as a person, which gives meaning to his 
experiences, including his experiences of other people, and enables him to 
respond appropriately, when necessary in terms of hypotheses and suitable 
experiments. The structure or model as a whole and its parts have a large 
measure of autonomy; the resources of the whole of the complex axe in principl 
available to give^geaning to each further experience yet the model is built- 
up from experience/ it always retains the character of a complex hypothesis 
or psxa&igmin that in principle it is always open to alteration in the light 
of further experiences. In practice, however, errors occur and the more 
deeply errors axising from the discrimination of inappropriate or false 
uniformities get embedded in the structure, the more resulting inconsistencies
of response can give rise to conflict and threaten the integrity of the
structure as a whole - a conflict which finds its expression in the problems
of neurosis. But in all cases, it is by a process of discrimination,
classification and conceptualisation from uniformities in our sense experience?
that the model develops and so the intellectual growth of the personality
takes place; and, more particularly, concepts relevant to the body-mind
relationship are developed. As I shall show more fully presently, from what
is common to our sense and other experiences we develop the concept of
conscioiisness which lies at the centre of our concept of minds from the
correlation of aspects of the content of our sense and other experiences we
develop the concept of the body; and these we bring together in the concept
of persons; and from wider consistencies in the content of our sense
experiences we develop our concepts of the external and physical worlds as well
aB more specific concepts such as space and time and causality. Such concepts
are then brought to bear as appropriate on each new experience and in the
light of such concepts we interpret each new experience - and, more specificall
r ' ■ Aexperiences of sight, sound, taste, smell and at an\early stage particularly
important, touch. . ■/- ' i :y'X
It is, therefore, from our sense and other experiences that we develop
our concepts of mind and of the external world and it follows that our sense
and other experiences cannot themselves be regarded as lying !in? the mind
or '.in* the external or physical worlds for these experiences must lie at a
more primitive, more basic, level than the concepts of either. What is more,.;
since our concepts of mind and of the external world''derive from our sense
and other experiences and can thus be regarded as lying at a higher conceptual
level than those experiences, the question must arise as to the sense in which
it is then legitimate to regard our sense experiences as deriving from and
as caused by events in the external and physical worlds. To this, it might,
of course, be said that? notwithstanding the evidence that we develop
our concepts of consciousness and mind and of the external and physical
worlds from our experiences and that these experiences are therefore more
basic, more primitive than these concepts, this ,is simply the way in which we
learn about the external and physical worlds which nonetheless exist quite
independently of our experiences and cause them. The idea of an independently
I
 existing physical world is accepted almost unquestioningly within our current 
Western paradigm and the fact that in some sense there is such a world.
, largely independent of and causing our experiences cannot, I think, be denied.
However, it is not so touch the existence of the external or physical .world 
as its status that proves to be of critical significance in this discussion,
‘ • ’ . CiSJfor if the external and physical worlds are of the same status^and cause, 
our experiences of them, then this is something that demands of us an act 
of faith for we can never prove or demonstrate IftS^existence behind our 
experiences: for the simple reason that we could seek to do so only by
yet more experiences. Such a world would, in fact, be a metaphysical entity.
It is, of course, open to.anyone to rely on such an act of faith but to do 
so in one case opens the door for other metaphysioal entities and most people 
today would probably agree, at any rate in principle, that recourse to any 
such metaphysical entities is very much a last resort. In practice, as I shall 
show,the problems presented by a separate metaphysical physical world haunt 
much modem philosophy, yet,,as I shall also seek to show, the difficulty 
can be fairly straightforwardly surmounted for, as Laplace said about the 
concept of God, I have no need of that hypothesis.
In the history of philosophy there have been many attempts to overcome 
S the dualism of physical and mental. As I have already noted, Spinoza saw 
the universe in terms of extension and ideas, both being aspects of God or 
nature. William James, in a sense foreshadowing Piaget, sought to overcome 
such dualism by regarding mind and matter as both deriving from ’pure 
experience1 which he defined as ’the immediate flux of life which furnishes
; • • •• • • 19the material of our later reflection with conceptual categories’.*7" And 
Bertrand Russell in his 'Analysis of Mind’ suggested that 'The stuff of which 
the world is composed is . ..„ neither mind nor matter, but something more 
primitive than either* *’*4 This more primitive stuff, he regarded as mainly 
sense data or sensibilia out of which he believed at that time the physical 
world could be constructed. The attempts, of James and Russell to reduce 
physical objects to appearances, actual or possible, amounted in practice to
forms of phenomenalism and it is on this' basis that Ayer, in a valuable study,
' 14.- ■' ■ • - • 7  ‘has considered James’s ’Neutral Monism*••Tlx, ‘ :
James’s account of the development of-the concept.of the physical world 
is very sketchy. James seeks to show that the differences between two 
experiences, one a subjective experience such as a hallucination and one a 
perception of an objective physical thing, does not lie in the quality of the 
experiences. Though the experiences themselves may have all the.same qualities,
each forms a part of a sequence of experiences and it is only because these 
sequences diverge that we can tell the differences between them. Yet, ad 
James notes, we call the fire ’hot' and water'wet1, but refuse these adjectives 
to our mental states when we. experience these objects. As James says, 
mental fire won't b u m  real sticks. He claims that it is on the basis of 
their consequences that our experiences get sifted and the stable parts and 
points that cohere with them are precipitated together to form the physical 
world./? As Ayer says, however, the 'strong' phenomenalist position which 
James would presumably have supported and which involves the claim that 
everything that can significantly be said about physical objects can in 
principle be translated into statements about actual or possible experiences, 
is not tenable: and Ayer refers to two of his own earlier works where he
- -  — -------- -5iV
showed this. /  One difficulty in the phenomenalist position is in accounting 
for physical objects continuing to exist unperceived for this involves 
relying 011 hypothetical statements to the effect that they would he observed 
if the observer were present: Ayer, himself, does not regard this as a
conclusive objection and other philosophers give rather different accounts 
of why the phenomenalist goal of providing detailed translations about physical 
objects fails: but there would be little dissent today that Ayer's conclusion
is correct. Some additional way to recognise the objectivity and continuity 
of the physical world in comparison with the subjectivity and intermittence 
of our experiences, has to be found if this double aspect account is to be 
maintained, ' , 7 7, •
Given James's account, Ayer's own solution is to treat the conception 
of the physical world as a theory with respect to our experiences - a view 
which he calls the 'weale' form of phenomenalism. He has, in fact, to abandon 
complete reliance on experience and inferences from it and to postulate an 
independent (but unverifiable) physical world which causes our experiences.
He is forced, therefore, to the conclusion 'that experiences, so far from 
being all that exist, have only a secondary title to existence, since it is. 
only through their association with living bodies that 'they gain the necessary 
foothold in an objective time order. Experiences are attributed to persons, 
or to other sentient beings: but not onlj? is it logically possible that
•y .7 ■' ■ ' ' v . v - v : 5the world should hot contain any sentient heinga, hut there its good empirical
evidence that it did not do* so at some time in the past and will no longer ‘
do so at some time in the future.’^ 7' He finds himself forced, therefore, to a
dualist position with the physical world having a dominant roles a position
which is characteristic of our current Western paradigm, ./
An apparent conflict of view thus emerges. On the one hand, all we
Imow of the world around us derives from our sense experiences, yet on the
other hand, our experiences have seemingly only a secondary title bo existence
for we know that our sense experiences are (dependent on a causal chain of
events from an apparently independent world around us of which we are parts.
In his book ’The Central Questions of Philosophy1, Ayer seeks to meet this
problem thus: ’What happens is that the theory that I have been calling
the main account of the world predominates over its origins. The objects to
which I have been referring as visuo-tactual continuants are cut loose from
their moorings, Once the theory of the physical world has been developed,
.... we are entitled to let it take command, in the sense that,it determines '
what there is. The fact that in doing so it downgrades its starting-point,
in much the same way as a self-made man repudiates his humble origins, is not
10a logical objection to tlia procedure, Clearly, however, even if a self- 
made man repudiates his humble origins, in the sense of refusing to acknowledge 
them, he still cannot alter these origins: ‘ on the face of it we cannot 
validly deny that all we know Of the physical world derives from our sense 
experiences yet we have to accept that all our sense experiences derive from 
the world around us: both are seemingly equally true and! thore;f: ought to be
some distinction which would allow us to recognise that both are valid.
The way out of this apparent conflict is to be found in my earlier 
discussion of the views of Piaget. As he has shown, we develop our concepts 
of the external world as a whole and of its various parts and aspects from 
uniformities in the content of our sense experiences. These concepts form 
a model of the world which thus lies at a higher conceptual level than the 
experiences from which it derives. What is more, this conceptual model has 
a substantial measure of autonomy from those experiences. TOius if we take the 
concept of a tree, it forms part of an. ordered complex of concepts covering 
a whole range of parts and features of trees, a whole/range of uses,of trees . 
and a whole range of associated ideas. , Each individual experience of seeing 
a tree or something related to a tree brings this complex of concepts into 
play and makes the experience meaningful*. The experiences may be .intermittent 
and may change in' form end character and detail but the concepts provide
for them a meaningful continuity. Whatsis more, such complexes have concepts 
at many levels of generality/and distinguish an enormous range of aspects 
of our experiences. Concepts are therefore of quite a different character 
and lie at a different level from sense experiences as such: and they bring
to each individual experience a significance and meaning accumulated from 
avast range of earlier experiences... YY/
We can apply this account not only to our individual sense experiences 
of objects and events around us but also to the processes which we know to be 
entailed when we see sitoh objects. When I see a tree, I see it as a trees 
that experience as such carries no information about 'the causal chain of 
events entailed in seeing the tree. These events constitute a chain running 
from the sun to the surface of the tree, to ray eye and so to the higher 
levels of my brain. Quite other observations by many people involving the 
behaviour of light, the responsiveness of the cells of the retina ox* my eye, 
observations of the sun, of electro-magnetic rays, of animals and people, 
living and dead, from the point of view of many different scientific 
disciplines, all these had to be made and integrated into a complex conceptual 
j model or picture before an adequate account of that causal chain could be 
j brought to bear on my simple experience of seeing the tree. ! If we regard 
my seeing the tree as a 'direct1 experience so are each scientist's 
observations of each aspect of the causal chain. But when 1 see the tree, I 
cannot see the causal chain and if I could I would see those events and not f 
the tree. Thus if I claim that my seeing the tree is 'indirect', I am bringin 
to bear on the processes invplvedin my seeing the tree the highly conceptual­
ised evidence derived from a host of other 'direct1 experiences.. There is no 
more conflict nor is there need to choose between the two accounts than there 
is if I watch the news on television and then take the back off the set and f 
peer inside it, \ * " „ • 7 ■ Y ■/., Y7 ,■ V  .7, .7
It is this higher-level conceptualising process which allows us to 
bring together the evidence from a vast range of experiences and.to bring it 
to bear on the processes involved in having such experiences. The whole 
process involves not only the sense experiences but a higher-level interpret­
ation of them. Both the experiences with their, own-specific meanings and 
the interpretation of the processes entailed in having the experiences are 
valid at their own levels: .they are direct and indirect. More generally, 
we experience directly the external and physical worlds when, for instance, 
we see a tree but our interpretation of it as . a. tree involves cur bringing 
. to bear on the experience such parts as are relevant of the higher-level
conceptual model of the external and physical worlds which has been established 
from a whole range of earlier experiences and which;substantial autonomy 
from individual experiences.. Both the experience:;.-and the model are valid, 
each at its own level. ^As I shall show at many points throughout this study, 
however, the model itself comprises many conceptual levels. Thus sometimes 
we wish to distinguish the external from the physical; world or world of science 
Whereas Popper, for instance, simply makes the distinction between what he 
terms World I which is the world of physical entities and World II which is 
the world of mental states, (he also distinguishes World III but I shall note 
this later), Quinton speaks of ’the apparent conflict between the account
of the physical world provided by science, which excluded secondary qualities,
; 19and what we ordinarily take our senses to tell us about the physical world,1 -
Whether we make distinctions between the external and physical worlds depends
on whether we are thinking of the physical world in purely .formal terms,
There|.s, however, no conflict if we keep the different levels clean for the
concept of the physical world derives from, arid is one aspect of, the concept
ef- tho-oeneept of the external world which in turn derives from consistencies
in the content of our sense experiences. It is because the concept of the
physical world derives from and is at a, higher level than the concept of the
external world and because the concept of the external world is at a higher
level than the content of our sense experiences, that, as I have already said,
we .cannot then postulate that the physical or external worlds exist independ- :
ently of our sense experiences and, as it were, lie behind them,at the same
conceptual level. . ' 4. - v *.•7 4 4 ‘ 4 4‘7 . •** - •
But this account of the external and physical worlds deriving from our
sense experiences is clearly pot the whole answer for, as Ayer has shown with
reference to James’s account, the phenomenalist view is incomplete in that
we cannot derive from our sense experiences alone an adequate account of
the external and physical worlds. J~Ayer’s solution is to distinguish our
sense experiences and the physical world, to treat them as at the same
conceptual level and to give priority to the physical world, thus regarding
our sense experiences as deriving fxx>m it and as secondary. Widely endorsed
| as such a step may be, there are, I believe, fatal objections to this step.
It can neither be verified nor falsified; the very concept of the physical
world is an abstraction and conceptualisation from our sense experiences, for
* it will be recalled from the carefully researched work of Piaget that the
concepts of the physical world and mind are derived from different aspects
of our sense experiences5 which are themselves in neither.) ?' Our sense /// /y-. 7  . 
experiences are both conscious or self-intimating and change in contentV"V .' • 
independently of our volitions, that content organising itself in three 
dimensions. Given, therefore,' that our sense experiences have both mental 
and physical aspects, there is no objective ground for splitting and 
separating their self-intimating aspects from-their objective aspects - both 
occur together at one and the same time in. our experiences and at different 
times we can concentrate on different aspects: which is why we can
concentrate on the experience of seeing the tree or on the processes entailed 
in bringing the experience about without there being any conflict. V
As I have noted, the external world has as one of its aspects the 7
physical world of science., But the external 'world is not a world of movement 
without colour, warmth or sound: that view derives from the splitting of
the sensuous and measurable qualities of our experiences and their allocation 
to the concepts of the mind and of the world around us. What is more, we 
are ourselves parts of the physical-.; and external worlds about us. We need, 
therefore, a concept which embraces and keeps together all aspects of this 
objective, evolving, dynamic end sensuous world of which we ourselves are 
parts and which in us is self-intimating. In other words, we need an , VJ
underlying concept of this wider, objec?ive/of: which we are parts. f;
That we are parts of this objective world is obvious J3nm the complex
conceptual model of it whioh we have developed:', that it is a.world of: . on .- ■< - - a . .primary and secondary qualities 7 is equally the everyday,, commonsense
interpretation. Our ordinary language makes this clear: it is the trees
which are green, the sea blue, the water hot,not our experiences of them. , . 1
The attempt'to explain that the physical tree, ’out there’ is colourless and 1
that i/ts greenness is in our minds is a dualist interpretation - and a false
one. It is from our sense experiences that we develop our higher level
concepts on the one hand of consciousness and mind, and 011 the other of the
external and physical worlds: and in the process of exploring the external
and physical worlds, we learn that we as persons, including our bodies and
our minds, are parts or aspects of a sensory/physical world which in us is
self-intimating. This sensory/physical worldof which we are parts has thus
to be conceptualised as lying at a more basic level than each of us as ,;
individuals for we are parts and manifestations' of it. /  . -l'~ " • '
■;ih;  -:>:'a7 7  visfe*X  ^  7 5 ^ 7 - v,^ :5,
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'- . In broad termsf-'bheyeffom, and despite/fri©/repetition involved'*/X - X : ■" 
may at this point be helpful; to bring togethei" ©aid'distinguish several 
important but overlapping -terms which I shall need to use at various 
points throughout this study, V The external world is synonymous with the 
world around us of which we ourselves are parts,.^.it comprises the objects 
and events that we see and hear and touch withtheir shapes, movements, 
colours, warmth and so on: but it includes also objects and events which, ,
we know of only indirectly such as atoms, the core of the earth and many 
features of our brains,- As so regarded, the external world is broadly - 
synonymous with the objective world, / 7 . 7  • .
The physical world, as I have noted, is sometimes regarded as the 
same as the external world, ^Sometimes* however*/the two terms are .7 7 -., 7 
distinguished:. a distinction which I observe in this study, j When the 
distinction is mad© the term the physical world refers* as I have said, 
to the formal, behavioural aspects of the external world such as their .. 
shape and movement but it excludes their sensuous aspects such as colour.
It is, therefore* never separately experienced but is the formal aspect 
of our experiences together with the objects and events of,- the external 
world which, though not directly observable* are inferred from 4hese aspects? 
objects and events such, as 1 have noted, as atoms and the core of the , . 
earth. . : '7-7 • ^'.7./;7'777 7" * " v i . / .
,7 The sensory world is the world as experienced by our senses and as 
interpreted in the light of experience. It thus, strictly excludes those 
aspects of the external world which we know only by inference: but, in so far
as such objects and events come within the range of our observation as 
scientific techniques improve, so the sensory world expands to embrace 
more and more of the external world and it is an implication of the argument 
presented .in this study that probably all. physical events, except perhaps 
at quantum level,must, in some extended sense, have sensory aspects. The 
sensory world has, of course* bdth primary and secondary qualities. In an 
effort to get away from the dualist idea of a physical world ’lying behind’ 
and causing our sense experiences, and to emphasise that there.is a physical 
aspect of our sense experiences and a sense aspect of physical events in so far 
as they are observable, I have had recourse, to the term the sensory/physleal 
world. By implication I am thereby seeking to deny the otheri half, of the 
dualist assumption that our sense experiences are ’in* the mind, an assumption 
that is deeply embedded in our thinking, and which is peculiarly difficult 
for us to eradicate even when its fallacious characte^ is recognised, ,
’■QV
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v This ’is. 'an interpretation of the wor4ld and of our place in it at tjiree 
main conceptual levels: Y(l)Ya sensory/physical world of which we are parts 
•;7j 7 b  and which in us is self-intimating; s (2) our own direct self-intimating sense
experiences with their subjective and dbjectiye characteristics; and (3) our 
higher level concepts of consciousness and mind and of the external and 
physical worlds, including our bodies, which we britig ip bear on our experience 
Yet even this interpretation is incomplete for, as I have noted, the higher 
level interpretation of the content of our sense'experiences makes clear that 
these 'direct* experiences must, from the higher level,^be seen to be 
'indirect': that all our knowledge of the.world around us is selected and
mediated by our sense mechanisms. These mechanisms bring together in one 
place selec tive information from our surroundings and interpret and render 
it meaningful;in the light of our past experiences: in us these sense
mechanisms provide the data for a conceptual model which we bring to bear on 
our experiences - providing. in us a microcosm of the macrocosm of which we 
■ each are parts. Y ", . YW* 7/ y/ y Y ^ Y Y Y Y } . /  .7“'
The empiricists attempted to basettheir entire interpretation of the 
external world on our experiences and to derive from these experiences a 
separate physical world - and failed; the mechanists and materialists 
postulated that separate physical world and, tried to.derive our self-intimating1 sense experiences from it - and failed; both ware crippled by a, failure to distinguish and keep separate the different conceptual levels ontailed*Once these are recognised, w© oan start with our experiences, as did the 
empiricists and we can recognise the external and physical worlds as aspects 
of the sensory/physical world, of which we are self-intimating parts.' But 
though we conceptualise and articulate our. picture of the world by \7 Y ' . % 
fc distinguishing these three main levels, weVpan see; that ontologically, there 
I is but one sensory/physical world of which,we, are parts, over which we exercise 
* some limited control and which in us is self-intimating. .Conceptually we 
need to keep these levels unconfused, but each concept - whether of the 
external or physical worlds or of consciousness or mind, can be seen to be a 
Y':*Y , concep;hof a different, feature y of the evolving sensory/physical world of
7 'r> Y, *•' which we ourselves are features.'’Y; 77/'‘/kv;.//£• Yk-’Y^ y/YYhyY, 7y.‘ Y
■YY, , , / ‘^  I have sought to show, therefore,'"the distinguishing of conceptual
YY .. Y levels enables us to break through the seemingly/insbluble problems centering Y
on the body-mind relationship which have dogged philosophy for at least, the '{■
; -.Y. • four hundred years and which have derived from misconceptions in our
; Western paradigm. Modem philosophy has, however, had much 1:0 saY on many *7.
YYY?, i Y \ aspects of this problem, notwithstanding that it has^ not solved it, and I need
vY.Y'r^ .-/Y\v, >, 7Ar.' *>* < 'r '
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now to relate some of what has been said in reoent years to the argument- which.
I am putting for this will amplify and, X hope,;;clarify a number of issues;
7  As I shall show, a dualist view pervades the w>rk of modem philosophers 
on the body-mind and related issues, even when they are seeking to overcome 
the problems which it raises by denying that dualism. .For the dualist, the t 
complement of an independent external or physical world lies in the sense 
experiences as such - the sense data or sensibilia, the sense experiences less 
their meaning. The case for such sense data has been argued at length by
such distinguished philosophers as, for instance, Moored, Pritchard“£, Price-.?? .■ o • . . •v':’ 7 .> ' .and Ayer ,7 .14, It was; however, powerfully attacked by J L Austin in his
posthumous book ’Sense and Sens ib ilia’. Austin described their claims as a . • 
tangle of sophistry and illusion. As he noted, there are circumstances whereS  
we say that we have not perceived something ’directly’ as when w© saw it 
through a periscope or mirror#Wj&Z*. But these are very exceptional cases 
whereas those philosophers who support sense data’ claim that we. never see 
objects and events in the world around us ’directly’. / As to what this usage 
was meant to establish, Austin professed himself unclear, but having,under­
taken a detailed examination of the arguments,'he concluded that they proved 
nothing of significance. Disposing of the matter, he claimed, was a matter of*, 
’unpicking, one by one, a mass of seductive; (mainly verbal) fallacies, of :///§ 
exposing a wide variety of concealed m o t i v e s . - A s  a result of this 
attack, the idea of sense data has fallen into'some disrepute, yet the dualist 
account has not lost its hold for Austin did not apply himself to the under­
lying problem of the status of the external and physical worlds and passed 
it off too lightly. Rightly, he noted that ’these two terms, "sense data” and 
"material things", live by taking in each other’s washing - what is .spurious: 
is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. 1 : But he failed 'to /’v/ 
recognise the character of the false dualist, assumptions that underlay the 
need for the antithesis. As. for the argument from; illusion which provided 
much of the support for dualism, the distinction between physical objects 
’as they really are’ and their appearances does not require *a, dualist / w / 
explanations we build up concepts from constancies in'.our sense experiences7-: 
and we explain illusions in terms of departures from those constancies and in 
terms of exceptional combinations of those constancies; the bending of a 
stick in water •-in .terms of its normal appearance and the behaviour of light ra$r
- .
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'As I have said, however, it is not only from uniformities in the Content 
of our sense experiences that higher level concepts are derived.; Our sense 
experiences share one basic common feature: '4theyare self-intimating and in 
that Sense, conscious. Again, an tm6.erstand.lng of the processes of discrimin­
ation and conceptualisation allows us to clarify this aspect. And when our 
awareness of this self-intimating, conscious aspect is combined with wha.t is 
common to our experiences of. conscious animals and people, we establish 
the concept of consciousness. This then becomes the central feature of the 
concept of mind which is, of-course, a wider,'higher level- concepts and 
mind, in turn, becomes a central feature of the concept of persons which is 7  
a still wider, higher level concept embracing behaviour and the body. All 
of these three concepts have been the subject of much discussion and dispute 
and it may be helpful first to turn to the views of Strawson on persons.^
Strawson claims that ’the concept of the pure individual consciousness -
the pure ego - i s  a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, cannot exist as 
a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained 
or analyzed. It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive
. * - • . V  ■’ v ' ’ 7  . pfconcept, which is itself to be explained in terms of the concept of a person.1"' 
In his view, ’The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an
individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be. analyzed as
\ 29 ■ ' tthat of an animated body or of an embodied anima. *4 7^  in other words, /for
Strawson the concept of .a person is ’logically primitive’ and pure conscious­
ness has to be explained in terms of the concept of the person and not vice 
versa,.. . ■' "7. 7  '' 4 r ’v 4 ' r77,v.’44u/ ..44';,4-- ‘■ "r'7:.\-7;4 vV-
From the point of view of genetic epistemology, all our concepts '"5 •. 7  
including our concepts of consciousness and minds and persons are the outcome, 
of years of discrimination and integration. As I have suggested, our concept 
of consciousness derives both from our ovm experiences and from our experiences 
of other persons. At a very early stage, the infant distinguishes and 
recognises its mother though any full concept, of the mother as a mother or as : 
a person are formed at later stages and, no doubt, the relatively abstract , 
conpepts of consciousness and mind are formed later still. In terms of my 
present argument, however, the concepts, of consciousness, mind and persons 
all derive from our sense and other experiences including our experiences of 
persons. In whatever order they develop, the concept of consciousness proves 
to be central to the concept of mind and the concepts of consciousness and 
mind prove to be central to the concept of persons. The concept of persons .iS 
thus at a higher, more all-embracing level thatv the concept of mind and the »< 
concept of mind is at a higher level than the concept of , consciousness. So ' v
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if we have an adequate undore‘banding of4,what is entailed in the concept*of , '•;
persons we cani in large mesiSure explain the/concept of mind} and if we have
an adequate understanding of; what is entailed vin the concept of mind, We can
in large measure explain consciousness: /but hot vicre versa: and this
appears to have been the main point that Strawson sought to show.
;• /’ As regards the concept of consciousness, many accounts of/it have been
put forward, particularly in recent years. Broadly,' most accounts of
consciousness put their emphasis either on third person or on first person
accounts. Logical behaviourism provides a third person account and naturally,
it is strongest in explaining such behavioural attributes and characteristies
as skills, capacities and habits. It is, howeirep, less than adequate for
describing sensations,/thoughts or memories.- /- Carnap at one time held these
views and put the position clearly: ’All sentences of psychology describe
physical occurrences, namely the physical behaviohrlof humans and other
animals. ’^ 9, And B P Slcinner,;. the behaviourist psychologist, suggested that
the sentence *1 was on 'the point of going homo’[.might bo regarded as tho
equivalent of ’I observed events in myself which characteristically preoode
or aocompany my going home. ’f/;74DBpliod in .‘this theory was the idea that I
observe my own behaviour and. from this infer my states of mind in; the, same
f way as I observe the behaviour of other* people’and from this X infer their
states of, mindyf^l. This account; is. however* not true. We do not ?look in’
on our own behaviour: / it is* as it were, self-intimating. There is no
duality involved here.// As Wittgenstein .says ’But do I also say in my own
case that I am saying something to myself, because I am behaving in such and
, such a way?/- I do not say it from observation of my behaviour. But it only
makes sense because I do behave this .way. And when I observe?someone/ -;
else ’ s behaviour I don * t normally observe and then say to myself s j ’ I think '
that inside they are nervous’: , I don’t/talk to,myself about it: /\I see their
.behaviour as nervous or excited or amused. ’It pomes to this, only of a
living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one
, say: it has. sensations} it sees; is blind} hears; is deaf; is conscious or
unconscious. In other, words, in Order to 'understand my feelings 03?
those of anyone else, I need to have developed the /relevant concents /and then
I can not only understand but,, provided they too .have developed the relevant
concepts and language, I can talk to other people about them.' Such concepts
are built up not only from ray observations/of-other',people but from my own
experiences. Such concepts, being at a, higher level, and being built from
imiformitj.es which we all find in our e3q?eriencies and so share, ooxx^thiuY 
bridge both aspects. The behavourist, by, concentrating 011 third person aspects 
like supporters of the first person accounts, fails to give a proper role 
to concepts and, in particular to these higher level, bridging aspects. '*■ ,
; - This failure to give an adequate place to concepts emerges clearly from
these first person accounts which regard behaviour aa a manifestation ,*of 
inner states.;-These accounts stress that at least some sensation words must 
be learned by ostensive definition - by the use-of examples. But once weight 
is put on such 'private* or ,* inner* experiences, the problem of.'other minds' , 
arises: how anyone knows that what he is experiencing is being experienced ;■ 
by other people. If 'in pain* means something felt by me, how does that 
help me to take the step of talking about someone:else *s pain not felt by me?
This has been a particularly serious problem for philosophers in the 
empiricist tradition. Thus Locke claimed that 'Words, in the ip primary or 
immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him 
that uses them ...... nor can anyone apply'them as marks, immediately, to
anything else but the ideas that he himself hath. Words standing for 
complex ideas were definable only in terms that stood for simple ones and * • ‘ 
these were indefinable, so 'the only sure way of making the signification of 7 
the name of any simple idea, is by -presenting to his senses that subject 
which may -produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea that s' 
the word stands. for. *1^7- \ > ' ./ Ea '7 /Y'VH-v- YY.Nl aY'
• - These are basically the views of the adversary of Wittgenstein in the 
'Philosophical Investigations' where Wittgenstein himself seeks to show that 
such a language .is neither teachable nor intelligible to others. As with 
the behaviourist' s account, neither that of Locke nor the adversary puts 
adequate ^ on the need to build end possess higher level concepts. As .. . 
Wittgenstein said: '.Do not believe that you have the concept of colour r -
within you because you look at a coloured object - however you look. (Any more 
than you possess the concept of a negative number by having debts. )7?X And 
he gives the telling example: *It is as if I were, told:<> "Here is a chair.
Can yovi see it clearly? - Good - Now translate it into French11,11^8^. 'In 
order to doubt whether another person is in pain, what we need is not a 
pain but the concent pain.'7 ^ / 3  ..Thus if we lacked 1 either experience of pain 
or of other people's behaviour when in pain, the'concept would in either 
event be inadequate. The full understanding of the development and role of .
such concepts thus provides a key to understanding how the oxporioncos 6f, 
each of us can he prj.vate yet understood by everyone else# Each private 
experience is always interpreted in a largely common conceptual context: 
once a concept has been acquired, however, the relevant experienflija and their 
interpretation are one and inseparable: when X see a tree, I see it as a
tree# As Wittgenstein said: ’You learned the concept "pain" when you learned
language# ■' 7 •/ ’ //.-/Ok , . -A/.. ;
' Also relevant to the role of concepts is the question whether conscious- 
ness is always the consoiousness of something# This was the claim of 
Brontano and the Phenomonologioto and has boon much disputed under.tho titJo 
of tho thesis of intontionality# 'Wio rolovonoo of concepts and, in particular, 
of distinguishing levels of concepts is brought out by considering a 
discussion of consciousness by Quinton#'^/ Quinton distinguishes what he 
terms the active sense of consciousness (in the sense that when I am awake 
I am conscious and when I ara asleep I am unoonsoious) from the passive sense 
of consciousness which he applies to what we are oonsciouar qf , ; as when w© say 
.purhopes are conscious. He notes that all minds are obviously subjects of 
consciousness and he suggests that in some sense or other anything can be 
an object of consciousness: mental events, physical events or abstract
entities. He considers, however, that the type of consciousness whose objects 
are mental requires some kind of qualification and claims that this is 
provided in general terms by Descartes, when he says "by the word thought#
X understand all that whioh takes place in ua that we are immediately conscious 
of it.n The mental, that is to say, is the object not of consciousness in 
general, but of immediate c o n s c i o u s n e s s # ■ ■'
There are several different difficulties in this brief,account. First, 
Descartes himself amplified the passage quoted by Quintdn: ' fI added 
"immediately" for the purpose of excluding the consequences of our thoughts; 
for example voluntary movement which though indeed depending on thought .... 
is not itself thought.1 - which bears not at all on the use which Quinton
seeks to make of it. Quinton distinguishes first the ’active’ sense of 
conscious (where the distinction is between the state of consciousness and of 
unconsciousness), from the passive sense of consciousness as when we say 
his hopes were conscious. He goes on to discuss people a,s subjects of 
consciousness and physical and mental events as objects of consciousness. 
Quinton tries to distinguish between consciousness of physical events and 
consciousness of mental events by distinguishing immediate consciousness from
from consciousness in general,. end by claiming that mental ©vents ar©; object a 
of immediate consciousness, presumably with the implication that physical 
events are objects of consciousness in general. .1 am not clear what state 
of consciousness is not immediate or.that consciousness in general is in itself 
distinguishable. This does hot seem an adequate distinction. The position 
clarifies itself, however, if we again distj.nguish conceptual levels..;! can 
speak of: (1) specifically,5 seeing a tree;1 or (2) more generally having 
sense experiences, or, what is broadly synonymous, being conscious of physical 
objects (including the tree); or (3) being conscious of sense experiences or 
memories or pain; or (4) iib its most general form, being conscious (as 
distinct from unconscious) -and, implicitly, being conscious of any of these. 
.And, of course, the concept of *1’ as a person is a concept at a higher level 
still embracing all such experiences. The higher levels embrace the lower 
levels and the level I7  use depends not only on myloiowle&ge but also on 
what is appropriate for that context. If when I recover from an anaesthetic,
I. am conscious of the clatter of teacups and of en.acute headache, the person 
reporting on my condition may report on my headache but rapy simply Want to 
report that I have come round® It will be apparent, therefore, that my 
concepts of. being conscious of physical objects lie at a different i mad more 
specific level than my concepts of being conscious of mental events such, as 
sense experiences or pain. This distinction-of conceptual-levels appears 
more apt'than Quinton’s attempt to distinguish immediate from general consoious 
ness, and, as I shall show, this distinction of levels is- also relevant in 
explaining why body and mind are not a pair. More specifically, it casts f.i&i . 
further light on why such sentences as YE am conscious of the tree’ do not 
.imply a dualism: for ’I’ end ’consciousness’ are both,concepts at a higher
level embracing, as it were,', the concepT'oTpne tree; v which .is, : of course, 
in line with the ideas of James and Russell and Piaget that oiir concepts . 
of the physical world are built up from?our,sense, experiences, \:: .
The idea that we are conscious, not only of' physical ob jects but of 
mental events has & however, had many distinguished supporters in the history 
Of philosophy, and because they, too, have not-thought, in:terms of the 
relationship being of conceptual levels, a ’misleading form of dualism has^ 7  
■been introduced into their. discussion. ;/.,iWe .can' see ibis at Various v Stages , 
by a series of quotations. .Quinton’s quotation from;'Descartes; indicates 
that we are conscious of our thoughts. This, Of itself , -is. harmless but '
Locke takes this further when be speaks of ’perception, thinking, doubting, 
believing,, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all. the different actings of'V* 
our ■ own minds; - which we being conscious of, and' observing '.in/aui?selves
do’ from these receive into our miderstanding as distinct ideas# . V ’.y 77 ■ 
Likewise, J S Mill assumes that in the process of understanding other miiids, v» 
we start out by observing the correlation between our own states of mind and 
body; 43**'and Hume thinks in even more misleading terms of an introspective . 
process when he says 'Now, since nothing is ever present to the mind but 
perception, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently 
present to the mind; . it follows that it is impossible for us t'b so much as 
to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and 
impressions* * Tn other words, according to Hume, we do not'remember
past events but only our perceptions of past events. If, however, I say I 
remember something that happened when I was a child, this in itself implies 
that I remember my view of it, whether formed, at first or second hand. To 
say 'I remember my view of it* interposes my perception between me and the 
event and makes me an observer of my own experience. Of course, when I 
remember an event I do not see/the event itself. But the fact that 1 do not 
see the event itself is implied by the word 'remember*. If we then insert 
the idea that we remember not objects but perceptions, we are, as it were, 
doubling the assurances that we axe not seeing the event itself, and inserting 
an extra stage in our mental processes - promoted, no doubt, by a mistaken 
idea of the relevance of the:causal chain of events involved in perception.
As Malcolm says, 'This desperate resort to an unspecifiable event evidences 
the strong grip of a metaphysical idea that when, at a particular time, a 
person remembers some’thing, the remembering is an occurrence in him at that 
time. This way of thinking results in a host of unansvrerable questions, (
What is more, it has, I believe, been a significant factor in encouraging an •
all-pervasive dualism into our view of the w o r l d . '/ . 7
The key to all these philosophical riddles and confusions concerning 
consciousness and concerning also private languages and other minds lies In 
the fact that words crystallise concepts and we build concepts, as I have 
shown, at many levels on the basis of consistencies in our experiences 
including the consistencies in our experiences of our own actions and 
behaviour and of the behaviour of other people. 7 The experiences themselves 
are conscious and have content. They have subjective and objective aspects. , 
The ideas of mental and physical are developed from tbese two different "‘* 7 -.y7 
aspects of our sense and other experiences at; two different levels. r
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My consciousness'of an object is a unitary events the conscious, sel£4./:;t 
intimating aspect gains its significance from,the fact that it is mine and 
its content is given meaning hy the bringing to it of the concept of the ’ 
object. As William James said: J 'Experience, I believe," has no such inner 
duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, 
not by way of subtraction,but by wayvof addition. In other words,' in terms 
I have used before, when we are conscious of something, that of which we are 
conscious is, in us, self-intimating. We can view such an experience from 
the point of view of the person who is conscious or of that which he is 
conscious of, but the experience itself is unitary. Clearly, too, conscious­
ness is not an entity or object. William James sought to show that conscious- '1 
ness is a function rather than a thing to be set alongside. or between other 
things. As he says: * I; mean only to deny that the word /~corisciousness/7 
stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand 
for a function. There is, I mean,\ no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, 
contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which ofir 
thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which . 
thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being 
is invoked. That function is knowing. '!?* It follows from this view that 
consciousness is a unitary function. is from different aspects of our 
sense and other experiences that we build up our concepts of the mind and of 
the external worlds IJhq^-these sense experiences;in particular and. consciousness 
in general cannot occur in the mind, nor, Indeed, can physical events occur 
in the physical world in any sense that attributes to the mind and the physical 
or external worlds the properties of separate containers. Yet the assumption 
that there are mental events and physical events which live their separate 
lives in their separate containers is very widespread and lurks even in 
Quinton's quotation from Descartes where he f^peaks of that which 'takes pla.ce 
in US*. /  •• ‘ • • ; ; - \t ;‘v, * ..'f.
Ryle attacks this dualism of body .and mind at the start of 'The Concept 
of Mind'. 'The official doctrine, which, hails chiefly from Descartes, is \ 
something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in ; 
arms every human being has both a-body and a mind./V.... Human bodies are 
in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which/govern all other bodies 
in space. Bodily processes and states can.be inspected by external observers. 
.... But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanica." 
laws. ; The- working of ope. mind is not witnessable by other observers, .7../;/
A person therefore lives through two collateral histories, one consisting oft* I 
what happens in and to his body, A  fie other consisting of what happens in and. 7/
V .. - V *. •"• •■•' ‘■■■•"is-
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the first history,are events!in.^he physicaleWorld, those in tho second are
events in the mental world./,/.. . . -It is; customary; to express -'this bifurcation
'of his two liveB and his two worlds by saying that the. things and events which
belong to the physical xTOrld, including his own body, are external while the
workings of his own mind are internal. This ^ antithesis of outer and inner is,
of course, meant to be construed as a ’metaphor/;siriqe-minds, not being in
space, could not be described as inside anything else, or as having things
going on spatially inside .themselves. 7, '7 ,:-. ' ,: v •'
-.Ryle seeks"to show further that this is a oats^ory mistake analogous to
the mistake of a foreigner who, having! seen. the Colleges, Library, etc. asks
to see the University. This analogy involving a confusion of conceptual
levels has been very widely quoted. Nonetheless* Ryleb account is not itself*:
quite clear though his criticisms are valid. ¥0 can quite legitimately speak
of minds which have as their central feature consciousness, and, in particular,
the conscious, self-intimating aspect of our:sense1 experiences. .. We can
equally legitimately speak of brains, bodies* and so on, which again are
conceptual/ised from aspects of our sense experiences. But the aspects are of
quite a different character and to treat; them as a pair can be seriously
misleading. Again we are dealing with conceptual levels. As I have already
noted, consciousness is a concept embracing more experiences than sense
experiences and we distinguish sense experiences as a class from the contents
of sense experiences. Consciousness, sense experiences, and the content of
these experiences are thus themselves at different conceptual levels. The
concept of mind which has at its heart the concept of consciousness in its
various forms is thus developed hot only from a different aspect but from
different conceptual levels from the concepts of the external or physical
worlds which are developed from the content of these sense experiences.
It is, of course, often said that objects and events around us ’cause’ 
our sense experiences, and this can imply, that/they are at. the same conceptual 
level. Such statements are, Vhowever, imprecise <for what suoh objects and 
events do is ’cause* changes in the content of our sense experiences. They 
do not in any intelligible sense cause our sense experiences as such. These 
sense experiences form the starting point and from different aspects of their 
changing content we build up our concepts of the external world and its parts 
including of the causal chain which itself brings about changes in the content 
of our sense experiences. One feature of the content of our sense experiences 
interacts with and causes other such features in the changing content of our 
sense experiences. Once, therefore, we discard in this context the idea of 
a wholly separate external world existing independently of our sense experience 
we can think of the external world in the terms, of a concept derived from an
■' A '/© v
of the relationship of a library of the tJhiveraity:. to speak of the external 
world and of our sense experiences can thus involve a similar confusion to 
speaking of the Library, playing fields, etc, and the University, Both 
involve confusions of conceptual level. To the confusions, therefore, of 
thinking ourselves to be conscious of our own experiences and to the confusion 
of thinking of such experiences as ’in* the mind with their external causes 
’in’ the external world we can now note the third source of confusions -
this confusion of conceptual levels. , k  '   ‘ ‘ . ,’• /
These confusions link with a fourth and more elusive error which has 
already been touched on: this is a classification of events as physical or
mentals an error which is often linked with the claim that physical events
’cause’ our sense experiences. For most philosophers, ’physical’ is broadly
synonomous with ’material’. As Armstrong says; in the Introduction to ’A 
Materialist Theory of Mind’, ;’Is man nothing but his material body? Can we 
give an account of man in purely physical terms?’ Implicitly, Armstrong 
accepts the division of events into physical and mental and then tries to show 
that the mental can be explained in terms of the physical. As I have already
/ " r ? *•*?,  } •’ V
noted, this division is explicit in the work of Popper who has put forward a
three world theory. His World 1 is the universe of physical entities of
processes, forces, fields of force and of material bodies; his World 2 in 
the world of mental states of conscious awareness; and his World 3 is ’the 
world of products of the human mind, such as stories,- explanatory myths, tools, 
scientific theories (whether true or false), scientific problems, social 
institutions, and works of art.’7  It is his World,3 that has aroused most 
controversy: his division of physical and mentaJ. is seemingly accepted.
Given such widespread acceptance of this division of physical and mental, 
therefore, it is hardly surprising that wq tend to think of our sensory/ 
experiences as somewhat akin to events on a television screen with non-sensory, 
physical events operating ’behind’ the screen in the brain and leading back 
from it. By then regarding such physical events as in some way ’causing’ the 
mental event, we meet the problem of their relationship ~ the problem which 
then forms the very core of the question of the body-mind relationship.
It is revealing, however, to think of more ordinary causal sequences 
involving, say, railway engines or billiard balls. J& these cases we 
ordinarily think of each railway engine and each billiard ball as both 
sensory and physical and of the events involved in shunting or in the. game of 
billiards as of one object which 1ms both sensory and physical attributes 
bumping into another, and so on. These sensory aspects - the aspects we see •; 
and hear and touch - include both primary and secondary qualities, the form 
as well as the colour of the objects, The physical aspects, on the other hand,
7
are primarily those aspects to which measuring instruments, including the 
sense receptors,; can An principle respond.•'Those aspedts ,include,. Lhcrofoiro, 
not only the 'primary aspects such as shape which are relayed more or less 
unchanged, at any rate as far as .the physical cortex, hut also the physical 
aspects of the secondary qualities such as the electro-magnetic counterparts 
of colour. •/: :• • .. ; *./•.t.: .*/ . -v ‘ . v ■
It is important for me to try to make quite clear what is being said 
here when 1 speak of the sense and physical aspects of an object.'-/This is 
not the same distinction as primary and secondary qualities . The sense 
aspect is what we actually experience by way of our senses and includes form 
and movement an well as the colour and warmth, of, an object,; .for the form and 
movement of an object are not only measured: . they can be seen and felt.
As for the colour and temperature - secondary qualities - these are not 
directly measured as such. But we correlate these aspects of our experiences 
with other experiences, notably experiences of the movements of measuring 
instruments,, and from these infer the correlation of oolour with electro­
magnetic radiation of certain frequencies, and1 of temperature with molecular 
activity, Not only, therefore, does all we,know of the physical derive from 
our sense experiences themselves, but many of the physical" features ‘which are 
assumed to characterise the physical world 'behind' our sense experiences 
actually are features of our sense experiences and the rest derive from them. 
What is being claimed here is thus very much in accord with ordinary thinking, 
We can take the example of the Sun's rays passing through a magnifying glass ;* 
and setting fire to a piece of paper. In ordinary, thinking we do nob divide 
these events into W o  classes - sensory and physical - though each object and 
event has both aspects. Their separation into sensory events and physical 
events is a dualist interpretation. Yet it would seem that ordinarily we 
think, of events in the brain in just this dualist way, for we seem invariably 
to regard them an physical. This AneoneAetepey requires some explanation.
The details of the chains of events in the brain hardly matter for 
this purpose. Using the example of -sight, light strikes the object being 
observed, certain frequencies are reflected and some of those to which the 
eye is sensitive stimulate the receptors -which discharge. The discharge is 
of constant amplitude but variations of intensity of stimulation vary the 
frequency of discharge. Even in the eye itself, the discharge of particular 
combinations of cells trigger off groups of cells at a higher level, thus 
discriminating that particular pattern. This process of discriminating and 
assembling various patterns of stimulation takes place at many stages in the 
brain until the incoming pattern gets lost to the observer amid its constant • V- 
activity. At the end of the chaip:of events, however, it seems that there
must be some pattern of neuronal activity which corresponds directly to the *• 
events in consciousness.. It is normal, as I have said, to regard all these 
brain events as physical’but this can be misleading. ;/ v / . / / ' •
'■ /. We have no difficulty :in seeing, even without a microscope, the 
grosser features of the brain; and microscopes enable us to see individual 
neurones. The brain as a whole and the neurones have' their sensory 4.;/ 
characteristics .for we should not otherwisVbe . able to see them. We cannot, 
however, even throrigh a microscope, see,,the actual ionic exchange involved 
in the neuronal discharge as it spreads rapidly along the interlinking 
fibres of the neurones. Partly 011 this ground, no doubt, we therefore think 
of these patterns of discharges as physical as distinct from sensory. It 
seems reasonable to claim, however, that these ’physical’. events are not 
intrinsically different from other events and objects itfhich we can see, for 
we can ascribe their lack of sensory qualities to the' fact that they are too ■
small and not of a nature to. stimulate our sense mechanisms. Light and radio 
wave's are accepted to be of the same character notwithstanding that our eyes 
do not respond to the latter. ' , . • • ’
Supposing, however, we could see the ’physical’ events that form the 
counterpart of consciousness: we have no reason to assume /that they would
not have the same drab colours as the brain itself and we have no reason to 
assume that they would have any of the bright colours associated , with our 
seeing, for instance, a Rubens painting.• It.must be/recalled, however, that , 
what an observer sees depends on what stimulates his eyes and so the chain . 
of events leading back to his brain and consciousness. /In that sense, .what 
the observer of tho brain is seeing is very indirect indeed whereas what the 
patient whose brain is being observed sees, ex hypdthesi, finds its-direct' 
counterpart in’these brain events. The fact that such events do not stimulate 
the sense mechanisms of the observer and the fact tijat. if / they could they 
would lie at the starting point of a chain of ©vents leading to the observer’s 
brain, provide ample explanation why the events in the brain might appear 
completely unlike the experiences of the patient./ .I am suggesting, therefore, 
that just as any ordinary sense object has both sense and physical, aspects 
so have the appropriate physical events in the brain: or, putting the point
the other way, just as an ordinary sense experience has both sense and physical 
aspects so we might expect to find the direct physical aspect of our sense 
experiences in the brain. They are two aspects .of the same event.,;.. It would 
thus be the sense aspect that we experience and -the physical aspect that 
interacts vrith the other neuronal events in the brain. This double-aspect 
account provides a central feature of the solution of the body-mind problem
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7  4/.r First, it5 will bo recalled that effectively/all our knowledge’ of mind 
and of the world around us/vinolu&ing knowledge of our own bodioo, ooj o^s 
from our sense experiencesj We build up our knowledge of such objects as 
billiard balls and engines and trees from our sense experiences but we build 
up also from our sense experiences and notably from our sense of touch, as 
well as from instruments, our awareness of their, physical, characteristics.
For when I feel objects, including my own body* they feel not only warm or 
7 cold/but I feel;their physical characteristics such as their length and * ;
" breadth and height and weight. Indeed, we can put the matter more strongly 
by saying that every object br process or event; with physical, attributes 
either also.has a sense aspect or has its physical attributes inferred from 
; other sense. experiences*What /Ls more,. w&en physical objects or events known 
only,in are brought within reach of our senses, notably by improved
instrumentation, they naturally always prove to have sense attributes. In no 
■:Q$B&,::p.kpL .W, conceive that if; a physical object came within range of our senses, 
would it lack primary and secondary qualities: for primary qualities cannot
be experienced without secondary qualities,- such as visual form without . 
7polour.J?Jv As Quinton says , , ’To use the pointer of a dial or ^ footrule we 
.’.have , to be able to determine; the visible coincidence of marks that are 
’ identified by their colour* ’74/ $ ’Vi* "y 7 ’ •
What, then* can we say about those events -in'the brain which we assume •
. to be the direct counterparts of our sense experiences. These physical 
counterparts are generally assumed to be the patterninge of the neuronal 
discharges in the brain. 'These involve an/yiohio exchange across the 
membrane of the neuronal fibres which is accompanied by a small voltage 
change and by a minute electro-magnetic field.* For _ reasons which. I explain 
later, there seem reasonable grounds for regarding the physical counterpart 
of consciousness as,the constantly changing field pattern associated with 
these neuronal discharges, -tike the patterns of neuronal dischargee as a 
whole, these fields cannot be seen or heard or felt by an. observer of the 
brain and the reason for this, as I have said, is/that they do not stimulate 
the observer’s sense receptors. . A critic, might,;,of course, claim that these 
field events' cannot meaningfully be said,to have sense characteristics: that 
they imxst be physical only.•■. But, as I have shorn, the physical is an 
abstraction, an aspect of or inference from our sense experiences and there 
is no reason to claim that physical events inherently lack sense characteristics.
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These field patterns would not be visible to an observer even of the 
exposed cortex for they are not of a size or frequency which would stimulate 
his sense receptors. But this would not, of. itself, prevent their 
experienced by the person whose brain is involved: in his case, no further
cells need to be stimuhted by the field in order for him to see,; for'ex 
hypothesi* the field is the direct counterpart or component of consciousness„„ 
If, therefore, the minute field associated with the neuronal patternings is 
a physical component of our sense experiences, this would provide the sought 
for linkage with the mechanisms of the brain. The relationship of the sense 
experiences to their physical aspect would then be analogous to the relation­
ship of the appearance of a tree to.its physical characteristics: two over­
lapping aspects which do not, of course, involve identity but which do 
involve an obvious and well established relationship in our ordinary 
experiences. ‘' J . . •:. .. -v \7g;.. . . ■ 7 -
There are, however, further implications of this view whioh have 
already been touched on, but which need to be tackled further at this point. 
In particular there is the problem raised by the chains of events from the 
sense receptors to the highest levels of the brain and so to consciousness,; 
Since, in one sense, our knowledge of the world around us must be indirect, 
we need then to ask how far the primary and secondary qualities of objects 
and events which we experience coincide with the qualities of the objects 
and events which originate the chain of events leading to consciousness.
The position can be summarised as follows: V
(a) it is from our sens© experiences that we build up .'-our honcoptjr-'Qi// vp r r; 
ourselves and of the world around us, of consciousness and.of mind
and of persons and of the external and physical worlds;
(b) from the consistencies in the content of our sense experiences we 
infer the existence of many objects, processes and events which
. are not otherwise open to direct sense experiences; / .
(c)
(a)
in particular, we infer from the changing oontent of our sense 
experiences that these changes are themselves the outcome of chains 
of events from the world around us; end? which must in a sense isolate 
us from direct observation of the originating events? 
apart from the constant cross-correlation of our sense experiences, 
we have some psychological and neurophysiological evidence suggesting 
that the form of the originating events is maintained by the sensory 
mechanisms, for the sensory mechanism? transmit forme and patterns and 
these forms and patterns of discharges, at any rate in the visdu&l cortex 
are broadly isomorphic with the forms and patterns on the retina of the 
eye. All this, however, gives us no clue as to whether the originating- 
objects and events have secondary qualities such as colour. Of course,
as Berkeley showedf primary qualities do not stand on their own.
As Broad commented: 'Whatever is extended must have some other 
characteristic which is capable of covering an area or filling a 
volume as colour or temperature do in sensa. Berkeley was wrong
in thinking that this ’extensible characteristic’, as I will call it, 
must be colour or temperature, or some other, quality which literally 
and dyadically inheres in sensa. It might be mass or electric charge. 
.... There is no reason to believe that the determinable characteristics 
of colour and temperature inhere literally or dyadically in anything 
but sensa’54- Broad’s dualist assumption regarding sensa aside, his 
conclusion seems unduly negative for there are at least four grounds 
for suggesting that the secondary qualities of the originating objects 
may broadly coincide with our sense experiences -though none may be 
regarded as conclusives
0 )  as I shall show, there is the direct evidence from some out-of-the- 
body experiences that when the centre of consciousness is removed 
from the body -the surroundings can be seen in clear and full light 
and colour as well as in the appropriate perspectives .yet in these 
cases our sense mechanisms cannot be involved;
(2) there is an argument from evolutions for since the effect of the 
brain and nervous system is to allow the organism to discriminate 
the more important data reaching it and to interpret these data in 
the light of earlier experiences, a fairly faithful reproduction 
of the secondary as well as the primary qualities of objects which 
are themselves the product of these same evolutionary processes 
seems called for; . . .  •
(3) as there cannot be objects without some kind of secondary qualities, 
the use of Occam’s'razor suggests that the secondary qualities of 
the originating objects should broadly coincide with our 
experience of them; . . .
(4) there seems to be no evidence to contradict these claims.
¥e need, however, further to consider the status of the events
originating the chains of events leading to the brain. Starting with our 
sense experiences, we may regard the external and physical worlds in terms 
of higher level concepts. As part of our experiences of the external world, 
we can in principle disoem the events in the brain leading to that experience. 
But we are, as it were, external observers of the brain events for we observe 
them by way of the chains leading to our own brains, whereas the nor son whose
brain is observed sees the'final events in the chain, as it were, directly.
In more specific terms, we catr observe light to strike a tree, to reflect 
to the eyes of the person being observed, and so to trigger off the chain 
of events to the brain. All these events form part of the world around ns 
and we ourselves form part of that world. We can,, therefore, regard ourselves 
as systems within that sensory/physical world which bring to the centre 
point of these systems information about what is going on around them.
This is very much as common sense sees the position. The events at the 
heart of the systems are self-intimating and since the form and character of 
these events depend on the causal chains in the brain, the organisms are • .
thereby made conscious of their originating events and are able systematically
to explore the world of which they form part. In other words, we are 
microcosms reflecting the macrocosm of which we all form part; and in these 
microcosms, the macrocosm becomes conscious of itself, the whole forming 
one system which has both public and private, physical and mental attributes. 
What is more, the dualism of mind and consciousness on the one hand and of 
the external and physical worlds on the other derives from the way in which 
we discriminate consistencies in our sense and other experiences as they 
change. Yet we can, as we know, vary these consistencies ourselves in many 
ways. We regard the more basic of these consistencies as laws of science 
or nature, yet, as I shall show more fully, we do not regard such actions 
on our part as breaching these laws; a point which will be of relevance later.
It follows, as I have tried to show, that tho errors which have led 
to the confusions of the body mind relationship stem primarily from the way 
in which we &i©criminal© and conceptualise different aspects of our sense 
experiences and then give these concepts a false status. We have split our 
sense experiences into physical and mental aspects and we have regarded the 
physical world as independent of, as lying behind and causing our sense 
experiences: and we have objectified and conceptualised consciousness and 
mind. Not surprisingly, we have then found the problems of explaining and 
relating mind to the external world and to the physical world impossible to 
solve. The dualists tried to give them separate and independent status 
either in parallel or interacting; the epiphenomenalists tried to preserve 
both aspects but to make the interaction one way only; the psycho-physical 
identity theorists assumed the dualism and then tried to assimilate the mental 
to physical events; and the braver materialists tried to deny or ignore 
mental events entirely.
Nearer than any of these to the present argument were the double aspecb 
theorists for, as 1 have tried to show, there is a double aspect to our 
sense experiences0 Tills was close to what Spinoza claimed for he attributed
the two different attributes of thought and extension to one substance which| ,
he called God or Nature0 He claimed further that there could be no ideasI
which were not ideas of extended things nor extended things which were not 
ideas: a, claim which, if we; understand by ideas in this context, sense
aspects, is consonant with what is argued here, at any rate about the 
everyday world. William James, too, claimed that our concepts of mind and 
body developed from two aspects of what he termed 'pure experience' s and 
Bertram! Russell9s arguments were similar. And, perhaps more significantly, 
Piaget and his colleagues have reached the same conclusions from long and 
careful observations of children. Yet the implications of this work have 
seemingly hardly reached current thinking.
I have sought to show that the prevailing Western paradigm, in itsivarious forms, treats mind either as an epiphenomen of body, or, at best, as 
having some measure of parity with it. Yet, despite the large measure of 
current agreeEient on these: views, the paradigm has given rise to great 
difficulties which have prevented any adequate or acceptable account of the 
body-mind relationship being found. As I have sought to show, however, 
this entire spectrum of views about the body-mind relationship is misconceived. 
It is from_ opr sense' exp©ri^c©#:tB&t weY'&veipp pt&’_qdhcept<A'of the 
external and physical worlds, of consciousness and mind, and, underlying the 
whole, the concept of a sensory/physical world of which we are parts and 
which in us is self-intimating. But, as I have also sought to shot?,
1 ontologically, all these levels resolve themselves into parts or aspects 
of the eensory/phyeica,! world which is itself changing and evolving and 
has both a spatial and temporal character. These features of the world 
have themselves given rise to much dispute and it is these which I now 
need to consider. ,
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century philosophers on the experiences of the congenitally blind but 
has also a review of recent work.
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In the course of building up our understanding of the world, it.has 
been only too easjr, as I have shown, to slip.into several closely related 
but false positions. First, we can wrongly see ourselves observing alike 
our sense experiences and the world around us? secondly, we can wrongly 
regard physical events as separable from their sensuous aspects? thirdly, 
we can wrongly think of physical events as occurring 'in* the external 
world and of mental events as occurring'in* the mind? and fourthly, we can
j.wrongly regard the external world and our sense experiences as being of 
the same conceptual status. Thereby we can find ourselves facing insuperable 
problems in relating body to mind and in building a more adequate view of 
the world of which we are parts. What is more, by failing adequately to 
understand the nature and role of concepts and conceptual levels, we find 
ourselves facing the problems of relating our personal and private 
experiences to the public world which is common to us all.
In place of these confusions, I have tried to sketch a picture of
an evolving sensory/physical world within which we form complex systems 
which relay by means of long causal chains of events, information from 
the world around to their centres where the resulting patterns of events 
become self-5.ntimating.
Can we, then, see why we should have so evolved as to relate so 
indirectly to the world around us? The full answers must be very complex 
and subtle but several answers stand out clearly. First, the system.,
allows each of us to build up a model of the world around us based on
consistencies in our experiences of our particular environments and then 
to interpret each further experience in the light of the model as it has 
so far developed. Each experience thus acquires a greatly enhanced, meaning 
and without this, intelligent behaviour would be impossible. Secondly, 
the system is selective: . it eliminates most of the disturbances reaching 
the surface of otir bodies and responds only to certain ranges above certain 
threshold levels. An optimum balance had therefore to evolve between, on 
the one hand, widening the range of information with the resulting problems 
from a lengthening time required for developing the system to take account 
of it and lengthening the time of response, and, on the other hand, 
narrowing the range of information, also with the result of increasing 
vulnerability. The resulting balance varies from species to species and 
within species. Thirdly, although there is a strong innate base to this 
information processing system, its ability to develop in response to
stimulation from the environment allows for learning from parents and other 
members of the social group on a cumulative basis: a process enormously-
speeded by the development of language, spoken and written, printing and 
other modem information devices. And fourthly, as I have shown, the 
development of concepts allows for thinking and therefore for various 
hypotheses and strategies to be considered before committing the organism 
to any particular response; to given stimulation. In these circumstances, it 
is to be expected that the'information available to us should reproduce 
as meaningfully and accurately as possible relevant information about the 
situation around the organism. If only for this reason, we might expect 
the reproduction in our consciousness of secondary as well as primary 
qualities to be reasonably faithful to the originating events.
In order to use to advantage all the information reaching it, the 
system has to organise itself in an extremely complex raenner for not only 
is the information reaching it itself complex but its significance is 
complex and often conflicting. A short-term advantage may involve a 
longer term threat or vice versa. The different uniformities have, therefore 
to be discriminated at" many levels over long periods of time and in any- 
given situation balanced one against the others a process which entails 
an almost incredible flexibility in marshalling the relevant information 
and relating one pattern to another, - *•
Directly related to these developments are three other, attributes 
of mind. Necessarily, if.the organism is to learn from experience it must 
have access to past experiences in memory? if it is to be, able to
respond to the various courses open to it, it must have some,control over 
itself, so it must in some measure be able to will its various activities; 
and it must, on the on© hand, have some built-in warning systems to enable 
it to respond to threats in the most appropriate manner- for example, by 
fear leading to flight or hiding or submission or by anger leading to attack: 
and on the other hand, it must have some incentive to respond to favourable 
events by, for instance, feelings of satisfaction, pleasure and joy. 
Underlying and as a necessary condition of all this activity is a basic 
indeterminacy which allows not only for the survival of those individuals 
and groups, but alsp, as the total environment itself evolves, places a 
premium on the ability of organisms to adapt and change.
Just as an analysis of their relationship pointed to body and mind 
being different aspects of one system, so from the evolutionary point of 
view we see one system also. Conceived and born, as part of a process which,
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whatever else it may he,/is 'chemical, nurtured oh ohemioals, and at; cloahh 
reverting to simpler chemicals, we are parte and products of tliat process 
which has been taking place and developing since the origin of the universe. 
The materialists are surely right to empSiee that aspect of our natures.
Yet, since we are part of the objective sensory/physical world which in us 
experiences itself, we are both subject and object, physical and mental.
On the face of these claims, it would seem that.there must be something 
special about the world for it to issue in life and consciousness at the 
appropriate stages of the evolutionary process. But against this, there is 
the apparently widely held view that the whole evolutionary process has 
been based on chance and that therefore life and consciousness are 
accidental aspects of that process which have emerged fortuitously and, 
necessarily, inexplicably,:
The case for regarding the world as a whole, and life and conscious­
ness in particular, as the products of chance was set out in a widely 
acclaimed book fLe Hasard et la Necessite’ by the distinguished French
1 ‘Abiologist, Jaques Monod. ^ Monod sought to show that 'the biosphere does not
contain a predictable class of objects or events, hut is (p.tself) a
particular event, certainly compatible with first principles but not
1 ?deducible from those principles and therefore essentially unpredictable.’ ; 
More generally, it was his view that life itself, the very existence of 
life, had been shorn to be the product of chance mutations that could not 
have been predicted and that therefore there could be no general purpose 
in the existence of life; and since it need not have existed, no reason fori ,
it could be g5.ven, * "
There is still much room for argument about the importance of chance
in evolution for many factors play a role in 15.mit.ing - though not
eliminating - its significance. These various fan tors are discussed
by Vaddington in his essay ’How Much is Evolution affected by Chance and 
xNecessity?’-../..-'v- one of a series of reviews of Monod’s book. This is a 
complex and specialised subject, but whether the scope for chance be wide 
or narrow, there appears to be a fatal flaw in Monod's argument which can 
be simply illustrated. / ..
The disturbances which lead to mutations are occurring continuously 
within the dynamic patterns of activity that constitute, molecules. Every 
now and then, an extra strong disturbance occurs and the molecule attains 
a new position of stability, in some measure changing its nature in tho 
process. Such a mutation may prove directly lethal to the cell in which
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Tit occurs and it may p3?oVo. directly or indirectly lethal to the organ,lorn 
of-which Itiformh a pa£t&f Exceptionally, however, ouch mutations lead to
new forms of organism which can reproduce and survive and form the base 
for yet further mutations/ Within this brief account, let us assume that 
chance alone causes the disturbances and that within limits they are 
completely free and unconstrained in their occurrence. Only exceptionally 
will new positions of stability be reached. /But to prove that, the entire 
process is due to chance, it would be necessary for Monod to show not only 
that these disturbances occur at random but also that the new positions 
of stability themselves occur at random and presumably are of random 
character. This they are not, for the points at which they occur are 
presumably points at which the various forces which sustain the molecule 
and cell balance outs and the fact that they are not is evident from their 
faithful reproduction each time that the cell reproduces. In other words, 
this suggests that the development of the structure and organisation of 
the molecules, cells, organisms and indeed the universe as a whole, are the 
outcome of the dynamic interplay of the forces involved? and this view in 
no way conflicts with the claim that the universe and each element in it 
have emerged and are still; emerging through' the operation of minute forces 
which themselves occur, within limits, entirely at random, thus gradually 
transforming a potential order into fact. In other words, the disturbances 
may be random without their lodging points being random; and the fact 
that they are not random is borne out bj the infinitely subtle order of 
the natural world which, however it may have come into being, is in its 
overall pattern and in its ability to reproduce its parts, anything but 
random. '■ •' X • *;• •- v. , ' - ;
Whether life and consciousness emerged unpredictably by chance is 
also directly linked with this argument. As I have sought to. show, in one 
sense this may well be true in that the variations in the activity, of the 
atoms and molecules take place at random. . But the emergence of life and 
consciousness depend directly, not on these random disturbances but on 
•the stable positions marking the various organisational levels that emerge 
as development proceeds. Indeed, it is norma! for quite new properties > 
to emerge at such new stages of developments water has quite different 
properties from the oxygen and hydrogen which compose it. If, therefore, 
there is nothing random about the emergence of life and consciousness, 
this must reflect back into the character of the sensory/physical world 
of which they axe manifestations; as will become clearer later in this study
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Yet though the highly ordered and reproducible character of life 
and consciousness needs.to;bo stressed, so must the fact that life maintains 
.itself in a vast range of forms and states, many of which are only marginally 
viable and none of which is totally secure. The vast number of units 
of which living creatures are composed can come together in countless 
different combinations in each of which there is a balance of strength and 
vulnerability. This balance depends both on heredity and environment and 
allows for, and indeed requires, forms to be destructive of and parasitic 
on other forms. The outer limits of the evolving system are marked by the 
fluctuating zones where viability is marginal and within these limits, the 
system as a whole develops^ despite countless abortive and destructive 
strains, towards greater complexity, responsiveness and conscious self- 
determination. :) v
A ‘ » V  ' • *
Since Monod wrote his essay, further information has been coming 
to light which makes his views even less realistic. 4' Thera is now some 
evidence which suggests that new forms of life are still being brought to
■ tZ —
this planet from outer spaoe.'^? There is evidence to suggest that the cells 
of complex organisms evolved as social structures incorporating smaller 
cells which have continued reproducing within them ever since and thereby 
affecting their development. There is evidence suggesting that this process 
continues with the transfer of genetic information by viruses under natural
conditions between species-that are only remotely related, thus enormously^ ? •widening the gene pool. 7 7 7  And very recent evidence of a massive reservoir 
of information carried in the genes of even the most complex organisms, 
only a very small proportion of which is selected for use, is causing much ■*. 
re-thinking in the field of molecular biology. It has led Perutz to say ■>. .
that 'the gap separating physical structure and biological function is much
,7 * ■wider than anyone expected. What is more, this gap appears to be
widening and it will be apparent that attempts to explain biological 
evidence, including life and consciousness, entirely in terms of the 
underlying physics and chemistry are becoming increasingly unrealistic - 
a point on which I comment later.
The changing and evolving character of -the,, sensory/physical world 
has, of course, both temporal and spatial aspects and this leads to the 
question whether these processes are taking place in time and space or
whether our ideas of time and apace derive fttom the evolving sensory/pbys.1 <ml 
world of which we are parts* The complexity and order of the system are 
exhibited in. and understood from our constantly changing sense experiences 
from which, as I have shorn,. we discriminate uniformities which are 
themselves manifestations of that order. It is from the changing content 
I of our sense experiences that we develop; the concept of change itself 
and thence such concepts as simultaneity, succession and duration. From
these, as Piaget has shownt?*, the concept of time is developed? but then,■. ", '■A • '< ■ ”
by a not unusual conceptual inversion,- it becomes thought of as having a
life in its own right within which events happen. Broadly, therefore, we
can say that it is from the content of our sense experiences that we develop
the concepts of the external and. physical worlds and, more specifically,
the concept of change and stability: and from these we develop the concept
of time. If we keep these! conceptual levels distinct, many of the
traditional problems of time resolve themselves. Thus the idea of absolute
time within which the external and physical worlds find their place was
effectively banished by Einstein, but it can be seen to be incorrect from
the fact that it involves an inversion of conceptual levels? and with
the banishment of absolute time went ideas that events occur 'in’ time. .
As Goodman said, fThus although there is no change that does not involve
time, there is no change in time.ty? The idea that, time itself changes
must also be incorrect for it too involves the inversion of conceptual
levels: and so also goes the myth of the passage of time whioh was
1 n  . - ‘effectively demolishod by ;0 0 WiX 1 iomoYYThe distinction of conceptual 
levels allows us also to resolve the question whether there was any time 
before the beginning of time? though admittedly, this leaves unresolved 
the question whether there was or was not a first change. Perhaps this 
was the fBig Bapg'of the cosmologists. If there were no change before
that, it would make no sense to ask if it endured a second or a million> . . .
years: and indeed, the claim that the enormous sequence of events
immediately following the fBig Bang*, took place in the first few seconds
*• J * - • . * *
_ can be made only by using change as we know it as a standard. As for the 
problem of the direction of time, the question resolves itself into whether v 
there is an overall direction of change within the sensory/physical world. :
To this, despite the t&me-symmetry of the equations of classical dynamics,
y*electro-magnetism and quantum mechanics, the evidence of the evolution of 
the universe at all levels appears to return, an unequivocal ’Yes’.
In other words, the asymmetry of time apparently derives from the initial 
or boundary conditions of the universe and not from the laws of nature 
themselves: a point on which I hope to cast more light later in this study.
The history of the development of the concept of time bears these 
claims out. For all peoples, the constancy, and ubiquity of their experiences 
of the movements of the sun, moon and stars have provided a standard in 
terms of which other changes could be measured. But as life became more 
highly organised and the need for greater precision and for more readily 
available means of measuring change increased, not only were various forms . 
of clock developed but the' need for greater precision grew greater and led, t 
for instance, to the development of quartz and atomic clocks. Such changes 
in the movements of the sun and moon and of cloaks are public to us alls
they occur in&ejjendently of our movements or volitions and it is this
that gives them their objective character. What is more, as our conceptual 
framework has developed, so has our conceptual span and our sense of history. 
It is a fairly late development of civilisation to think of time as linear 
and this is understandable for a cyclic account was analogous to and almost 
equally consistent with the experiences of people whose span of life was 
short and whose life was dominated by the changing hours and seasons.
As for the concept of space, it ,too, derives from the uniformities 
in our sense experiences uniformities of shapes and angles and distances, 
for instance. The spatial organisation of the world around us derives from 
the interactions of the various natural laws and other uniformities in
the physical forces of the! sensory/physical world.' To see this, we have
only to think of the surface of the moon before man reached it. The 
position of the moon itself depended on the interplay of gravitational 
and centrifugal forces and’ the position of each feature of its surface 
depended on the interplay of the gravitational and other forces operating
on its surface. ; -
On this basis, we can understand that our ideas of space and time 
derive from observed uniformities in the spatial distribution of and changes 
in the sensory/physical world. Our ideas of space and time are therefore 
derivative and derive, as it were, from custom and not from law. And,
indeed, it is in terms of custom that we interpret all apparent departures
from custom notwithstaMing that we may think of them in terms.of 
departures from the ’laws’! of nature. This is a point which will he ox 
special relevance when I come to discuss various forms of psychic phenomena 
where such departures are , especially prominent.,../ . /'; /
Much modem work relevant to our understanding .of time and space 
hears out these understandings. As I have already noted, there was deep 
controversy on whether time and space were absolute until Einstein’s 
General Theory of Relativity was understood finally to have resolved the 
matter. The controversy then almost ceased, notwithstanding that the theory, 
though indeed affected by the distribution of matter, does not specify it 
uniquely.^ However, given; that time and space are to be understood as 
concepts which derive from;the ways in which our sense experiences of the 
sensory/physical world organise themselves, it follows that time ‘and 
space cannot in any ultimate sense be absolute. As Quine says, ’Whether 
or not it was better to stay within the three spatial dimensions for our 
geometrical objects, or better to look beyond space into space-time for them, 
turned on whether it was ai* absolute distinction between
rest and motion. This question, in turn, is the question what theory will 
best systematize the data of physics.’^ ?/- In other words, whether we are 
considering space or time or space-time, w© are considering theories or 
concepts in terms of which,,we can best understand and account for the way 
in which our sense experiences normally organise themselves temporally < 
and spatially; and since these concepts of time and space derive from 
uniformities within our normal sense experiences, they cannot limit 
thes© experiences, and, ’a fortiori’, as Ryl© noted, they cannot limit 
consciousness or mind. * . * * n • .r, A , ■
In the light of this’ discussion, many classical discussions of time 
and space are not relevant, to this study for they start from different 
presuppositions. Thus Kant argued that time and space were ’a priori’ forms 
of intuition having an origin in the mind - as distinct from the external 
world - and that they were not concepts and not abstracted from sense 
experiences. Not only do the arguments presented here conflict with this 
but the presupposition of a distinction of mind and an external world, 
albeit unknowable, is different, too. ’ ,:j. f . . -
There remain, of eouree, other traditional and current arguments
about time and space which are less relevant to this study, and which
I cannot here pursue# One relevant issue, however, has been brought into
recent prominence by Grunbaum who holds that coming into being is the same
as coming into awareness, with the implication that the physical world
13is tenseless and only becomes tensed by cot becoming conscious of it.
However, he allows that physical events happon independently of any mind
and occur in objective succession: so what appears to be at issue is
whether the conscious mind is needed to pick out and register 'now1 and
therefore 'before' and 'after*# Grunbaum denies strongly that he is thereby
seeking to establish a universe which, in the words of Capek, 'with its
whole history, is conceived as a single hug© and time less bloc, given at 14once.* Yet, as I shall show, pro-cognition and rotro-cognition suggest 
that future as well as past can in some sense bo present. This is, of course 
open to the objection expressed by William James that 'If tho future 
history of tho universe pre-exists timolessly in its totality, why is it 
not already present?'1** This and related issues I shall have to discuss 
more fully towards the end of this study, but light on them is oast by, 
and serious questions aro posed by, tho evidence of parapsyohology which 
needs also to find a plaoo within any solutions# It is to objections 
to even taking account of this evidence that I must now turn.
1 Translated as Chance and Necessity (1972)
2 Op. cit. p 49
3 Beyond Chance and Necessity ed, J Lewis (1974) PP 89-102
4 A very readable, if speculative account of the latest developments
in this field, with references, is givon in Lifetide (1979; by
Lyall Watson
5 See e g F Hoyle & N 0 Wickramaoinghe in Nature vol 2 6 4 pp 4 5 - 6 and
vol 266 pp 241-243; and New Scientist voT t^ P P  402-4
6 R E  Beneviste & G J Todaro 'Evolution of the C-Type Viral Genes'
Nature vol 2 5 2 pp 456-8
7 M Perutz 'Bizarre behaviour among the Passengers' New Scientist 
vol 77 PP 8-9
8 See J Piaget and B Inhelder The Child's Conception of Space (1956)
The Child's Conception of Geometry 0960) 'and The Child's Conception
of Timo" Yl969)
9 N Goodman 'The Structure of Appearance* in Problems of Space and Time
ed. J J C Smart (1 9 6 4) P 368 * _
10 D C  Williams 'Tho Myth of Passage' Journal of Philosophy vol 4 8 (1951)
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of Gravitation* Physical Review vol CXXXV (1961) p 925
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The start of full and systematic investigations of psychic phenomena 
can be dated to 1882 when the Society for Psychical Research was founded in 
London. Since then there has been a steady accumulation of evidence from 
experiments which increasingly have sought to meet standards higher than would 
be required in better established fields of science. In addition there has 
been built up a vast collection of accounts of experiences, many of them highly 
testified, which occurred to individuals or groups of individuals. None the 
less, it is only within the last few years that the investigation of psychic 
phenomena has attained fairly general academic acceptance. The main rational 
grounds for scepticism can be outlined briefly.
First, the experimental evidence has typically proved difficult and 
often impossible to repeat on demand. In particular, there is strong evidence 
that a negative or hostile attitude on the part of the experimenter can prevent 
results being obtained and this, naturally, has tended to confirm the doubts 
of sceptics.^
Secondly, psychic phenomena have attracted a wide range of people, only 
a small proportion of whom have had the concern or the ability to investigate 
them dispassionately, and there has been a good deal of fraud and'-wishful 
thinking. What is more, reports of some of the stranger and less well 
evidenced phenomena have cast doubts on the subject as a whole. All this has 
done grave damage to its credibility.
Thirdly, and most important, has been the fact that psychic phenomena 
have been seen to conflict with the highly ordered paradigm presented by' 
Western science and thus to threaten it. This has led to the somewhat 
disreputable practice on the part of some of those assessing the evidence, of 
dismissing their occurrence as not yet proven#ground that the evidence does not 
fit an accepted and acceptable theory: as was reputedly said on one occasion,
TIf the facts don’t fit the theory, so much the worse for the facts’.
Underlying this apparent conflict with the paradigm presented by modern 
science, is a failure to establish any adequate lower level paradigms or 
conceptual models of the ways in which psychic phenomena operate;^ and there 
is, therefore, a failure to produce any adequate hypotheses to explain the 
evidence which is being produced both from experiments and individual cases 
in increasingly large volume. This problem needs further clarification.
If we take the term 'extra-sensory perception’, these words imply some sort 
of analogy with perception. In the case of telepathy, for instance, it implies 
seeing something being seen by someone else, but not by use of the senses.
OBJECTIONS TQ THE IDEA OF PSI
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But the analogy of seeing is full of uncertainties. If x looks one by one 
at a long sequence of Zener cards, and y, who is in a different room, guesses 
each card being looked at, the number of correct guesses may also be random, 
or it may be statistically far above or far below chance. What is. more, the 
guesses may be random for the cards being looked at but may be highly significan 
for one or two cards ahead that have not yet been chosen, implying precognition, 
or may be significant for one or two cards back, implying retro-cognition.
That there is some factor - or more than one - influencing the guessing is a 
necessary assumption to explain the sometimes highly significant deviations 
from chance, but we lack any clear idea what this factor is and what determines 
these effects. It could be that y is 'perceiving’ what is in the mind of x 
though in what sense he is perceiving is obscure; x could be ’transmitting' 
what he sees, though again the mechanism is unknown; or this particular 
example might be a case of clairvoyance, with y perceiving the cards direct, 
again in an unknown manner. Because the mechanisms involved are unknown, we 
find ourselves using terms like 'perceiving' or 'transmitting' but when we try 
to turn these terms into hypotheses which can be tested, we fail to find one 
that stands up. Tests to find something transmitted fail and this brings into 
question the relevance of spatial separation; precognition brings time into 
question; because y 'sees' nothing normally when guessing the analogy of 
perception fails: and in any event, though the deviation from chance can be
highly significant over long runs, to perceive only say six or seven cards 
out of twenty-five when the random score is five would be a remarkably poor 
form of perception.
All this affects the interpretation of individual cases. The evidence 
for many of these cases is very strong indeed, and though the weighing of 
people's testimony is more akin to history or law than science, that does not 
make it less valid. Yet the lack of any understanding of the forces involved 
makes it much more difficult to evaluate such evidence. An example can make 
this clearer. The mother of a friend of mine died and left a picture to her 
daughter who lived in Africa. Pending her return with her family to England, 
her brother hung the picture on the wall of his house. One day, the picture 
fell and a few hours later a message was received to say his sister had died 
about that time. The evidence that the two events occurred and roughly 
coincided can be evaluated on an historical or legal basis, but the explanation 
of the coincidence remains obscure. If we knew more about the mechanisms which 
occasionally link death and falling pictures, we could form a view on whether 
they operated in this case and in any event there would remain no mystery.
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Bearing in mind the number of such cases and other evidence of psycho-kinesis, 
this extra factor may well have operated in this case but the absence of any 
understanding of the processes involved makes any evaluation much more 
difficult in any particular case.
There have been many attempts to find an orthodox explanation of the 
processes operating in E S P and P K. Taylor, for instance, who carried out 
detailed scientific investigations of P K, including the feats of Uri Geller, 
considered that of the four basic forces known to physics, only electro­
magnetism could begin to meet the requirements for an explanation of these 
phenomena. He then eliminated all but the very low frequencies as a possibility 
and after further investigation, he announced in the course of the International 
Conference on E S P held at the City University in April, 1977 that he had 
been forced to eliminate that possibility also. He had, therefore, been 
forced to the position that no explanation at present available could fit the 
evidence. In most people's view, this is where we stand today for the evidence 
has proved incompatible with our current Western paradigm and most people 
cannot conceive of any rational alternative being possible; and in the absence 
of any rational alternative, the threat that this implies to their way of
looking at the world forces a rejection of the evidence, however well it may
. . 5be testified.
Hume's sceptical view on miracles is relevant to the problem set by 
psychic phenomena for it has influenced the thinking of philosophers and 
H  other’'"s in this century and has been used in argument against these phenomena.
It is in Section X of his Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. 'A miracle 
is a violation of the laws of nature; and as firm and unalterable experience 
has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature 
of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be
imagined. ....  There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.......
When anyone tells me he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider 
with myself, whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive 
or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. 
I weigh one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority 
which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater 
miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would then be more miraculous, 
than the event which he relates; then and not till then, can he pretend to 
command my belief or opinion.^
Hume defines a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature but it is 
important to note that in a footnote to this passage he says that a miracle
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may be accurately defined as 'a transgression of a law of nature by a 
particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible 
agent1: and as Flew notes, 'Hume's main concern in this whole section is
with the question whether a miracle could ever "be proved so as to be the 
foundation of a system of religion." ' For, Flew continues, 'unless a 
miracle is stipulated to be some sort of exception to the order of nature 
the occurrence of miracles surely could not possibly serve as an endorsement
of any revelation of something beyond. Hume is, therefore, right to insist
• . . 7that miracles must be violations of the laws.of nature. In other words,
in the cases Hume is concerned with, he had common ground with those
supporting the miracle that some divine or other agency had intervened to
alter the normal course of events: and he distinguished from miracles the
difficulties of an Indian Prince in believing that water froze. As Hume says,
'Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary and requires a
pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate:
8but it is still not miraculous ...'
Before Hume's argument about miracles is applied tg psychic events, 
therefore, it needs to be established whether miracles are involved and not 
just events which, though in accord with natural laws?are outside our 
experience in normal circumstances and for this reason are presenting us 
with the difficulties of comprehension felt by the Indian Prince. It was 
certainly not established that miracles were involved and that natural laws 
were violated in psychic phenomena in the attack made on their occurrence 
by G. R. Price on the basis of Hume's argument in 1955: an attack which led
to a number of rejoinders which included the claim by Brid^/man that Hume's 
position was 'irrefutable'.^ Price listed some instances of what he claimed 
were incompatibilities of psychic phenomena: these were of very different
kinds - precognition, lack of attenuation with distance, absence of effects 
of shielding, problems of reading cards in the dark and in the centre of the 
pack, the absence of any structure in the body associated with the psi function 
the tendency for abilities to decline and the different results of different 
investigators. As is fairly obvious and as will become clearer in later 
discussion, none of these points necessarily involved 'a violation of the 
laws of nature' and Price appeared to rest his case on. a quotation from 
Thouless: 'I suggest that the discovery of psi phenomena has brought us a ..... 
point at which we must question basic theories because they lead us to 
expectations contradicted by experimental results' - a suggestion involving 
the very nature of progress in scientific thinking. Price continued, however,
'If, then, parapsychology and modern science are incompatible, why not
reject parapsychology?' And he devoted the remainder of his paper mainly
to an attack on the credibility of certain experiments and experimenters,
notably Rhine and Soal. On this point it need only be added that in a letter
to Science in 1972, Price admitted that in 1955-56 he had been highly unfair
10to Rhine and, he suspected, to Soal.
Rhine in his 1956 response to Price's attack accepted that the 
prevailing physicalist theory of man and the experimental facts of para­
psychology directly contradicted each other and he concentrated his attack 
on this theory. Bridg^man discussed problems arising from the dependence of 
E S P on considerations of probability; and it was left to Meehl and Scriven 
to consider the compatibility of science and E S P .  As they noted, Price's 
argument stood or fell on two hypotheses, only the first of which he 
appeared to defend. They were (i) that E S P is incompatible with modern 
science and (ii) that modern science is complete and correct. As they said,
'If E S P is not incompatible with modern science, then the Humean sceptic 
has no opportunity to insist on believing modern science rather than reports 
about E S P .  If modern science is not believed to be complete or correct, 
then th^ceptic is hardly justified in issuing a priori allegations of 
fraud about experimenters even when they claim to have discovered a new 
phenomenon that requires reconsideration of existing theories.' They went on 
to show the inconclusiveness of each of Price's claims of incompatibility 
referred to above. Clearly, despite his reliance on Hume's argument, Price 
in no way showed that E S P  involved miracles or that it involved any 
violations of the laws of nature.
In these articles, however, there is no detailed consideration of what 
might be implied in a violation of the laws of nature and this requires 
consideration. We can take one of the best established laws; that of gravity. 
Its presence throughout the universe is ubiquitous and though its Newtonian 
formulation has now been replaced by that of Einstein, we can go along with 
Hume in regarding it as for all ordinary purposes established by firm and 
unalterable experience. It is necessary, however, to distinguish gravity as 
a force occurring throughout the universe from our formulation in the form 
of a law of its manifestations. It seems very much open to question whether 
our understanding of gravity is complete given the search for gravity waves 
and for a unification of physical laws: and, in the very nature of science,
if any variations from hitherto observed consistencies were found, we should 
look for disturbing factors: but in the last resort we should have to seek
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toieformulate the laws, for any scientific law, however well established, 
can be only provisional. Indeed, it is a basic tenet of our view of the 
universe that though our formulation of the laws or consistencies of nature 
can be shown to be wrongly formulated, these consistencies cannot be broken: 
they would not be consistencies if they were. What is more, these consistencie 
are underlying tendencies only and they can be, and constantly are, overriden 
or outweighed by other forces. I raise myself from the ground: aeroplanes
and rockets rise into the sky: an electro-magnet can lift iron bars: but
none of these violate the law of gravity. Thus if we see a bar raised by 
psycho-kinesis, though we may have little idea of the precise significance 
of the word, we have only to assume that it has been raised by some force 
that we do not yet understand which has overcome the force of gravity. And, 
of course, there are many physical phenomena such as atomic events and radio 
transmissions where gravity is not relevant. As for mental events, we know 
that gravity, like all other physical laws, does not apply to them. I may 
be ’weighed down* by my thoughts but gravity is not responsible. Yet effective 
ly all psychic events involve mind in one way or another and the problem of 
finding laws or consistencies in psychological phenomena ranges far wider 
than parapsychology. We are far from needing to assume, therefore, that 
psychic events violate any laws of nature, even as at present formulated, 
and if this is in due course shown, it will simply point to the need for 
that law to be reformulated. In other words, if.we are to apply Hume's 
argument, on miracles to psychic phenomena, we have to assume from the outset 
that a violation of the laws of nature has occurred and the strength of his 
argument will depend entirely on the strength of these preconceptions. If 
we decide in advance that men cannot be brought back to life in any 
circumstances, his argument in such purported circumstances must be con­
vincing. But if we allow even the slightest possibility of such restoration, 
his argument helps us not at all to weigh the evidence dispassionately or to 
understand it: and a fortiori, this is true of psychic phenomena.
Hume’s criteria were considered also by Broad in his Lectures on 
11Psychical Research. He sought to show that 'in dealing with evidence,
we always have to take into account the antecedent probability or
improbability of the alleged events, i.e. its probability or improbability
relative to all the rest of our relevant knowledge and well-founded belief
other than the special evidence adduced in its favour.' He then proceeded
to discuss the problems of testimony of events which conflict with 'one or
more of the basic limiting principles which form the framework of all our
12practical activities and scientific theories.' As I noted earlier,
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he had discussed these basic limiting principles more tully tn 
Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research and he picked out for comment 
the problems of direct mind to mind communication, precognition, 
psycho-kinesis and survival or communication after death: all of which,
he claimed, we take for granted cannot happen.
What Broad was, in effect, describing here were the limits of the
all-pervading paradigm or conceptual framework of Western thought. But
once this is understood, it becomes apparent that other, alternative
paradigms, no less firmly based in observation and rationality, might be
possible for there are no immutable ’laws’ which prove that parapsychological
phenomena cannot happen. In other words, given the evidence, it is the
existing paradigm that needs to yield. But this, as I have already shown,
cannot be contemplated lightly. As I shall show more fully presently, that
paradigm is not only the framework in terms of which we view the world:
it is the very framework on which our personalities have developed.
A threat to the framework is a threat to our very stability as persons:
which is why we cannot disregard the paradigm in terms of which we think
without being able to switch to one that is more adequate. Yet our current
paradigm is already being eroded. Whether or not Broad's basic limiting
principles were taken for granted twenty years ago, at the time of his
. 13lectures, to many people they seem more questionable today and, as I 
need now to show, such misgivings should be reinforced when different 
aspects of the evidence are examined in more detail.
1 A good general account of experimental work before 1972 is From 
Anecdote to Experiment in Psychical Research by R H Thouless (i972)
A much more detailed survey of many aspects of parapsychology is to 
be found in Handbook of Parapsychology ed. B B Wolman
2 e g R H Thouless op. cit. pp 118-122
3 For an extended example, see E S P, a Scientific Evaluation by
C E M Hansel (1 966)
4 See e g Parapsychology in Search of a Paradigm' by S C Thakur in
Philosophy of Parapsychology eds. B Shapin & L Coly (1977) PP 198-215
5 The force of this comment is to be seen in a comparison of J Taylor's
Superminds (1975)* a akgar and fully illustrated account of his
experimental work wi tiff phenomena, and the statement by him and by
E Balanovskii 'Can Electromagnetism account for Extra-Sensory 
Phenomena' in Nature vol 2 j 6 f 2 Nov. 1978, pp 64-7
6 Hume's Enquiries ed. L A Selby-Bigge , 2nd. edn. pp 114-6
7 A Flew Hume's Philosophy of Belief ( i t } 6 l )
8 Inquiry concerning Human Understanding sec. X(1) footnote
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9 G R Price Science 26 Aug 1955 vol 122 no. 3165 pp 359-367? the 
ensuing discussion by S G Soal, J B Rhine, P E Meejil & M So riven,
and P W Bridgeman; with further rejoinders by Price and Rhine Science 
6 Jan. 1956 pp 9-19
10 Doubt has since been cast on the results of experiments by Soal with
; Shackleton. It seems clear that certain figures were altered but the 
; form of the alterations raises many unresolved questions: see 'The
Soal-Goldney Experiments with Basil Shackleton: New Evidence of
Data Manipulation* by B Marwick in Proo S P R vol 56 part 211 May 1978 
and subsequent correspondence in the S P R Journal
11 Lectures on Psychical Research pp 14-20
1 2  "  "  "  "  p p  3 - 4
13 See the survey by C Evans of some 1500 responding readers of the 
New Scientist , mostly working scientists and technologists of whom 
67/o held E S P to be an established fact or likely possibility and
88^ held its investigation to be a legitimate undertakings New Scientist 
25 Jan. 1973? p 209
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PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MEMORY J 47    ,----------- .----------- .— . iW!t«fro3K«B>' *** »'
The defining characteristics of personal.identity have been the subject 
of intense discussion in recent years. ■ ■ Broadly, views as to its nature h 
depend on the relative weights given to various kinds of mental continuity,' 
and in particular to memory, as against forms of physical continuity.'' I do 
not propose to enter here into discussions of the implications of exchanged 
bodies, exchanged memories* divided brains/and. divided consciousness, for 
in many ways, the preconceptions of the disputants have been more significant 
than their conclusions A /  Jit this point my. concern with personal identity ’ /. 
is limited to considering*first the principle of basing the idea of, • 
personal identity on .the continuity of thebo&y, and thexi of considering the/1 
related problem of the physical basis of m e m o r y ; I  shall, however, return 
to the question of personal ..identity much later1 in this study*
I have already argued that all our knowledge of the external world 
and in particular of the. bpdy stem from ol’p?.,sense, and other experiences 
and that the external and physical worlds ,vVincluding'the body,* are thus to 
be thought of in terms of higher level concepts. ‘-From this -claim there / . ? 
follows a view of the relation of the body "to. the personality which radically 
simplifies the whole approach to the subject. . .Briefly, because all we know 
about the .body, stems from the content of our sense and., other experiences, 
end since from the content!'of these experiences we build the concept of 
the body, the concepts of; the body and of the causal chains of events in . ;
the sense mechanisms .are higher level concepts*:/ We can,, of,,course,7 escplaih^  f 
the content of a sense experience in terms of the content of sense experience? 
of, say, instruments monitoring neuronal discharges and 6f concepts' derived / 
from them, but we cannot explain our sense experiences as Such'as deriving 
from the body and these causal chains without taking, the metaphysical step, 
of giving these .physical events conceptual priority and thus involving / 
conceptual inversion* But. if we cannot explain our sense experiences as sticK 
in terms of the body, a fortiori, we cannot explain consciousness or mind 
or personality without Such conceptual inversion, and it follows that we 
cannot explain personal identity in these ‘terms. We in practice recognise 
the personality by; the body, because it is a manifestation of the personality5 
the personality is not. a manifestation of’ the body. ' '* ' r';' ." 4/
' —  But if. the identity of the personality, cannot be . defined by the, body 0
it must be sought elsewhere and memory provides an obvious candidate, '4
1, ■ '  ’ • -v 7  ■ •’ . ;• l/, Without memory ou$- experiences would lack; all meaning and all continuity ‘of
1 -7 :.v 0  X : '  .7 .7
the personality would be lost,Many difficulties have, however, been 
in relying on memoir as a criterion of personality for, as was said by 
Joseph Butler, the eighteenth century divine, ’consciousness of personal 
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity*.
In other words, only real, as distinct from false, memories guarantee 
identity and they have to be the memories of the personality concerned.
The person, it would seem, cannot then rely on memory to justify his 
claim to continuing identity. The answer to this, however, is that memory, *. 
as I shall show, lies at many conceptual levels and relates to many contexts, 
I judge whether my recollection that Mr X was my form master when I was 
aged twelve by reference to other memories and these may lead me to conclude 
that I was mistaken and that Mr X was my form master when I was eleven.
I judge individual memories in terms of this structured complex of memories 
and it is this structured ‘complex as a whole which, I shall argue, is the 
basis of my identity. In any event, as Parfit has argued,2 self- identity 
is itself a questionable idea. Am I the same person as 1 was at the age 
of ten? My answer can only be both yes and no; in one sense 1 am the same 
person but in another sense I have changed greatly. It is, therefore,
Parfit claims, ’psychological connectedness* rather than identity that 
matters; and psychological connectedness is a matter of degree. As 
Penelhum says ’there is only one person (myself) with whose earlier or 
later stooges I can b© psychologically connected. But this does not seem * 
to be a necessary truth, merely a brute fact about how the world is at 
present. ’d/L a • v
If, however, all our memories are stored in the brain, we are led 
back by another route to dependence for our psychological connectedness on 
the body. That our memories are so stored is an almost unquestioned 
assumption of psychologists and neurophysiologists - an assumption, that has 
been taken over by many philosophers alsq. Thus Ayer, having raised the 
problem of a disembodied stream of consciousness and referred to the 
evidence of psychical research, says that.’The evidence of the causal 
dependence of all our experiences upon the condition of our bodies.appears 
to me to carry greater w e i g h t . A i d  Williams says ’But memory is a 
causal notion, and as we actusj.l3ru.se it, it seems _a .necessary condition
on x'8 present knowledge of x's earlier experiences constituting memory 
of those experiences that the causal chain linking those experiences and 
the knowledge should not run: outside the body. * And in the subsequent
f' ■ !i . > vdiscussion, following Shoemaker, he takes for granted that the memories
.. gof two people could be exchanged by exchanging their brains. ,
Claims such as those of Williams were disputed by Wittgenstein when
J. ■’>
he commented: 'I saw this man,years ago:' I see him again, X recognise him,
X remember his name. Why does there have to be a cause of this remembering 
in my nervous system? , Why must something or other, whatever it may be, 
be stored up there in any form? Why must a trace have been left behind?
Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological
regularity corresponds? If this overturns Our concept of causality then
<7 •it is time it is overturned,1' The answer to Wittgenstein's questions 
might be expected to be that; this is the way.the world is? there are such
. '£.v fji . .
traces and a mass of soientific^shows it. In practice no such evidence is 
forthcoming and there is much evidence to suggest that it cannot be forth­
coming. Such evidence as can be adduced is open to other interpretations 
as I shall show. The assumption that there are such traces for all memories 
rests on the misconceptions of our current Western paradigm. More is, 
however, obviously involved for the brain must have a vital role and the 
engrain is a necessary feature of our memories being developed: in other words,
as I shall show, from the point of view of brain, memory is not a simple 
1 concept, • , j' 7,7 • ' ' . . \
These and other views of Wittgenstein relating to memory have been 
taken up by Malcolm in 4 Memory and Mind. His criticisms of philosophical 
accounts of memory are closely related to those which I made earlier about 
perception. Since there are events occurring in the world around us, it
f -is assumed that there must be mental counterparts of these events and that
• r '
there must therefore be internal events. Malcolm notes the prevalence of
the view that what we remember are not objects and events but are always
mental in character and thati'the objects of memory are called ideas or
■b ' 8sensations or impressions or>perceptions or images.' As I have shown, this
account is in many respects unsatisfactory and it leads to the opposing
and equally unsatisfactory view that in memory we are 'directly aware1 of
the objects that we witnessed in the past. In contrast, Malcolm seeks to
show that 'the words "memory" and "remembering", as they are actually used,
range over a huge spectrum of , cases. In some of these cases there are
memory-images? in some there are claims or judgements? in some there is . i
a "re-living" of the past; in‘some there is "trying" to remember;, in some there? 
is just confident behaviour.f/^Philosophers feel tempted to concentrate 
on a portion of the total range and fix on it as "memory in the fullest
> 1 . . . * n
sense" or as "genuine" memory. But these stipulations are unjustified.’
But, Malcolm continues, if memory is not in some sense a copy of the thing 
remembered, this throws a major .question over the possibility of there 
being some physical .counterpart of memory in the form of a memory trace.
For psychologists and neurophysiologists the;"memory trace has. three roles, 
’First, a memory trace has a- causal role in bringing about a memory response; 
without the existence of the* trace there would be a gap in the causal chain 
and causal action would oocufc at a temporal distance. Second, enduring 
traces provide.;for the retention or storing in memory of experience and 
learning. Third, a trace possesses a similarity in structure to what is 
remembered.^ ■ . • 7  , .7,, V..
Malcolm seeks then 'to show that though past experiences may cause 
us to do something, and there is, therefore,‘a ’causal ingredient’ in memory, 
this does not require the assumption either of causal laws or of a temporally 
continuous chain of causation. As he says, ’It is a truism that people 
respond to experiences and perceived events, weeks, months, years after the
occurrence of these events. 1 In ordinary life our thinking is not boggled
' - 11 ■ '• . " 7by these temporal gaps,* - As he notes, there-cannot be a gap in a causal
process unless first there is a causal process’and he criticises the o,©sumption
that beneath the phenomenology of memory there has to be in all oases a
causal process of memory. He then goes on to query the related assumption
that our retention of memories implies their literal storage and he quotes
Deutsch’s comment that ’it is our present lack of theoretical understanding
of how cerebral storage might operate that hampers us in the search for
its physical basis, as we do not have any clear idea of what type of
•. 1 Pphenomena to look for. ’ (Malcolm’s italics) " Nonetheless, it is generally 
accepted that what the processes involved must entail must fall into four 
stageB. Malcolm quotes John’s summary of the position; ’There seem to be 
four fundamental functions that a memory mechanism must perform: (l) the
configuration of external and internal stimuli impinging upon an organism, 
which constitute an experience, must somehow be coded into a neural 
representation; (2 ) the neural representation of that experience (coded 
information about the set of5 stimuli) must be stored; (3) it must be possible 
to gain access to the coded information in order to retrieve specific
experiences from storage; and (4) the retrieved data must again be decoded 
into neural activity, which somehow recreates the sensations and qualities 
of the original: experience and thus constitutes a "memory".' All this 
is based on the assumption of a transfer of mental events to the brain and 
back again.' a / v  \ *. • . ■ '!. . Rt-4.
Though there are as Malcolm shows, a wide spectrum of ca.ses covered by 
the words 'memory';and! 'remember', they have a greater unity than he allows.
As he accepts, sometimes when! remember, X visualise what I am remembering, 
but sometimes 1 remember in words. Thus if I am asked if I remember 
someone whose picture X am shown, I may answer, 'John Smith* without any 
conscious thought: and if I; am asked if I remember John Smith I may answer
'yes' without visualisation.! I do not need to visualise John Smith to recall 
him for the words 'John Smith* play the same kind of role as visualisation, 
uniting what I am asked to my memories of him. - The name and the visualisation 
in such circumstances are largely interchangeable. Other events can play 
a similar role.. A glance at; the clock may bring to my lips the words 'I must 
go', but without speaking X a^ay simply reach for my coat. Thus memories 
can be evoked in many different ways and can.result in many different kinds of 
response but this does not of itself disprove the possibility that there may 
be a similar variety of linked traces in the brain.
Malcolm's objection to! such traces is however better founded than that. 
First, there is the absence of.any conclusive neurophysiological evidence, 
despite years of concentrated search:; a point to which he, of course, draws 
attention. The ability of the memory to retain earlier learning despite
the destruction of large areas of the cortex, ledICarl Lashley in 1950 to
write: 'I sometimes feel in reviewing the evidence on the localisation of
the memory trace, that the necessary conclusion is ;tliat learning just is not 
possible. It is difficult to' conceive of a mechanism which can satisfy the 
conditions set forward.' This view was reiterated by Rozin in 1976 when ho
said: 'In the classical paper in this area, "In Search of the Engram",
Karl Lashley (1950), after a|long series of experimental attempts at excising 
engrams in animals, admitted* that he had not been able to locate them.. The 
story in humans is remarkably similar. Even massive lesions of the brain 
do not result in what can be:defined as a loss of long-term memories.
Though it is logically impossible to prove that loss is not loss of access, 
the actual phenomena do not suggest significant true losses. Most losses
of past memories are impermanent. ..... Pribram' (1949) in summarising the 
literature on impaired memorp, consequent upbh experimentally produced local , 
brain damage in 'animals, 'Concludes .that \ ^ 'tne'S^aiimeht apparently is not 
so much a removal/of localizabl© engrams asan interference with the
. s “ • *" r *7/ J,j’' v | ** V /L :y/>vf • ' 1* v  • - * j. .mechanisms that code neural; events so as...to* allpw facile storage and retrieval,..... ‘*v „ .'I'(C.' ■' " 1 ;• *1 AThis holds good as well for humans. We are; still in search of the engram. ’
jV/l. - pg’ ;f /Vi-Tliis bewildering olusiyeness of the engrain despite massive research’ •- j: -s'i.effort over more than a centhry ;is confirmed .from nther angles. That there 
is a difference between longh and short term memories is now well established. 
Short term memories usually ilast only some .seconds/ as when we briefly
.? j, * * /’.j. _
memorise a telephone number land, having dialled it, forget it. The evidence 
suggests that the physical basis of these short term memories lies in the 
reverberating circuits in thp brain. Their role is seen in current theories 
as allowing for the establishment; of permanent: circuits in the brain which 
are assumed to provide the physical basis of long-term memory. , It is known 
that growth takes place at junctions between neurones, the synapses, in respons 
to repeated stimulation; . Such growth normally takes place over some hours 
whereas short-term memories last some seconds. As Eccles says, *We are
> , .. * ** \  *’ * ' Vi ' ' ■ » ,f “ c * •'confronted with the urgent problem of filling" in the temporal gap between
the short term memory of seconds and the hours required for the synaptic
. • ' 'Hq-V v . ■ ' 'fr: " • ; • ’growth of long term memory.11= 7 - Therefore an intermediate memory has been
. ;  :■ f 3  -suggested relying on certain, synapses which. appear to be more easily
modifiable. But the evidence for e M  this seems entirely speculative and■ ■ , . . -i /the suggestion appears to have been invokedjbecaus© of evidence but because 
the gap cannot otherwise be explained on existing assumptions.
The question whether the brain has the necessary capaoity to retain 
all our memories has also been considered. - Von Neumann in a pioneering study
made various calculations based on information theory and on the basis of
• - ‘ ' 1 6  1 his calculations, Wooldridge; has made various estimates. Assuming that the
1 0 ,0 0 0 million neurones in the brain are the receptors, he found that the
storage requirements of a sixty year life could be met only by stretching
all the stages in the calculation in the direction of low storage needs.
In particular, he made very low estimates of the amount of information
retained and he appears to have made no allowance in his calculations fori * ... «•:
meeting the requirements of redundancy which provides the only known way
• » < , to ensure stability and accuracy of memory over many years. This involves
*a factox’ which Elsasser estimated at 10^ and which ho accepted was probably
5 1«7too low if storage is at quantum level. 1 Any such calculations have, of
course, an enormous range of uncertainty but when the needs can hardly be
met even by making the minimum estimates at each point, some doubts must .
be cast on the assumptions. »
Other factors add to these doubts. It appears, for instance, that
some 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 neurones die each day, never to be replaced, yet, for most of
life, memory is riot impaired. What is more, when, with the onset of senility,
memory is impaired, it is the early memories which are retained and the recent
memories which are lost. This is directly contrary to what might be expected
if memories are stored in the brain but might be expected if no storage
in the brain were involved but the learning mechanisms were deteriorating.
As for the cases of those with phenomenally good memories, one of which
has been vividly described by A Luria in The Mind of a Mnemonist , it is
noteworthy that their inability to forget is matched by an inability to
organise their memories so as to be able to draw general conclusions from
them: in other words, to discriminate, classify and conceptualise.. Whereas
there seems to be no adequate explanation of these states on conventional
interpretations of memory, if no storage is involved,and their retention' itakes place anyway, their undisoriminating recall fa^ls to be explained
in terms of the inadequacy of the discriminatory and integrative mechanisms
of the brain which in their nature not only play this role but also act
as a sieve, a screen, eliminating all irrelevant memories. These doubts about
there being a memory trace are emphasised when we note the greatly increased
range of memory under hypnosis. Police in parts of the U S A  are, for instance
reported to be using hypnosis on willing witnesses of serious crime to enable
a much fuller reconstruction of the crime to be made. Penfield, in the course
of brain operations under local anaesthetic, discovered that by electrical
stimulation of the exposed cortex, some patients found themselves re-living
,j ■ . ■ '
in vivid detail, whole sequences of long past events and this led him to
18suggest that all our experiences must be retained in the brain. Even more 
remarkable have been the considerable and rapidly increasing number of cases 
where those under deep hypnosis have been taken back through their earliest 
years to the very point of birth, through the period in the womb and then 
beyond where new personalities with memories of earlier times have emerged. 
Such people have given vivid and often emotion-fraught accounts of lives in 
earlier times: accounts which where they can be checked, have often proved
to be astonishingly accurate, sometimes giving information which only
83
}subsequently proved to be correct. Those hypnosis cases find strong
re~inforeement from a now significant number of cases where children recall
clearly a former life, often as a young person who died only1a few years
earlier and whose relations,jfriends and home surroundings survive and
are recognised by the child. A number of impressive cases have been collected
20and rigorously checked by Stevenson. Whether or not these cases imply
re-incamation, such memories cannot have been stored in the brain.
Clairvoyance casts further light on these problems. As I have already
noted, whatever the processes involved in clairvoyance, to refer to it as
a form of perception is almost certainly misleading for one finds neither
the physical organs nor the physical processes nor the reliability nor the
clarity associated with perception. Some of the factors common to E S P
21and memory have been explored by Roll."' He quoted W H C Tenhaeff, the
Dutch parapsychologist who, commenting on the behaviour of his ’paragnosts’
in free response tests, says he was reminded "of persons thinking intently of
a word or a name which they have learned or heard before, or of an event
22they have witnessed in the past." A case involving Tenhaeff and Enklaar 
of the University of Utrecht and the Dutch mediiira, Croiset, illustrates 
this close linkage of memory and E S P .  It involved a mediaeval document 
sealed in an envelope.
’Almost immediately, Croiset said, "I return with this manuscript to 
the Middle Ages. The image of a Pope appears to me. This document is 
somehow connected with a Pope. I see also a knight and a monk." .... The 
document was, indeed, written by a monk (a request to the Pope) at the order 
of the knight.’ Presently, Croiset remarked, ’I am thinking of a book which 
I read many years ago. It is called ’Sans Famille’. The main character in 
this book is Remy. He is searching for his brother. This brother lives on 
a houseboat, an ark. Ark, arlc, arche. Has the word ’arche’ something to 
do with this document I am holding?"’ In the document the word ’presul’ 
appeared frequently and it is synonymous with the word ’archiepi.seopus *«
As Tenhaeff said: ’"During this experiment, Croiset received a telepathic
impression of the \rord ’archiepiscopus?. The first part of this word 
reminded him of the word ’arc’ - the Dutch word for ’houseboat’. This, 
in turn, reminded him of R&ny, the hero of Hector Malot’s ’Sans Famille’, 
who was searching for his houseboat-living brother. Croiset emotionally 
identified with Remy becaiise both he and Remy had foster parents."’2"
19
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It will be apparent that Croiset's own memories and the^ideas and images 
were in effect indistinguishable to him,
A similar example, this time of telepathy, is provided by an experiment
carried out by Professor Gilbert Murray, On one occasion when a group was
experimenting and Mrs Davies was acting as agent, she thought of 'Jane Eyre
at school standing on a stool and being called a liar by Mr Brooklehurst.
The school is spread out below her and the Brooklehurst family "a mass of
shot purple silk pelisses and orange feathers"®' Murray's response was:
'My mother being at her French school and being labelled "impie".' Murray
remembered being told that his Mother had once been so punished at school,
'I reject that. ... Girl standing up and a group or a family coming in and
2Adenouncing her. I think it is English.' Again the memory and the telepathic 
experience both came into his consciousness and were apparently distinguishable 
only by his noting that the telepathic experience did not quite fit the 
memory. Yet this experience, like all cases of telepathy, clairvoyance and 
psycho-kinesis, must have involved processes in some sense extending 'outside' 
or 'beyond' the brain. >,
It will be apparent that both in the Croiset and Murray cases,-the 
association of ideas and images played a very large part. The associations 
of the people and events w i t h  the manuscript and the association of the two 
school events are clear but the associative linkage of Jpresul* /with ' 
'archiepiscopus* and so with 'arche* and'ark', the houseboat, though leas 
direct is equally revealing, s As I shall seek to illustrate much more fully, 
such associations play a basic role not only in memory but also in extra­
sensory perception. That ideas and associations which occur in association 
or become associated in the mind tend to retain these associations so that 
the memory of one tends to evoke the others has long been recognised. The 
process was central to Aristotle's doctrine of mind and played a major role 
in the thinking of the British Empiricists. Yet the term has* all" but vanished 
from modem psychology so ! need to show why this so and why I shall need 
to use it.
The reason why this term has disappeared from modern psychology was 
summed up by Hebb thus: 'Though this term has disappeared from psychology
as a result of the house cleaning by Watson that has got rid of all 
"mentalistic" terms...., it has meaning again now that we have found out 
how to deal with mental or cognitive processes behaviouristically. Wre have 
seen that "idea" is not a precise term, so "association of ideas" is not
likely to be precise either, but ifc does re for generally to the oommcni 
experience that some things pcour together in thought because they have been 
perceived together in.the p&pt. ... Whether it is called the "association 
o.f ideas" or "connections between mediating processes", this tendency of
simultaneously active central processes to become capable of exciting one
 ^ 25another appears fundamental to the existence of organised thought.’ J
It is clear, therefore, that though the term is imprecise, the occurrence- 
of the association of ideas is not in doubt. On the other hand, when Watson 
sought to rid psychology of a lot of ideas about mental processes that had 
been uncritically taken for granted and which he claimed were nothing more 
than conditioned reflexes, he thereby imported the assumption that every 
mental event has a physical counterpart: an assumption which, as I have
been showing in connection with memory, was, and still is, unsubstantiated.
That there are some physical processes involved in memory need not, of course, 
be doubted, but this does no;b require all memories to have physical counterpart
in all circumstances as I shall show. I propose, therefor©, to retain the
\ .. . . ' ■ . .......more old-fashioned term ’.the association of ideas* which loaves open questions
< \. , . . .  3
about physical counterparts, and I shall seek to justify this caution by 
showing where physical process are involved and where they are not. It must 
be stressed, however, that by using the older term and in due course abandoning 
a purported physical explanation of the phenomenon, no doubt can thereby 
be cast upon the occurrence of such associations. It must also be added 
that in addition to the classic kinds of association by bontiguity and 
similarity, there is also association of lower level concepts with higher 
level concepts which embrace^ them. Indeed, it was because all learning 
involves not just ’association’ but '’assimilation* to previous learning 
that Piaget prefers the latter word. The classic term should not^give 
rise to misunderstanding in the contexts in which I shall be using it.
As so understood, such associations play a major role, not only in 
memory but, as I shall further show, in extra-sensory perception and, indeed, 
in the structuring and continuity of the personality. The assumption, however, 
that such associations can be regarded as central mediating processes in 
the brain and that all memories are stored in the brain is, as I have said, 
far from being siibstantiated. As I have shown, despite massive effort over 
a hundred years and more, the attempt to find a physical basis for memory 
has largely failed and the constraints which any explanation must satisfy 
if storage takes place in the brain appear almost impossible to satisfy and 
they are probably growing greater as more about it is discovered. Apart from 
the philosophical difficulty which is unanswered by any current theories,
about hox-7 mental events can be encapsulated and stored in a physical system, 
there are major difficulties in understanding how the brain could store even 
the normal memories of a lifetime, and particularly in a form which allows 
for instant recall. There are major problems, too, in reconciling such
storage without deterioration, of memory over most of life, and with the
\ ' ■ order and nature of that deterioration in old age. These problems are
i ' - * .accentuated when the range of memory under hypnosis is taken into account:
and these memories appear subjectively and in the circumstances of their
occurrence to be indistinguishable from what appear to be memories of earlier
lives and from various forms of extra-sensory perception - where neither
sense mechanisms nor brain storage can be involved. Underlying the assumption?
that all memories are stored in the brain, as I have already said, is the
wider assumption that all memories have physical counterparts in the brain
and the yet wider assumption that all mental processes can be regarded as
brain processes, or as epiphonomena of these processes, or as having some
linked parity with them; assumptions which 1 have sought to show are patently
false. Although, therefore, the evidence casts serious doubts on the
assumption that all memories are stored in the brain and points towards
jtheir retention in some form of interpersonal or collective unconscious, 
yet the vast amount that is already known about the working of tho brain 
makes clear that it has a fundamental role not only in our sense experiences 
but also in learning, both of which have intimate links with memory*
A basis of a re-interpretation and reconciliation of this and much
other evidence lies in our distinguishing two different kinds of memory. The
distinction was drawn by Tulvlng in 1972 and has received wide currency
in subsequent discussions of! the subject though it has not proved as fruitful
2 7experimentally as might have been hoped. - The reason for this may lie in 
the form in which the distinction was conceived by Tulving, as I shall show.
The distinction drawn i>y Tulving was between what he termed 'episodic* 
and 'semantic' memory. He noted that psychologists had hitherto spoken rather 
loosely about different kinds of memory; there had been references to some 
25 different kinds of memory in a single collection of essays published some 
■bio years earlier. Tulving regarded both episodic and semantic memories 
as being involved in normal recall. He described their different character­
istics thus. 'Episodic memory refers to memory for personal experiences and 
their temporal relations, while semantic memory is a system of receiving, 
xetaining, and transmitting information about meaning of words, concepts, 
and classification of concepts,“ 'Episodic memory receives and stores
information about temporally; dated episodes or events, and teraporal-npr* 1 !
relations among those events• A perceptual event can be stored in the
episodic system solely in terms of its autobiographical reference to the
already existing contents of the episodic memory store.’ On the other hand,
’semantic memory is the memory necessary for the use of language. It is
a mental thesaurus, organised knowledge a person possesses about words and
other verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among
them, about rules, formulas, and alogrithms for the manipulation of these
symbols, concepts and relations. Semantic memory does not register
perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input
signals. ‘The semantic system permits the retrieval of information that was
not directly stored in it, and retrieval of information from the system
leaves its contents -unchanged, although any act of retrieval constitutes
' 29an input to episodic memory.’ Tuiving suggested, however, that the 
episodic and semantio memory systems could operate separately and that, 
for example, a flash of light or the seeing of a person’s face could be 
remembered without the intervention of the semantic system.
In the discussion which follows I shall accept and adduce further 
evidence in support of the basic validity of lulving1s distinction between 
episodic and semantic memories but with several significant conceptual, 
differences. The most obvious difference which will emerge more fully 
presently, is tnat whereas Tuiving assumes both memories to find their 
; physical basis in the brain, I accept and develop tnat view as regards the 
semantic memory but seek to show that events in the episodic memory have no 
physical counterpart but are retained in a collective or interpersonal 
unconscious, a concept whose logical status and character will have to De 
considered and justified presently. This claim carries with it, however, 
another conceptual difference from the views of Tuiving about the nature 
of the two forms of memory - though it may be considered more as a difference 
of emphasis. Tuiving appears to regard the two memories primarily as 
different roles whereas though we may think of the episodic memory as a kind 
of storehouse of processed experiences, I shall argue that the semantic 
memory is better thought of as the processor of that material. Tuiving, 
as I have noted, thinks of events such as seeing a face as passing straight 
to the episodic memory but it appears reasonable to regard the semantic 
memory as playing a role even here. It is well established that even when 
we see a face, the image is broken down into punctuate elements in the retina 
of the eye and then reassembled in the moat complex manner at many stages. 
What is more, in seeing a face, we see it as a face - in meaningful terms.
I
Even a flash of light will usually call for some interpretation as a torch, 
a spark or a  firework. Although, therefore, a major part of the semantic 
memory is concerned with rendering meaningful the forms of spoken and 
written language, it equally renders meaningful effectively all the rest 
of our experiences. But, of course, though the primary role of the semantic 
memory is to process the information reaching it, to achieve this role it 
has itself to grow and develop according to the processes discussed earlier 
of discriminating uniformities in our sense experiences, of classifying them 
and of integrating (conceptualising) them. In this sense, the semantic 
memory is a cumulative cognitive memory in terms of which each new sense 
experience is rendered meaningful and then passes on to the episodic memory 
in this meaningful form. 7 :
We may, therefore, envisage the system operating in principle as 
follows. Let us imagine seeing a sign or word written up on a hoard.
The form of the word is broken down at the eye.and is reassembled in the retina 
and at subsequent stages in the brain. During these it acquires its meaning. 
*13118 process can be understood in terms of the initial stimulus awakening 
at each stage neuronal circuits which have been established on the basis 
of uniformities in earlier experiences. The resulting pattern of neuronal 
discharges continues to discharge for some seconds as a short term memory 
unless subsequent events interrupt the sequence. The normal interpretation 
of short term memory is that; it allows for the structural development which 
is needed for the memory trace to be set in train. As I have noted, however, 
these structural changes often take some hours to be effected? hence the 
case for postulating an intermediate memory. On the other hand, on the 
interpretation being offered here, this problem at once clarifies itself.
The role of short term memory is not to effect structural changes in the 
semantic memory and, ex hypothesi, there are no structural changes involved in 
the episodic memory. The role of the short term memory is therefore to 
allow a wide range of discharging networks each to establish associations 
with memories in the episodic memory which will allow them to be recalled 
to the threshold of consciousness. On this basis, the semantic memory 
networks are part of the perceptual networks and at each stage have association 
with memories in the episodic memory which are thereby evoked and provide 
the event with meaning. What is more, though it would seem that perception 
requires some form of isomorphism between the events reaching the retina 
of the eye and the ultimate physical counterparts of consciousness, some 
measure of arbitrariness and individual uniqueness of form of the networks
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is presumably possible at higher levels of abstraction, all that ia needed 
being that a given form should have consistent and specific associations: 
which is borne out by the non-representational and conventional character 
o f  much symbolism including language, written and spoken. This said, however, , 
the networks which form .the semantic memory, develop on the basis of uniformitie- 
in the signals reaching the senqory receptors. But that learning process 
does not rely on the few seconds during which short term memory endures? 
though the time is very variable, such conceptual learning can take children 
hours of work at school before new concepts are grasped? which is the order 
of time for the growth to take place at the neuronal synapses; the process 
which almost certainly underlies the development of the semantic networks.
There is supporting evidence for much of this in the pathology of
memory. Kinsboume and Wood have reviewed the evidence in the light of
30Tulving’s division of episodic and semantic memories. They note the 
puzzling phenomenon of retrograde amnesias - the tendency for impairment 
of memory to be greater, the; more recent the memories which it is sought 
to recall. They reassess the evidence and suggest that in this state remember­
ing is typically incomplete and that there tench to be 'islands of remembering'. 
Events become condensed, disconnected from their context and mislocated in 
time. As they showed in an earlier paper, retrieval in this state from 
earlier years tends to be general and not bound to any particular event.
In other words, retrieval from the semantic memory tends to be satisfactory 
but poor from the episodic memory. On this basis, they claim that '.Amnesics 
are seriously deficient in retrieving information about specific events from 
any time in their lives. Yet categorical information, .information about 
appropriate uses of objects and other® such information which is not tied
31to any specific instances is relatively accessible to long-term retrieval.’' 
That the concepts and their relationships which lie in the semantic memory 
remain accessible can be understood on the basis that the core of associated 
experiences may have a well-established but widely spread physical basis 
in the brain and in any event most items of semantic memory must have very rich! 
associations because of their use in many contexts. Therefore, the destruction 
of part of the brain is likely to destroy only a part of the semantic memory 
network and may leave some levels virtually intact. What remains may then 
be'sufficient to evoke a proportion of the associated memories which may be 
sufficient to give the relevant concepts meaning, albeit somewhat impoverished. 
On the other hand, the events ascribed by Tulving to the episodic memory
have, in comparison, associations which are relatively weak and diverse, 
relating as they normally do, to particular incidents which have nonetheless 
very complex components each with their own associations. After an accident 
or operation in which the networks of the semantic memory are damaged, the 
ability to establish associations for new experiences may be much impaired 
and thus the ability to recall them may be lost. On the other hand, memories * 
of before the accident or operation will have their associations already 
established and their recall:will depend only on sufficient networks remaining 
to provide suitable cues. This appears to explain various forms of amnesia: 
thus the inability of old people to recall recent events presumably lies in
the impoverishment of the semantic memory networks so that strong new  .
associations can no longer be established, notwithstanding that sufficient 
networks remain to provide cues to evoke earlier memoriess end where the 
damage as a result, say, of an accident, is so great as to destroy even 
the ability to provide cues,'there may still remain sufficient networks 
to enable words and concepts to be used, albeit in an impoverished form, 
given the normal richness of;their associations.
Kinsbouma and Wood also draw attention to certain specific or cortical
32amnesias affecting semantic memory. In these cases the meaning of-. . 
individual words is retained but the ability to oarry their meaning forward 
into whole sentences is lost. This loss of memory span is made intelligible 
if, as is to be assumed, the semantic memory covers not only individual 
concepts but also combinations of concepts -combinations which are necessarily 
much more diverse and flexible than the particular words and concepts that 
make them up and are thus lacking the range of parallel circuits .involved 
in normal concepts. ; '
Kinsbourne and Wood conclude that the amnesic syndrome does suggest 
a difference in the two kinds of remembering and they add that episodic 
remembering represents a more advanced capability than semantic remembering 
in that we learn some word meanings and other semantic information before 
there is evidence of episodic remembering."---' This comment, too, bears out 
the view that the basic role of the semantic memory is to enrich experiences 
with associations: and it also explains why the memories of early childhood,
though inaccessible to normal memory, can be recalled in the dissociated 
state of hjrpnosis when, as I shaH show, the mind is in much more sensitive 
to memories and extra-sensory events which have only weak associations.
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In summary, therefore, L the picture that emerges is of the sensory 
system responding to stimuli by breaking down and reconstituting them % n  
a process involving the semantic memory at many levels and in the form of 
many networks established on the basis of uniformities in earlier experiences. 
Each network at each level has its own clearly defined associations with a 
wide range of memories in the episodic memory: memories which in turn
arouse other memories which .thus become progressively more diffuse but which 
form a structured cluster around the relevant sense experience® The sense 
experience as such enters consciousness while the surrounding associated 
memories cluster near the threshold of consciousness and give the sense 
experience its meaning. , . . '
In the light of this interpretation much hitherto puzzling evidence 
falls into place. The failure to discover the memory trace despite so much 
effort over a century in laboratories all over the world finds an explanation? 
so does the near indestructibility of memories despite massive brain lesions? 
so do many puzzling features of the pathology of memory; and the problem 
of the gap between short term memories which endure for seconds and the 
hours required for the growth at the synapses which apparently underlies 
the development of the neuronal circuits no longer arises. The difficulties 
of reconciling the capacity of the brain with the need to store the memories 
of a lifetime no longer arises in serious form and the apparent close 
relationship of memories to extra-sensory experiences also finds an explanation 
Go does the inability of the elderly to recall reoent memories while retaining 
earlier memories notwithstanding the death of large numbers of cells each 
year: and so do the feats of mnemonists and the abilities of ordinary
people to recall so much under hypnosis.
More basically, tho problem of understanding how physical circuits 
in the brain can store mental images and other memories no longer arises 
for the role of such physical events becomes one of evoking them from the 
collective unconscious, as I shall show. And, as regards our understanding 
of the organisation of the brain, its truly fantastic complexity and 
organisation must become more intelligible if it can be seen as basically 
a mechanism for processing and organising the responses of the organism 
to its environment in the light of experience without having also to take
• ' * A 5 ■ , ' . !
into account blue vast storage requirements of the episodic memory! storage 
in a form which would have to allow for memories to be evoked continuously.?’ 
and almost instantly, particularly where recognition is involved. But, 
of course, to set against this there is conceptual upfeaval of a shift of 
paradigm. •; , •
Tiro further facets of these memory processes need to be noted*at this 
point, though both have wider significance which will have to be developed 
later. The first stems from the claim that events stored in the episodic 
memory have no physical counterpart in. the brain. On the other hand, 
sense events have such physical counterparts and these, 1 have suggested, 
are to be found in the field associated with the neuronal discharges in the 
brain. These sense events., then pas3 into the episodic memory, presumably 
in some way losing their physical components yet, when recalled, presumably 
that physical component must be re-evoked. This would seem to be a puzzlinf 
and even arbitrary claim put forward to bridge an awkward transition.
What it seemingly implies is that such unconscious mental events may have 
a physical component which- can either be manifest or latent and these 
physical attributes must manifest themselves in certain specifiable 
circumstancesJ^What is more, there ought to be other manifestations of 
this phenomenon. That there are such other manifestations, perhaps in the 
very heart of matter as well-as in the exceptional circumstances of psycho­
kinesis I shall seek to establish later.
The second point which needs to b® made at this point is that it is 
the relatively strong associations between each person and his own past 
experiences which make his memories his and which play a major role in 
establishing his own identity. But this same point also carries the 
implication that if the associations between a person and the experiences of 
someone else are such that they can enter his consciousness, his awareness 
will be extra-sensory. These experiences need not be from the originator\s 
more distant pasor/present Centers the episodic memory virtually instantly 
and, as I shall show, there are weak associations in the unconscious with 
end between events that have yet to happen and with events which are not 
experienced by anyone. This suggests, in other words that the processes 
of association are completely general in the sensory/physical world and 
that mind is, from this point of view, a complex system for maximising 
these associations in meaningful-combinations.
In following chapters I shall m o d  to show some of tho many 
manifestations of these associative processes and, in particular, X shall 
need to show the circumstances where associations can he exceptionally 
strong and can form a focus for psychic activity. This is where strong 
emotions are involved. This requires that I should show this comes about. 
At the same time I need to show how emotion fits within the wider picture 
of the body-mind relationship which I am sketching. Two other pointsf
relevant to this study can also usefully be considered in this context.
The first of these is why the defence of a threatened paradigm can become 
so fraught with emotion? and the second is why, in the very nature of our 
personalities, wholeness and integrity of our conceptual model or structure 
manifests itself, not only in rationality and maturity but also in the 
outwardgoing, caring attitude of love, which is itself psi-conducive„ 
Unfortunately, any attempt, however limited, to discuss these points 
meets wider difficulties than might be expected for, from the point of 
view of both philosophy and psychology, the study of emotion is in some 
confusion.
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EMOTION
The study of emotion, has deep roots in philosophy. There is, 
however, little unanimity to he found, not just in explanations and theories 
hut even in definitions. Descartes commented that ’There is nothing in 
which the defective nature of the sciences which we have received from
the ancients appears more clearly than in what they have written on the
1 ' passions. Even today , despite the development of psychology, this
situation appears markedly unchanged. In his study of emotion, published
in 1960, Hillman noted that the Encyclopedia Britannica gave four different
kinds of theories of the emotions and that three leading textbooks gave
respectively four, five and five while a fourth gave thirteen meanings
of emotion. Drever, in his Dictionary of Psychology, made a useful ,
distinction between areas of agreement and disagreement and Hillman set v
this out schematically. As Hillman saids
’I There is agreement about the description of emotion as a complex 
state of the organism of varying intensity involving:
(a) widespread bodily changes,
a mental state of excitement or perturbation
(c) strong feeling, ■ -
(d) an impulse (usually) towards a specific form of behaviour.
II There is disagreement: about:
(a) a more exact description of this complex state?
i 2(b) any explanation of!this complex state.’
The position appears not to have changed radically since then and it 
obviously offers an unpromising basis for considering the limited but 
important issues .involving; emotion which are the concern of this study.
Some - I hope not too controversial - effort has/tb/be. ms,de* however.
Broadly, there is a long philosophical tradition stemming from 
Descartes and the Empiricists which presents emotion as a causal process 
in which perception causes physiological processes which cause the 
behaviour characteristics of the various ©motions. This view has been 
followed by many nineteenth century and more recent philosophers and 
psychologists. This causal account was, however, attacked by Wittgenstein
Aand some later philosophers, notably Kenny. Kenny distinguished the object 
of emotion from its cause and sought to show that the relation of emotion 
both to its object and its manifestations is not contingent and therefore 
not causal. His account was, however, heavily criticised by J R S Wilson*^ ,
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I return to Kenny's aooount labor but it seems lair bo say that it han nob 
added much to what is obviously an elusive end difficult subject. Nor 
has modem experimental psychology, which Kenny himself criticised, added 
much. Indeed, in the field of emotion one of the most fruitful approaches 
remains that inaugurated by Freud.
Broadly in keeping with Freud's approach but much more firmly based 
in neurophysiology and experimental psychology was an account of the emotion? 
in The Organisation of Behaviour by D 0 Hebb, published in 1949* Hebb 
drew attention to a variety of confusions in the subject and then
continued? 'A way out, I believe, can be found if we do two thing3:
first, stop talking about emotions as a single, fundamental kind of unitary 
psychological process and separate (1) those in which the tendency is to 
maintain or increase the original stimulating conditions (pleasurable or 
integrative emotions) from (2) those in which the tendency is to abolish 
or decrease the stimulus (rage, fear, disgust) including, however, depression 
in which the organism may discover no way of escape from the condition
giving rise to the emotion. Secondly, if it is assumed that tho stimuli
in class 2 aro essentially disintegrative, it must be recognised also 
that the disintegration in rage or fear is often incipient or potential 
and likely to be successfully averted by tho aggression or avoidance of 
the subject. In tho case of emotional disturbance, the groat variety 
of causes of disturbance, the differing responses to a single cause, 
tho great variety of expression of a single omotion and tho difforent ways
in which the expression of emotion changes, wore all noted by Hebb. Ho*sought to account for all those features in terms of a disturbance of the 
timing of the discharge of tho neurones of tho brain which disrupts the 
integration of the networks, and ho adduced much evidence in support of 
this claim. He showed also how neurosis and psychosis can be explained 
as conditions of chronic emotional disturbance or as lasting conditions 
in which past emotional disturbance has effected a lasting modification 
of the thought processes.
Hebb's views have stood up woll in the face of much psychological 
and neurophysiological investigation since then. They are echoed by 
Lindsay and Norman who remark that 'There should be little doubt that 
bodily states of tenseness can be distinguished from states of relaxation, 
at least in extreme cases* and they add that 'in terms of tho emotions, 
/"states of tenseness^ are often the symptoms of rage., hate or anger;
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/"states of relaxation /  are often symptoms of pleasurable states.^
More specifically, they says 'First we need an ongoing system that croates
an internal model of the world to provide the expectations that are so
important for emotions. That is, a central feature of the system must b©
cognition; the active development of a picture of the world, including
the past, present and expectations about the future. In addition, we need
an assessment of ... how well our expectations are being met. ... Next,
we need some way of correcting aberrant behaviour. Suppose / ’"there is a
mismatch between expectations and events.^ Panic. Tension. How does
the system cause panic? Obviously it can do the cognitive operations that
lead to the prediction that the /"’conflict cannot be resolved./? *••• When
there is sufficient mismatch of expectations with actual events ... then tho
cognitive comparator triggers the release of appropriate chemicals (mostly
hormones) into the biochemical structure of the body. This changes the
neural activation of the brain structures. These biochemical changes will,
in turn, be picked up by the normal monitoring systems of the body and
will become part of the information used by the cognitive processor. ...
The cognitive system can control biological ©motional processes. Similarly,
the biochemical system can control actions. Th© whole system is a circular,
7feedback, control system.';
Moro generally, this view fits naturally with the view of the living 
organism as a dynamic open system, tending all tho time to seek greater 
integration and to overcome any attempts to disrupt it. Broadly, therefore, 
the integrative ©motions are those associated with pleasurable, satisfying 
activity which tends to bring about greater growth and development of the 
semantic memory, whether by immediate integration of already established 
concepts or by further conceptualisation; and the disintegrative emotions 
are those associated with disruptive situations which tend to disrupt 
the operation of the semantic memory system and to evoke such emotions 
as anxiety, fear, anger, guilt and shame. This fits well with the account 
given earlier of the discriminatory, classifieatory and integrative 
functions of th© personality which, as I have shown, are stressed by 
Piaget. It fits well, too, with the account of the body-mind relationship 
which I have developed on this basis, for each new sense experience 
awakens existing concepts which give it meaning; but if it awakens conoepts
which in como way conflict, often through faulty learning or learning
\ , ,under stress, the effect ip disruptive of the personality: and, of course,’* *
this account recognises that only the semantic and not the episodic 
memory can have its functioning directly affected by biochemical changes.
In tho light of this, briof account of the circumstances leading to 
©motion, it is posoiblo to oast more light on tho criticisms made by 
Kenny of earlier acoounts of ©motion. First, ho oritioises introspective
accounts which aro characteristic of tho Cartesian approaoh and whioh{-
claim that tho emotions aro raontal events which or© introspected and whioh 
are immune from error. As ho oayo, if ouch observations aro available
' ■ 'i > .
only to tho observer, they cannot bo in error for thoy cannot bo corrected8and so cannot bo right or wrong. This is tho point made by V/ittgenotein
and discussed earlier, that before error can ariso, wo nood to have a
concept which is built up from our observations of tho behaviour of others
as well as from our own experiences. On tho difference botwoon a oonoation
end an emotion, Kenny claims that tho ©motion is essentially directed to 
9 . * .objects. And again, wo con coo th© significance of this, for emotion
is normally awakened by sense experiences or sometimes by memories whioh
cause tho integration or disruption of concepts. If I see an alarming
faco at tho window, it disrupts my normal expectations of faces In their
inormal context. As therefore, emotions aro normally directed to objects, 
this relation, according to Kenny, is not contingent: and again, we can
isee that moot emotions are*in their very nature directed to soma object, 
the exception being, perhaps, anxiety. Ifenny, however, oooko to show 
that as tho relation is not contingent, it thoreforo cannot be causal.
j. . . .
But that depends on tho sense of causal. VJhon, in tho case of the 
disintegrative emotions, tho object ’causes’ tho emotion by bringing 
about the mismatch of pro-oxioting concepts, it acta ao a triggers in that
sonoo it is causal. To put tho point another way, objooto or situations
• i
give rise to chains of events whioh largoly determine tho content of
\oi*r sense experiences and it is tho exceptional congruity or incongruity 
of our preconceptions thereby evoked which gives riso to tho emotion by 
producing integration or conflict between existing concepts. Tho potential 
for integration or conflict is always present but normally it has to be 
triggered off. Thus as Kenny says, ©motions are directed to objects 
though many different objects can evoko tho same emotions. In that an
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object is normally nooeosary to evoke emotion, the relationship at that* 
level io not contingent, but in that many different objects will serve, at 
that level it is contingent. But though objects do not in any full 
sense cause emotion, they do 00 in tho sens© that they trigger it.
On tho basis of this’ brief account, it is possible to show how 
emotional experiences pass1 into th© memory, there to become a disruptive 
force in the personality and in 00m© circumstances a focus for psychic 
activity. ¥© can, of course, rooall dispassionately some emotional 
experiences. But some emotional experiences retain thoir force without the
. j ox object being presents th©: problem io tK understand this. Wander, in a
' t : * 10valuable recent review of psychological work on emotion says? ’There is
; 11 good evidenco, dating from' an important paper by Callaway and Dombo (1958)
that increased arousal, particularly at very high levels, loads to a
narrowed range of attention. ... Tims in the panic condition, there io an
insistent signal to keep repeating some sot of actions, its continued
interruption drives tho arousal higher and higher ... ’ and he notes thatip IBaddeley (1972) specifically indicates that extensive throat increases 
arousal which, in turn,,focuses attention on the most important aspects of 
the current environment. As a result, wo would ©2tpeot these events, as they 
pass into the episodic memory, to carry exooptionally strong associations 
and to be particularly easily aroused. Thus Morris draws attention to work 
by ICleinsmith and Kaplan which showed that words arousing high omotion
wore better recalled a week later than words lacking such emotional
• 13arousal and he notes that later work has tended to confirm this. Such
evidence fits also with tho role of short term memories and, as is generally
assumed, the corresponding; reverberations in the brain. In the nature of
a frightening experience, the personality takes some time to return to
normal end, typically, during this time, the experience retains its
influence on consciousness. Assuming that the role of tho short term
memory, as I have argued, is not to establish a permanent trace in the
brain but a strong set of associations, it can clearly establish these
on such occasions. I
In normal life, however, if such recollections evoke distress,
inhibition or repression takes place. If, however, tho; wide range of
associations constantly bring such emotion-evoking memories to the threshold
of consciousness, constant:sub-conscious vigilance is needo to avoid stress
and can cause anxiety. ¥hat is more, events with ouch strong associations
can draw to themselves other events passing into th© episodic memory and
in this way activo complexes can develop which can not only distort thinking
but, as I show, can form the core of autonomous psychic activity.
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Emotion can arise, however, not only when we have some particular 
threatening experience hut; when c/$r paradigm or oonceptual framework, in 
terms of which we view the4 world, is threatened in a more comprehensive 
manner. All such' conceptual frameworks or paradigms within which we view 
the world are, in practice;, limited and in varying measure inadequate, and 
since they form.the very structure of our minds and personalities, it is 
not hard to see that fo*V those who are feeling oppressed hy the inadequacy 
of their paradigm, an alternative which brings a resolution of that conflict 
can be welcomed almost emotionally. Yet for others, an alternative can. he- ‘ * * C • . v.
seen as threatening the stability of the old paradigm. In either event 
the response can be disproportionately emotional, an emotion whioh may, 
of course, be justified by..various forms of rationalisation. It oan a,lso 
he seen that effectively all paradigms have,'built in to them characteristic
V" ’ : • •conflicts which work against the maturity of their members, In-so far 
as individuals grow beyond their culture's paradigm and attain maturity 
or wholeness, they are able to manifest 16ve. . . .
Love is, of course, a. word with several different meanings which,
in practice, shade into each other. It can be a synonym for sexual desiret ‘or for its satisfaction or; it can refer to the des5.re to possess. Differing
f •from either of these is the attitude of unselfish, clear-eyed, and in a 
sense almost dispassionate1 concern for others; an attitude which in! 
Christian thought is known by its Greek.name of 'agape' or charity.
It is a remarkable and revea/Ling commentary on modern academic psychology 
that such a basic feature pf human personality should be ignored in most 
psychology textbooks. It does not, for instance, find a place within Hebb'a 
'Organisation of Behaviour?, or his 'Textbook of Psychology'. Yet, if as 
I have argued, his account; of the emotions is broadly correct, such love 
should be able to find its5place within the framework that he offered.
First, such love is blear-eyed and rationalthe object of such love 
being seen without distorting vision., It is seen, therefore, in fully 
meaningful terms and without conceptual conflict. This in turn implies 
the absence of desire to possess or reject, both of which can be thought 
of in terms of a desire Ori^ebdYto overddtoetinternal conflict. In a sense 
such love is creative in that it seeks the development of the object of
i
that love and so of its own conception of it. It would seem, therefore, 
that a rational, detached,; yet deeply caring attitude ought to be understood 
as the normal concomitant of the rational mature personality and that the
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disintegrative emotions might them be understood in terras of reactions 
to distortions,of it. This, however, is an argument which would take• V , '* * * v „ * [ '
me far beyond the limits of this study to develop though 1 shall need to 
return to it and comment father in a later -chapter.
Within this brief account of the disintegrative and integrative eraotior 
and their fulfillment in love, therefore, I have sought to show how emotion 
finds its place within the’ body-raind relationship for which I am arguing.
I have sought to show why experiences involving intense disintegrative 
emotion can be the nucleus! of complexes and in particular of parapsychologice 
phenomena: and I have sought to show how threats to our overall conceptual
paradigms can produce reactions of deep fear or resentment, or alternatively, 
of relief and near e:Khiltp?ation0 All this needs to be set in a wider, deeper 
context and this leads me to a discussion of an interpersonal or collective 
unconscious. . ; . ' , • 7 - ■
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the i de a o f a  gol lkct ive o r  interpersonal u n c o n s c i o u s •,.
I have given what I/believe are strong grounds for doubting the 
normally accepted .view tfiat all memory, and in particular, the episodic 
memory finds a physical counterpart in the brain; and I have suggested 
that the episodic memoryilieq in, or is*'part>of, or an aspect of, a collective 
or interpersonal unconscious!//This claim, which radically conflicts with 
current thinking/ requires stirong justification and I need now to consider 
the logical status of the semantic and episodic memories and of the personal 
unconscious as well as of/thd,collective or interpersonal unconscious: and
I need to consider further evidence for them too.
Perhaps ,7 surprisingly;|the idea of the unconscious plays little role 
in modern academic psychology7", The position-is explained by Hebb thus: 
he notes that consciousness 4s a state of being awake and responsive. He 
goes on to claim'that in psychoanalytic theory and in popular language 
’consciousness1 has quite a 4ifferenF meaning. 'There are conscious ideas
and unconscious ideas 7: Here |the term does not describe the state of the
* “/ ■ ’*:■ ■ \ i afA ..7 •whole mind, but a part of the mind - the part one knows about .... It is
one thing to say that I am conscious of the world about me. It is another
to say that an idea is conscious, meaning that I am conscious of it, and
implying that I can introspect and be aware of some of some of my mental
activities and not others..’ /And he continues,' ’For modern objective
psychology, which assumes thht introspection does not exist - that mind
does not observe itself directly - there is no conscious in this sense
- I *’(i.e. no part of the mind that we are conscious of or observe directly) and
hence no need to speak of an |unconscious <7 ^ ",. ■'
,■ -• . *. ':\ ■ ‘ 7': .Hebb grants first that/consciousness is a state of being awake and
responsive. In this sense it is legitimate to say that someone who has
come round from an anaestheticvis conscious and also that he is conscious
of, say, a movement on the other side of the room. Hebb distinguishes this
. * I ■ . , . >usage from the idea that a person is conscious of or introspects his ownA * > ■ "
mental activities. To such a claim I also have taken exception but it must
* # . # *. j| ; #be noted that the mischief in this manner of speaking comes when it is used 
to imply that we are conscioiis both of our ideas and of things around us: 
it is the juxtaposition that {is especially objectionable. Of course, we
i- I . ' .
are conscious of things around Us and in that sense we are not conscious
t . :
of our sense experiences or ideas. But if the latter claim needs to be made, 
we can, perhaps, say that our sense experiences are self-intimating, without
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seriously jeopardising the point that we see things or have ideas. Despite 
what Hebb says, this particular source of confusion seems hardly relevant to 
the case for using or not using the concept of the unconscious.
The reason modern objective psychology does not make use of the idea 
of the unconscious appears to;lie primarily in the fact that modern objective^ 
psychology, as Hebb’s words xinply, is concerned primarily with observable \ 
and preferably measurable differences of behaviour and the concept of the 
unconscious is not needed for;this purpose. And if the concept of the 
unconscious is not being used about ideas and fears and so on, the word 
’conscious’ is hardly needed either. But the fact that modern objective 
psychology, with its precise and limited objectives, does not need the concept 
of the unconscious, in no way makes it unnecessary or irrelevant in a wider, 
more conceptual discussion. / However, its conceptual status and some
confusions and differences of:usage still need to be considered.
. |The unconscious processes are considered by Munroe in her comprehensive 
survey of psychoanalytic thought. She notes that ’By definition the
1 • i . . . 2operations of the unconscious cannot be directly discovered by introspection,1
By implication, she might be thought to be suggesting that the operations of the
conscious mind can be discovered by introspection: the view that Hebb, in the
passages quoted above, dissented from. Introspection can, however, take rather
a different form. Thus Popper and Eccles in The Self and its Brain make much
of the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. Eccles casts
doubt on whether animals are conscious. Popper describes the consciousness
of animals as a kind of metaphysical problem in the sense that any hypothesis
about it is not falsifiable: though he adds that metaphysjc^al hypotheses are
important for science both for giving a general picture of the world and in
the preparation of research programmes, and he considers that we have every
reason to think that animals have perceptions. Both Popper and Eccles agree,
however, that man is self-conscious and Popper regards self-consciousness as
3developing together with and-m interaction with World 3. But unfortunately,
neither he nor Eccles defines:self-consciousness and it is used by Eccles where
it would seem that ’consciousness’ would serve: as when he says that ’The
self-conscious mind is only effective in the brain when the brain is in
special states of very highly integrated dynamic activity, and of course this
leads on to the question of unconsciousness and sleep, coma, convulsions.
4Under these conditions there is no self-consciousness.’
There is a valid difference, of course, between consciousness and 
self-consciousness. If we take first ordinary perception, we can say that
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we are conscious of ordinary objects and events: our perceptions of them
are self-intimating. In the sense that we are conscious of objects around
us we can assume that animals?are conscious, too, for, as I argued earlier,
it is only a misconception within our Western paradigm that gives ontological
priority to physical events and only this gives any reason to doubt their
consciousness when they are awake and alert.V* Popper illustrates the
difference between consciousness and self-consciousness by reference to
optical illusion. As he says; f.... I think it is possible to make quite
a fair conjecture that under Certain circumstances animals also suffer from
optical illusions, but x*e can le pretty sure that animals cannot be critical
§of their optical illusions. Obviously, if we are to recognise an optical
illusion as such, we must be able to compare what we are seeing with earlier
experiences and recognise some discrepancy which will enable us to see in a
different way what had been i^luding us. In the same way, I can relate my
sense experiences to any relevant concepts which take account also of similar
earlier experiences and of similar experiences of other people. I can note
features which enable me to decide whether I was seeing what at the time I
Butthought I was seeing.a I cannot easily, at the one time, both be conscious 
of objects around me and monitor my own performance in relation to them; in 
that state the actor forgets his lines and, in the words of the old joke, 
the centipede forgets which foot to put down next. In other words, when I 
am, in this sense, self-conscious, I relate more recent experiences to concepts 
based on uniformities in my earlier experiences - uniformities which in their 
nature tend to lie in normal rather than abnormal experiences. In this way I 
may be able to recognise that ;I was thinking confusedly, seeing objects out 
of perspective or getting irrationally angry even though I did not recognise 
it at the time. In this way, ;too, I build up my picture of myself and relate 
my experiences to it. It-is this higher level conceptual ability to form 
such concepts and to reflect on and monitor my experiences that constitutes 
self consciousness. Self consciousness in this legitimate sense is thus a 
well recognised reflective process or state which needs sharply to be 
distinguished from the mistaken view that we introspect our ordinary thoughts 
or sense experiences.
By this self conscious, reflective process, we can in principle 
concentrate on our own less rational behaviour, and that of others and 
discern in it consistencies; and these we can conceptualise as unconscious 
distorting processes. These unconscious distorting processes or influences are
thus inferred by A process of; reflecting on our salf"intinmting 
experiences and our behaviour' and that of others. Therefore, the concept 
of consciousness in the sense of being awake and responsive is not at the 
same conceptual level as the Concept of these unconscious influences which are 
at a higher, derivative level. Despite the widespread assumption to the
.V.contrary, therefore, the concept of unconscious forces, or of .'the unconscious'
as so envisaged, carries no necessary implication that there is a part of the
mind called the unconscious which is, as it were, a hidden part of a kind of
container. Although we use .'the unconscious' as a kind of shorthand, a
,• i • ,truer picture of its role.is given by speaking of unconscious mental
processes: with the implication that the contents of consciousness and our
behaviour are altered by processes which are not themselves conscious and which
are inferred from changes whibh are directly detectable in those contents and
! ’
in that behaviour. These alterations are detectable only because they involve 
deviation from a norm of rationality that is automatically established over
most areas of our experience by the discrimination and conceptualisation off.
uniformities in our experiences: which in turn leads to the important but
often implicit concept of the}, 'normal' mind - not in the sense of average or 
typical but in the sense of rational or undistorted.
Freud's own views bear bn all this. He noted at an early stage that
• 7'We obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression'.
. ?■
But as his ideas developed so' did his concept of the unconscious and it became 
a more dynamic concept in which the idea of inadmissibility to consciousness 
played a basic role. As Wollheim says, 'spelt out, this notion means that
ideas that are unconscious ini the dynamic sense have, in the first place, been
* '
repressed, and secondly, have! been kept from consciousness by a continuing 
pressure. From this it follows that there is a distinction within unconscious 
ideas between those which arejcapable of being conscious and those which, 
as things stand, are denied access to consciousness. The former, to which 
attention had been paid long before Freud, are called ’pre-conscious'; the 
latter are called 'unconscious'; and the frontier between them, Freud insists, 
is sharp, and the difference not one that can be expressed in terms ofQ
gradations of awareness or degrees of psychic clarity.'
'i
Subsequently, Freud’s idea of the unconscious developed further.
As Wollheim says: 'If initially Freud tended ±o think of defence and the
unconscious as strictly correlative, he soon came round to another view, which
he expressed by saying that, though everything that was repressed was
9unconscious, this proposition jcould not be converted.' Indeed, it was
Freud’s mature view that in the life history of the individual, everything Ut
originally unconscious, and/that it is only under the continual influence
of the external xrorld that s'ome of the mind's contents become preconscious
and so, should the occasion arise, conscious. And while this process goes
on, the unconscious is replenished by fresh contents that are taken in, found
unsuitable, and put down: so that ultimately the unconscious falls into
two parts, that which was 'innately present originally' and 'that which
10was acquired in the course of the ego's development.' Yet Freud seems 
still to have thought of the unconscious in strictly individual and 
personal terms. Though he recognised and discussed in a number of papers
the part played by telepathy in dreams and m  the psycho-analytic situation!
and at one point he went so far as to say that if he had a chance to start
• . 11 his career all over again, he would dedicate himself to psychical research,
his public attitude to psychic events remained equivocal and he did not attempt
to relate his evidence of psychic phenomena to his own system of thought.
The unconscious remained, therefore, for Freud mainly a repressed and
distorting force on consciousness and on behaviour and an unintegrated
and immature part of the memory system. . T V ’
The role of the unconscious in this sense can be understood in terms
of the operations of the semantic and episodic memories which I discussed
earlier, for, as I showed, our memories are normally rendered meaningful
by enrichment xtfith associations in the semantic memory and experiences which
when recalled bring about the stress of great emotion are likely to be
exceptionally rich in associations. It is such strongly emotional
experiences which provide an explanation of the processes attributed to
the unconscious by Freud and other psychoanalysts. Thus whereas associations
lead usually to sequences of memories which are normal by waking standards
and, indeed, to many of such sequences in our dreams, such normal sequences
are not necessarily followed. As in free association, the sequence of mental
events in memories and dreams is liable to be diverted by alogical steps
leading at times to bizarre sequences simply because the associations at
that point are strongest in that direction. As I have already stressed,
however, the human organism is an open system, drawing energy and information
to itself and constantly seeking to maintain its stability: and when some
memory, exceptionally highly charged with associations, approaches the
threshold of consciousness, it is liable constantly to disrupt the ordered
sequences of associations in ways which conflict sharply with our 'normal
waking standards. Such conflicts can then arouse deep emotions. In these
10?
circumstances, the personality can and does assert itself; automatically to 
block off this disrupting intruder. But in the very nature of such a 
highly charged memory, a wide range of cues will have some kind of 
associations with it and will keep drawing it towards consciousness. Thus 
many sequences of thought are liable to find themselves deflected towards 
such memories and thus inhibited. What is more, such a highly charged 
memory will not, it seems, lie passive in the memory but, probably by 
being brought constantly towards the threshold of consciousness, will tend 
to accumulate associations with other memories which may gradually develop 
into a cluster: and this cluster or complex, in the very nature of the
formation of associations in the semantic memory, will tend to have a 
basically coherent and logical structure, though with many irrational 
elements in it. These processes tend to distort our normal interactions 
with our surroundings-and, in particular, when some otherwise harmless 
event evokes disrupting memories, we tend to react emotionally by anger and 
attack or by fear and retreat or by anxiety.
Typically, free ranging memories such as occur in free association and in 
dreams are very rich in visual imagery rather than in logical order or 
language: and again this can be understood, for any visual scene normally
comprises many elements and groupings of elements each with wide ganging 
associations and so such imagery is brought easily into consciousness: 
whereas, in the nature of language, its associations tend to be highly
specific. The same richness of associations can lead to condensation with
• • • • i:*one image or idea serving the role of several.
By the standards of normal rational discourse which are based in the 
uniformities discriminated from our sense experiences, these associative 
processes, though often distorting and irrational by normal standards, 
have a certain rationale of their own, as Freud appreciated. But, as I 
have shown, these distorting processes of the psychoanalytic unconscious 
are only particular examples of the processes which characterise the 
episodic memory. While, therefore, the psychoanalytic unconscious is a 
higher level concept derived mainly from our more irrational experiences 
and behaviour, it can be regarded as embraced within the concept of the 
episodic memory which thus lies at an even higher conceptual level.
Recall on the basis of associations is not, however, limited to 
memories of our own past experiences: exceptionally, as I have already
noted and as I shall discuss further presently, we can, without the use
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of the senses, experience tolepathically events being experienced by others: 
we can clairvoyantly experience past and present events not experienced by 
anyone hitherto, and in precognition we can experience events not yet 
experienced by anyone else. \What appears to be necessary for these 
experiences is that consciousness should be in a very sensitive state of 
equilibrium and that there should occur in or near the threshold of 
consciousness, cues with strong enough associations to evoke the events 
concerned from the unconscious.
On this basis it follows j therefore, that while the psycho-analytic 
unconscious is personal to each individual and can be understood as one 
feature of the episodic memory, each person’s episodic memory can be 
understood as forming a part-of what we may terra an interpersonal or 
collective unconscious. .The concept of the interpersonal or collective 
unconscious as so conceived is thus a concept at a yet higher level than 
the concept of the episodic memory which in turn is at a higher level than 
the concept of the psychoanalytic unconscious: and all three are derivedIfrom aspects or features of our experiences.
As I have already shown', however, the personal unconscious is not 
passive for the memories within it are in some form of creative tension : and
this applies also to the episodic memory and the interpersonal unconscious. 
What is more, new events are continuously being added at the episodic and
collective level©. As Lindsay and Norman show, memory is dynamic and
involves continuous integrative processes far removed from the more passive 
classical learning theories which typically rely on repeated exposure of 
specific stimuli as the basis of acquiring information. As they say, ’This 
continual evolution of the stored knowledge within the memory system has very 
profound effects upon the way that new information is acquired. It suggests 
that there must be a tremendous difference between the way in which a message 
is encoded into a child's memory and the way that the same information is 
encoded by an adult. For children, each concept encountered has to be built 
up from scratch. A great deal of learning must take place during the 
initial construction of the data base: understanding is only slowly
elaborated as properties are accumulated, as examples are learned and as the
class relations evolve. At first most of the concepts in memory will be only
partially defined and will not be well integrated with the other stored 
information. Later in life, when a great deal of information has been 
accumulated and organised into a richly interconnected data base, learning 
should take on a different character. New things can be learned primarily by
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analogy with what is already known. The main problem becomes one of
fitting a new concept into the pre-existing structure. Once the right
relationship has been established, the whole of past experience is
automatically brought to bear on the interpretation and understanding of 
12 - ;new events.1 All this is difficult to reconcile with and provides
« • * «further objection to the idea of stored information - usually thought of
in terms of memory traces in the brain - lying in latent form which are
occasionally awakened., Neisser, for instance, stresses the malevolent
influence which this 'reappearance hypothesis' has exercised over 
13psychologists - as it has over philosophers and neurophysiologists.
This tendency for the character of memory to change is borne out by the 
evidence of eidetic memory which, as Neisser notes, is less common in 
adults than in children and tends to be lost as they develop: and he 
quotes also a study by Doob showing that eidetic memory is very common
1 /among rural Nigerian adults but rare among urban members of the same tribe.
How far these reconstructive processes take place in the semantic 
memory and how far in the episodic memory, and indeed in the interpersonal 
unconscious, is not clear arid may well vary in different cases; but it 
seems clear that at no level is the unconscious passive. This, indeed, is 
to be expected, for the associations lie not only between cues in 
consciousness and memories, but between different events xtfithin the 
unconscious: and all these associations must have a highly complex
structure deriving not only from events going on around us but also from 
the highly structured semantic memories of countless people: which, of
course, have a broadly similar structure and are flowing continuously 
into the unconscious. It is not, therefore,>surprising that when we are 
faced with some unresolved problem and retire to sleep, under the tension 
of these associations, the unresolved items may well fall into place, 
subsequently presenting us with a completed picture, either in a dream 
or when we waken.
Though it was Freud's view that, as I have noted, consciousness 
emerges from the unconscious, he concentrated mainly on the. disruptive 
effects of repressed memories and it fell to Jung to explore the deeper 
and wider reaches of the collective unconscious. As Jung said, "The 
unconscious processes, then, are not directly observable, but those of its 
products that cross the threshold of consciousness can be divided into two 
classes. The first class contains recognisable material of a definitely 
personal origin; these contents are individual acquisitions or products of
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instinctive processes that make up the personality as a whole. Furthermore,
there are forgotten or repressed contents, and creative contents.......
Then there is another class of contents of definitely unknown origin, or
at all events of an origin that cannot be ascribed to individual
acquisition. These contents have one outstanding peculiarity, and that
is their mythological character......... They belong to mankind in general
15and therefore they are of a collective nature.1 Indeed Jung went so far
as to say that 'our personal psychology is just a thin skin, a ripple upon
the ocean of collective psychology. The powerful factor, the factor which
changes our whole life, which changes the surface of our known world, which
makes history, is collective psychology, and collective psychology moves
16 —according to laws entirely different from those of our consciousness' 
a view which anyone who has close knowledge of government and political 
and other forces which play a major role in motivating and steering national 
and international affairs would find it hard to deny. I shall seek later to 
show the evolving sensory/physical world is itself one manifestation of this 
collective or interpersonal unconscious and that it needs, therefore, to be 
understood^in terms of a concept at a yet more basic level. But as regards 
the individual, Jung develops these ideas [ae~-re^ ai?ds-^ H3e^ it3arvidttaij by 
showing how these mythological or archetypal forms can provide the basis 
for the information of complexes which he regarded as a structural 
agglomeration of associations. The ego, the conscious personality as a 
whole, is itself a complex in this sense. Unassimilated subsidiary complexes 
which operate in the unconscious and influence consciousness, Jung regarded 
as partial or fragmentary personalities: and, indeed, he stressed that these 
complexes can have a sort of consciousness of their own and he related these
to spirits manifesting in automatic writing or through the voice of a
17 . . . .medium: an idea which has found striking confirmation m  recent years, as
I show later.
The idea of an interpersonal or collective unconscious can be approached 
another way. As I have sought to show, all we know of our brains derives 
from some of our sense and other experiences and therefore, on the basis that 
there is normally some form of unity to minds, mind as a whole cannot be 
limited by brain, unless we give brain a metaphysical status beyond possible 
range of our experiences. Similarly, as I have shown, our concepts of time 
and space derive from some of our changing sense experiences and they, too, 
cannot, therefore, limit or define our minds as a whole, and, a fortiori, 
the unconscious. But if neither brain nor space nor time limits our minds
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as a whole, it is not apparent what can separate them other than the 
structural clustering on the basis of associations of memories which, of 
course, make them meaningful and give continuity to all our experiences. 
Although, therefore, such clustering normally preserves the identity of each 
person from encroachment by others, it in no way precludes the entry into 
consciousness of other events with appropriate and usually weaker 
associations, provided the mind is in a suitably receptive state. Some of 
these weakly associated events will, of course, be our own memories of 
experiences which normally lie beyond recall except when cues are very strong 
or perhaps when we are under hypnosis; but others will not necessarily be our 
own past experiences. As I have shown, the meaning of each experience lies 
at many levels each of which has its own associations. At the best, therefore, 
an event will have full and rich associations at many levels and the more of 
these levels that are lacking in any cue, the less likely is an associated 
event to be brought to mind. ; What is more, in the nature of any recall, it 
will tend to shut out from consciousness other events whose associations are 
less strong including events which lie in the unconscious but which have not 
hitherto been experienced by anyone - events which we classify as involving 
clairvoyance and precognition and which I discuss more fully later.
It follows, therefore, that there should be no sharp distinction in 
experience between memory, telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition - which 
is what is found in practice. Indeed, though memory, by virtue of the 
strength of associations and the relevance of cues, must by far predominate, 
events in all these classes can be called into consciousness or to the 
threshold of consciousness where they give meaning and significance to our 
ordinary experiences and may affect our feelings and our moods. All this 
provides a basis for an understanding of the characteristics of telepathy 
and clairvoyance. Many of these various characteristics were brought together 
in a valuable discussion by H. H. Price in a paper on ’Some Philosophical 
Questions about Telepathy and Clairvoyance1, origi^nally published in 1940.^
As Price notes, in spontaneous cases the agent is usually, but not 
always, undergoing some form of crisis; he usually, but not always, has 
some close links with the percipient, being a relation or close friend. The 
percipient’s experience may be a feeling of conviction about the crisis and of 
anxiety or distress; it may take the form of a. strong sense of presence; 
or it make take the form of of some kind of visual or auditory hallucination; 
and sometimes the ’message' comes in the form of a vivid dream. The form and 
circumstances of the experience are thus very diverse. As experimental work
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makes clear, however, neither strong emotion nor intense concentration by 
agent or percipient is necessary for telepathy and the latter may inhibit.
As Price points out, in experimental work the 'message’ may get distorted 
in form or meaning and details may be inaccurate. What is conveyed maybe 
little more than the 'general idea', or it may be symbolic. Price notes 
that to describe this as involving 'knowledge' is a misnomer for knowledge 
is right or wrong whereas the percipient's impression is often only partly 
right notwithstanding that there is no experienced difference between what 
is right and wrong. He concludes, therefore, that telepathy involves 
reproduction or representation - a correlation of experiences - rather 
than knowledge in any strict sense. This then leads him to postulate some 
form of 'collective unconscious' which he suggests would be simply a field 
of interaction where unconscious events in one person's mind produce 
unconscious events in the mind of another person. He emphasises the 
speculative nature of this suggestion in the form in which he puts it forward 
but he points out that 'the hypothesis of "unconscious" events which are 
mental in their intrinsic nature is perfectly conceivable. It amount only 
to saying that there are mental events which are not introspected by anyone, 
and this involves no contradiction whatever; just as there are unperceived 
physical events, so there may perfectly well be unintrospected mental ones. 
Moreover, there may be some which it is causally impossible for human minds
to introspect, just as there are physical events (e.g. in the centre of the
• 19Earth) which it is causally impossible for human minds to perceive.'
As for clairvoyance, Price notes first that it is not at all easy in 
practice to distinguish it from telepathy. Like telepathy, it appears not 
to be affected by distance or physical obstacles, and the experiences can 
take many forms. As with telepathy, there is a correlation with the facts 
rather than any knowledge proper. On both telepathy and clairvoyance, he 
suggests we might think in terms of such events being normal and consider 
what may limit their occurrence. As for a theory to explain clairvoyance, 
Price notes that this presents even more difficulties than telepathy and he 
suggests looking for light in speculative metaphysics, for instance in the 
Monadology of Leibniz and the more speculative parts of Russell's 'Our 
Knowledge of the External World'. He puts forward several different 
suggestions on these lines and as the first of these he suggests 'we might 
suppose that there is an omniscient consciousness which is aware of everything 
that is going on in the material world, and possibly some future events as well
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If you like, it would be a kind of God; but the present argument does not
oblige us to attribute intelligence to it - whatever other arguments might
do - still less moral predicates of any sort. It xvi.ll be safest just to call
it World-Soul if you vrant an old-fashioned name for it. This omnisentient
consciousness would enjoy unlimited clairvoyance; and human clairvoyance
20would be due to a telepathic relation between ourselves and it.'
These important and far-reaching ideas have not made much impact on
21the world of parapsychology at least partly because, as Rao notes, Price’s
ideas leave the essential intricacies of E S P unexplained, and he notes, in
particular, the important omission of any suggestion of an answer to the
riddle of the ’selecting' process in E S P.
From a different angle, Thalcur in his essay 'Telepathy, Evolution and 
22Dualism’ raises similar issues. He notes suggestions by Rhine and Hardy
that telepathy may be of evolutionary origin and he examines the implications
of this idea. He points to the strong evidence of telepathic ability in
animals and to the more controversial evidence for the telepathic powers of
plants. If the evolutionary account of telepathy is correct, he points out
that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that telepathy must in principle be
a universal ability inherited*by all forms of organic life and that it ought
in principle to be a normal or natural ability in all forms of life. This,
however, would be inconsistent with claims that telepathy is an ability
exercised by minds if human beings alone are regarded as being endowed with
minds: and he points to the widespread beliefs of Indian religions, of
vitalists like Bergson and Driesch, and to some extent of Aristotle, that all
forms of life may have some form of mind. He points out that if there is a
non-physical reality in nature as a whole which makes telepathy possible,
it cannot be the exclusive privilege of homo sapiens: and he suggests that
if telepathy is a normal or natural mode of communication, this would be
incompatible with the doctrine of ’privileged access' which has been regarded
as an inevitable consequence of Cartesianism. He goes on to suggest that for
telepathy to occur, two ostensibly different minds in ’communication’ must,
23in some important sense, be one. He notes Mundle's suggestion that 
Berkeley’s form of idealism would seem better equipped than Cartesianism to 
explain E S P  but he suggests that to invoke 'God’ as an explanation of 
E S P is to give up any attempt to retain parapsychology in the field of 
science. He notes, too, Spinoza's psycho-physical parallelism but suggests 
that this, too, is hardly an explanatory theory: and he criticises the
doctrine of a ’collective unconscious’ as not explaining how it becomes
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possible in the first instance.
Thakur goes on to point; to one philosophical system that could go 
some way to meet the requirements of the case: the Advaita Vedanta of
Shamkara, the eighth century Indian Philosopher. Shamkara 'speaks of all 
individual souls (atman) as being literally part of. one universal soul 
(Brahman). Every living creature has an atman, but the atman without a 
body will not be an individual. Indeed, when ah atman becomes completely 
disembodied, i.e. it has neither a gross nor a subtle body, it then becomes 
'liberated' and merges into the universal soul. This World Soul, or 
Brahman, is eternal and uncreated but impersonal. Personality, like 
individuality, presupposes embodiment. Such an impersonal principle cannot 
act, will, or desire. It simply _is_ and has consciousness and 'bliss1. 
Whatever the cause of the 'splitting' of the universal soul into many 
individual souls, one consequence of this is embodiment for the latter.
Bits of the universal soul become 'trapped', as it were, by various bodies 
and thus separate into distinct units. But they are all parts of the same 
soul or 'mind-stuff'. It is clear that this system has both the features 
required: every organism has a soul; and the souls of all organisms, while ✓
'encapsulated' in different bodies, are essentially parts of one and the 
same ' soul-substance' In his further discussion Thalcur suggests that 
telepathy should be regarded as normal, and that we should concentrate on 
asking what stops it, and he suggests an analogy with electricity, the 
efficient generation and distribution of which was brought about by better 
knowledge of insulating materials and of the principles and techniques of 
insulation. I hope in this study to make clear the aptness of this analogy. 
Thakur develops further the implications of the Indian tradition for
25parapsychology in a subsequent essay to which I shall have to refer later.
It will be clear that the views of Price and Thakur have much in common 
though as Rao notes of the views of Price, the essential intricacies of the 
modus operandi of E S P remain to be developed and, in particular, the 
'selecting process' of E S P. On a wider basis, too, the relation of mental 
to physical remains to be argued and so do the solutions to the problems of 
time and space raised by E S P.
The arguments that I have been putting forward in this study clearly 
point in the same direction as those of Price and Thakur. First, I have 
attempted to show that parapsychology joins forces with other areas of 
experience to require a change in our current Western paradigm: which would,
of course, also be entailed by the far-reaching views of Price and Thakur.
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Secondly, I have argued against current accounts of the body-mind 
relationship in favour of a double aspect theory deriving from the two 
aspects of our sense experiences which in turn are self-intimating 
features of the evolving sensory/physical world. As I shall show later, 
this monistic argument fits well with thei.argument that the episodic 
memory is retained, not in the physical structure of the brain but in a 
collective or inter-personal unconscious. I have already shown how the 
idea of the semantic memory in the brain and the episodic memory in a non­
physical collective unconscious makes sense of a wide range of neuro- 
physiological and psychological data which existing accounts fail to explain; 
and how also it opens the door to a full explanation of E S P. More 
specifically, the tendency for E S P to occur between agents and percipients 
who are relations or close friends is to be expected in view of their many 
associative bonds; the resulting sub-conscious awareness of crises could 
be expected to give to a wide range of manifestations in the percipient 
including a sense of depression or anxiety, and, as I shall show more fully 
later, various forms of hallucination. Because the link between the 
experiences of the agent and the percipient is one of associations, the 
various forms of distortion including those typically experienced in 
psychoanalysis are explained; so is the fact that the experiences of agent 
and percipient are 'correlated* rather than identical. The explanatory 
power of the argument goes much wider than this, however. The selectivity of 
E S P is explained by the association process and so are the 'normality' of 
E S P ,  and yet its normal exclusion from consciousness. The normal absence 
of close fitting cues explains the infrequence of telepathy and additionally, 
the weak associations which characterise clairvoyance and precognition 
explain their even greater rarity in normal life. The status of time and 
space as high level concepts derived from our changing sense experiences 
explains why they do not apply to the unconscious or, indeed, to memory: 
and this should remove some of the main difficulties of principle to the 
idea of precognition.
Other features of E S P find their explanation from this theory, too.
Stevenson, for instance, in his analysis of the characteristics of telepathic 
26impressions, suggests that not only is a close relationship between agent 
and percipient usually found but also that focussing by the agent on the 
percipient is conducive to such experiences. The idea of focussing, though 
suggestive, is hardly precise; but if the agent thinks about the percipient, 
especially at a time of emotional stress, more associative links can be
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expected to be induced between the agent’s current experience and his 
memories of the percipient - associations which will in turn tend to draw 
them towards the percipient himself.
Linked with this question of focussing is Carington’s idea of K objects.
. . 27 . .He, too, argued for an association theory of telepathy. The K idea is an
associative link or bond between the mind of the agent and the percipient.
Thus in some of the early experiments of Carington, he pinned up in his
study a sheet of paper with the target on it and he supplied the percipients
with a photograph of the study with a blank sheet of paper pinned in place,
so that the percipient was able to visualise what was happening there. Such
IC objects play precisely the same role as ’token objects’ used in psychometry
and clairvoyance. As Rao has noted, however, the Cambridge-Richmond distant
series of experiments by Soal and Bateman to test the theory were not
statistically significant and the statistically enormously significant
results obtained in other card guessing experiments, which did not appear
to foster the associative bonds between the agent and percipient, also stand
28against the theory. On the other hand, such IC objects are only an aid 
to focussing: other undesigned aspects of the experiments may be playing
the same role: and many other factors play a role in determining the
success of any experiment: all these may mask the influence of IC objects. 
Certainly there seem grounds for suggesting that experimenters should pay 
more attention to the associative linkage betfween percipient and target for 
the state of mind of the percipient, the precise question to which, 
consciously or unconsciously, he is directing his mind, the degree of interest 
or attention of the agent and the richness and strength of the associations 
of the target may presumably all influence the outcome.
One particularly important factor in determining the outcome of 
experiments is the personality and attitude of the experimenter - the 
so-called experimenter effect. Some experimenters regularly produce highly 
significant results in their experiments yet when these experiments are 
repeated as precisely as possible, even the same experimenters may fail to 
get significant results and there are some experimenters who constantly 
fail to get results better than chance. And, of course, x^hereas the results 
of some experiments will be far above chance, some will be random and some 
will be far below chance - the latter being as good evidence of some
non-random factor operating as high scores. Much work has been devoted to
Q 29the explanation of such variations and the outcome is still not conclusive.
The subject was, however, the subject of several papers at the Third
11?
International Conference of the S P R in Edinburgh in April 1979. Thus,
in an important paper on 'The Strange Case of the Experimenter Effect',
Ernesto Spinelli, who has been notably successful in his work with young
children, noted particularly the importance of the experimenter's
personal and creative involvement with the design of the experiment and
his expectations as to its outcome. Whereas in an initial experiment his
attitude may be one of open-minded curiosity, if he attempts to repeat the
experiment, he has his expectations already formed and this may of itself
prevent success. Carl Sargent stressed in his paper on 'Repeatable
Significance and the Significance of Repeatability' that the detailed
replication of an experiment is just not possible if only because, as
Spinelli said, expectations are themselves changed by the outcome of the
first experiment. More generally, as Palmer notes, ' .... the data seem
to suggest that two kinds of people are most likely to perform best on
laboratory tests of E S P, at least the first time they are tested
individually with clairvoyance procedure: (a) people who are relatively
well adjusted, and (b) people who believe in E S P ... It also seems to
be the general consensus of opinion that the reason believers and/or well
adjusted subjects score best is that they are more comfortable in the test
situation, thereby better able to exercise the relaxed spontaneity thought
30to be necessary for high scoring.' And R. A. White, in the article noted
above, refers to a favourable subject-experimenter relationship favouring 
31psx test results.
How, then, is all this to be explained? It would appear that what 
is involved here is an attitude or emotion that as I have already noted, is 
not recognised as such by modern psychology and which is totally 
disregarded in most psychology text books - the attitude of love in the 
sense of 'agape' or 'caritas'. This is the unpossessive, outwardgoing, 
caring attitude towards people in general and those around in particular 
which is found especially in mature and sensitive people. It is rarely 
to be found in people who are very defensive or closed or aggressive or 
ambitious and even in the most open personalities, much can depend on 
their mood and expectations at a particular time. At least a part of the 
effects of such attitudes on psi can, I think, be found in the idea that 
when the experimenter or agent is relaxed, a very substantial proportion 
of the networks of the semantic memory in the brain will, in effect, be 
disengaged and available to relate to and integrate with the target on 
which he is concentrating: and in this way, the experience of the target,
as it passes into memory will be heavily enriched with associations and 
will therefore be more easily picked up by the percipient. If, however,
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the experimenter is a less well integrated personality, if he is preoccupied, 
even sub-consciously, with other and in particular conflicting thoughts, or 
even if he is simply feancentrating too heavily on the expected result, then 
many of the networks of the semantic memory will be already engaged and the 
range of associations attaching themselves to the target x-jill be much reduced. 
What is more, a detached, outwardgoing concern for others involved in the 
experiment rather that for the results as such will rapidly convey itself to
the others and can quickly bring a relaxed state of mind, particularly in
the subject or percipient, which will allow impressions to rise from the 
unconscious more easily. On the other hand, a more closed, preoccupied state 
of the agent or experimenter may equally convey itself to the subject and, 
particularly in the absence of precise cues, many impressions will either not 
be drawn towards the threshold of his consciousness or will fail to gain entry 
to consciousness. And, of course, if the attitude of the agent or experiments 
is sufficiently tense, his lack of concern or even reproachful attitude
towards the subject in the course of often long and boring trials can easily
arouse conscious or sub-conscious resentment. This in turn can lead to 
unconscious rejection of any impressions associated with the agent.
From this account two other features associated with E S P  can also find 
7 an^ explanation. It has often been suggested that in spontaneous cases, an 
impression or ’message* may have been held for some time in the unconscious 
before reaching consciousness, usually when the percipient is relaxing 
before sleep. This might be expected if the ’message* has strong associations 
for the percipient as a person. The receptiveness of young children to 
E S P  has often been noted and the explanation may here lie in the fact that 
in them the semantic memory is still relatively undeveloped. The networks 
will thus be less firmly mobilised by any current thoughts or other 
experiences and will be more readily available to respond to upx*iellings from 
the unconscious, than when they are older. Somewhat similarly, the 
disorganisation of the mind in extreme cases of schizophrenia should likewise 
leave it open to so-called psi pollution.
In the light of this discussion, the distinctions between the main 
classes of E S P fall into perspective. Telepathy involves events ’in the 
mind* which are, therefore, enriched with meaningful associations and which, 
on the basis of these associative linkages xtfith cues in the mind of someone 
else, appear in the consciousness of that other person by way of the 
unconscious. Clairvoyance does not depend on the events having been or
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being ’in the mind1 of someone. Such clairvoyant events have not been 
enriched with associations by the semantic memory. It is this enriching 
role of the semantic memory which distinguishes for this purpose events 
which occur 'in the mind’ from events occurring elsewhere for associations 
occur naturally between all associated events: mind simply concentrates
the process of enrichment greatly. Not surprisingly, therefore, clairvoyance 
seemingly occurs spontaneously much less frequently than telepathy and 
appears to be more in the province of the gifted psychic who can attain 
states of dissociation with their much greater sensitivity and who, in order 
to ’key in’ to the appropriate events, typically needs some token object 
which itself has strong associations with them. Once this ’keying in’ has 
taken place, it seems that the events experienced can equally relate to 
future or to past, and given a suitable token object, they can relate to 
the far distant past. In other words, as I have already suggested, and 
as I shall be seeking to explain further, events past, present and future 
find equal place within the collective or interpersonal unconscious. 
Precognition therefore takes its place simply as one form of clairvoyance 
and so do telepathy and retro-cognition. Indeed it seems likely that many 
experiences brought into consciousness by the stronger associations of 
telepathy, have associated with them closely linked clairvoyant events so 
that what is experienced may at times be the outcome of their combined 
associations. A few examples can illustrate these processes.
The first case was a simple one of precognition. A woman woke her
husband one night to describe a terrifying dream. She had seen in the dream
a large ornamental chandelier above their child’s bed fall and crush him to
death: she recalled that the clock in the room had shown 4.35. The husband
laughed at her anxiety but she took the child into her own bed. Two hours
32later, at 4.35, the chandelier fell on the child’s empty bed.
How, then, do we explain this? I have sought to show that, before 
the fall of the chandelier, the idea of the event was already in the 
unconscious and potentially able to be evoked on the basis of associations, 
given suitable sensitivity and cues. The idea had, therefore, already 
associations with the child and mother and these themselves would have been 
deeply disturbing, notwithstanding that they were very weak in comparison 
with those that would have been evoked by the experience itself. But, of 
course, the child was not in the bed when the chandelier fell: the dream was
thus falsified. Any implication that this shows we have free will is perhaps 
misleading for the ideas involved will have had, as it were, khe-i-r~own
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their own momentum. The fall of the chandelier on to the child's bed 
will have had natural associations not only with the child but also with 
injury and death whereas the events actually followed - namely, the mother 
taking the child into her own bed was probably unusual or unprecendented.
The associations for this outcome were thus probably weaker than the 
regrettably more normal sequence.
33The next case was one of telepathy. It involved identical twins.
One girl was on the west coast of the U.S.A., the other on Cape Cod several 
thousand miles away. The former was stricken with a severe kidney attack.
At the same time, the latter suffered severe pains in the back and was taken 
into hospital but as tests proved negative she was discharged. Assuming 
telepathy was involved, how can we understand these events?
On the basis of the arguments which I have given, the experiences of tin 
sick girl were not 'contained* within her mind. They were therefore open to 
be experienced by others if the associations were sufficiently strong and 
their minds were sufficiently relaxed and open. Many experiences are shared 
by identical twins and the associations between them will normally be close. 
This implies that, apart from hereditary factors, there will be many common 
links between each twin and the experiences of the other. Thus the 
experiences of each twin must form a kind of on-going undercurrent linking 
her experiences with varying degrees of closeness to the experiences of the 
other. Particular associated experiences are more likely to break through into 
consciousness on occasions when the mind is relaxed and not pre-occupied with 
incoming sense experiences. Such experiences, once they have broken through, 
presumably retain their place in consciousness until some other experience 
supervenes, including, of course, speculation by the receiver about the nature 
of the experiences themselves. However, in this case the sympathetic pains 
of the one twin lasted some hours so it is reasonable to think that she was a 
basically open and relaxed personality as well as having close emotional ties
with her sister. The preoccupation of the first twin with her illness and her
associated anxiety may well have added in number and strength to the 
associations and so facilitated the entry of the experience into the mind of 
the second twin.
Sometimes, of course, and notably in some experimental work, the
transmitter seeks deliberately to 'project* his thoughts to the receiver.
L. L. Vasiliev in 1923 described an experiment in which the transmitter was to
send as his target 'a strongly illuminated block of cut glass'. The receiver
reported 'reflections in water ... iceberg ... iceflows in the north
34illuminated by the sun ... rays broken up.' It is difficult to regard
'projection' as other than a metaphor, but it can be understood in terms of
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associations. In seeking to project a thought to a particular person, 
memories of that person are presumably brought to mind and are concentrated 
on. In this way the associations between the thought, the memories of the 
person and the person himself are established and if the person is sufficiently 
relaxed, the associations may well draw the thoughts into his consciousness.
Recent work by Targ and Puthoff has cast more light on the processes
involved in telepathy. Briefly, they found that patterns were more easily
transmitted than words and names and that even when patterns were received
correctly, they were often misinterpreted. Thus a video terminal was
correctly described as a black box in the middle of a room, with a glass
porthole and a light coming out, but was labelled as an oven or radiation
machine; and an accurately described bicycle shed was described as an
35immense barn-like structure. This has led to the view that psychic 
phenomena are associated more with the right hemisphere of the brain which is 
itself associated with intuition and pattern recognition, artistic abilities 
and synthesis rather than with verbal and analytic activities which are 
associated more with the left hemisphere. Evidence on all this is hardly yet 
conclusive and it should, perhaps, be recalled that whereas analytic functions 
involve complex, carefully disciplined, sequential series of associations, the 
more synthetic activities may well involve forms and patterns held longer in 
the mind and with wider ranging associations which, for this reason, may be 
more likely to obtrude upon consciousness, regardless of the hemisphere 
involved.
Between telepathy and clairvoyance the boundary in particular cases
36is often ill-defined. One such case occurred when a girl 'saw1 her
sister's children playing near a timber stack which fell, just missing them.
The girl reported that she had been reading and her thoughts had turned to
her sister. Suddenly, she 'saw' the sister's kitchen window, the woodpile
moving, the children playing close by it and its fall just missing them.
The girl apparently 'saw' the episode as a whole, including the children
and the woodpile, before it fell and before it drew itself to the attention
of the children and their mother by falling. As there appears to have been
no other observer, this was presumably a case of clairvoyance rather than
telepathy. We can assume that there were strong emotional ties and shared
experiences between the girl, her sister and the children so, on the basis
which I have been putting forward, what was happening to the children would
have had fairly continuous but sub-conscious associations for the girl.
Normally, however, such events would not have threatened her equilibrium or
that of her sister in any way nor would they have threatened the lives of the
children, so there was nothing particular to draw such events into the girl's
consciousness. This event, however, was deeply threatening to them all and
working from the unconscious, presumably had disruptive effects on her thoughts,
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thus arousing her fears and so attracting; her attention. It was presumably 
this, combined with the fact that she was already thinking about her 
sister, x^hich brought these events into her consciousness.
The case of Croiset and the mediaeval document, quoted earlier,
probably involved clairvoyance though it is possible that the information
could have b&n picked up from the minds of those who organised the test.
This, however, was hardly a possible explanation in the cases x^ here Croiset
has located the bodies of those drowned which have in many cases drifted
37downstream below the surface. Indeed, m  these like other cases, Croiset 
has on many occasions been able to trace the movements of the person from 
the time of their disappearance through the present to the future x<rhen they, 
or their bodies would be found. Time, in other words, appears to present 
no greater problem than space to Croiset: which, on the basis of my
earlier arguments, is to be expected.
From all this it follows that, as I have claimed, associations 
apparently exist between related events in the sensory/physical world 
regardless of whether they have been experienced by anyone: but the
resistances that this idea may cause should be lessened by the realisation 
that no such events occur 'in’ the mind and, as I have said, the difference 
between those experienced and those not experienced lies for this purpose 
mainly in the fact that those experienced have undergone the conceptualising 
processes which greatly enrich the associations which in turn provide the 
basis of meaning. Those that are not experienced therefore lack the rich 
associations of memory which link them to the person whose memories they 
could otherwise be: and this, of itself, explains the rarity of extra­
sensory events as compared with memory.
Several other features of telepathy and clairvoyance find a natural 
explanation in the light of x*hat has been said. First, everyone must 
potentially have psychic abilities and so, presumably, must those animals 
which are sufficiently developed to have memories of past experiences.
But for these psychic abilities to manifest themselves, the mind must be 
sufficiently developed to respond to the associations and it must be able 
to still itself and relax, shutting out any active concern with sense and 
other experiences which crowd in upon it, xtfhile still remaining active.
Many of the most successful mediums are, of course, able to go into a state 
of light dissociation or trance which presumably achieves the same effect. 
Secondly, the events experienced, particularly in telepathy, are often in 
symbolic form. Thus in one of Tenhaeff's cases, a psychic working with the
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police said: 'Isoe the picture of a mill, Now 1 see a man who ia povmeled
xzith flour. Is the man's name by any chance Meel or Van Meel?' ('meel' is
the Dutch word for flour) - It turned out that one of the persons involved
38was named Van Meel. Again this is easily understood for the essence of 
symbolism is one idea or event 'standing for' another with which it is 
closely associated: and it is noteworthy that names of those unknoxm to
the medium will lack the associations \tfhich general x-zords in the semantic 
memory typically carry, thus explaining the difficulty which mediums often ' 
find in identifying names. And thirdly, the tendency for psychic events 
to cluster around the time of the experience or event can be explained by 
the tendency for cues to become more attenuated or lost as time goes on, 
notwithstanding that time as such is irrelevant.
One further problem needs to be referred to here though it is not
one to which I am at present able to offer a coherent answer. This stems
from the fact that the sense mechanisms reproduce information on a common
sensory/neuronal.’network/field basis about sensory/physical events of very
different characters and physical dimensions; and they presumably resume
that same form in the course of remembering or telepathy or pre- or
retro-cognition xzhen they are recalled from the collective unconscious.
But events perceived clairvoyantly have apparently not passed through the
' of Jju,sense mechanisms or minds of anyone: nor has much^mformation picked up
by dowsers. These events seemingly have noSs been translated into common 
form, or if they have, it is not clear by what mechanisms this comes about.
This is, I think, a serious problem,, for what is brought to mind in' 
clairvoyance is views or ideas of events: not the events themselves: and 
such views or ideas are normally thought to entail the experiences of 
persons in specific locations. Much sorting and coordination can, presumably, 
take place in the collective unconscious on the basis of associations but 
this cannot be the whole answer. References such as that by Price to 
'omniscient consciousness' find support in the strong evidence for clairvoyance 
but the precise mechanisms are difficult to understand. This also raises 
problems of a physical component of such events. Assuming such clairvoyant 
events reach the mind in the same state as episodic memories or telepathy, 
from which subjectively they can seem indistinguishable, and assuming 
that they all therefore have, as I have suggested, an electro-magnetic 
field component, the problem would be to see how the field variations
tUbrought about by the neuronal discharges could be parall^ed on a common basis
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outside the brain. Electro-magnetreism is, of course, ail-pervasive and 
there are persistent claims that electro-magnetism is involved in dowsing. 
Yet this cannot apparently be normal electro-magnetic radiation for the 
abilities of many dowsers operate equally effectively on maps far from the 
sites concerned. Dowsing is, I believe, almost certainly a form of 
clairvoyance using the amplifying motor activities of the brain, whether 
with or without psycho-lcinesis, but the persistent belief that electro­
magnetism is involved would find some justification if, as I have suggested, 
it is involved also in clairvoyance.
This account of the collective or interpersonal unconscious and of 
the many distinctive features of extra-sensory perception obviously needs to 
be developed and tested in detail? but it will, I hope, be apparent that 
the various features find a coherent place within the general argument 
being presented in this study. E S P is, however, only one part of the 
field of parapsychology and I need now to turn to the even more puzzling 
and controversial evidence of psycho-lcinesis.
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I went now 9 in the light of my earlier discus a ion, to consider some
of the problems raised by psycho-kinesis# Though we still seem far from
an acceptable explanation of this phenomenon, a lot of information is
available which suggests quite narrowly defined parameters within which
an explanation must be found# Wo are dealing here with a mind phenomenon
producing very varied physical effects# There are, for instance, reliable
reports of metal and other substances being moved and bent; of electrical
voltage changes; of broken watches being' re-started and of recording tapes
and films being made blank# It seems reasonable to assume also that many
1psychic healing phenomena are of similar character#
All these effects occur at a distance from the agent, apparently as 
a result of his mental activity# Despite extensive monitoring, there is 
no evidence of transmission of forces nor does there appear to he any 
decline in the strength of the effects with screening; or with distance#
The forces appear, however, often, but not'' always, to be of electro-magnetic 
character; they appear often, perhaps always, to operate internally within 
the structure being influenced; and they appear often, but hot, always, to 
operate at quantum level# Often, they appear also to operate in small 
bursts or pulses, though the overall effect may appear continuous# 
Notwithstanding that the effects derive from mental activity of th© subject, 
they do not require his conscious attention for psycho-kinetic effects 
often occur when the subject's attention has turned elsewhere after 
apparently fruitlessly concentrated effort# There is also a remarkable 
selectivity in the location and the form of the effects within the structure 
being influenced - a selectivity and appropriateness to the goal that the 
subject has in mind which extends far beyond his technical knowledge and 
awareness and often including a selectivity of detail beyond the reach of 
the senses: and there is some evidence that the effects manifest themselves
most strongly and consistently in unstable systems such as those in flux, 
including particularly those with large amounts of random activity or 'noise* 
Stanford has d r a m  attention to these and other characteristics
of psyclio-kinesis/in a recent review of the evidence and ha.s criticised what;
3 Ahe terms ' the psychobiological paradigm*« be attributes to this paradigm
two main assumptions: (l) that E S }?'must ho an inforraation-roooiviug
capacity and that the receiving; and processing' of such information must 
in some way depend on ei'bher a specialised, receptor or on the brain and 
nervous system as a wholes and (2) that in psyclio-kinesis, extra-sensory 
perception must be used, albeit unconsciously, to guide and control the 
outcome. To this paradigm he attributes responsibility for a number of 
ideas which he regards as misleading. Such are ’E S P  ability1 and 
’E S P  sensitivity’ as analogues of sensory abilities and sensitivities, 
and the idea that E S P is a (not very satisfactory) form of perception? 
such also is the idea that there must be some form of unconscious monitoring 
or feedback to account for the selectivity and efficiency of psycho-kinesis* 
to illustrate which, Stanford refers to such phrases as ’extra sensory 
response to the target stimulus’? and he criticises the idea that a person 
’causes’ a psycho-kinetic effect in the way a person causes a car to turn 
bjr steering it.
Stanford has therefore felt himself obliged by the evidence to 
reject ideas he had earlier advocated such as ’psi-scanning’ of the 
environment with appropriate feedback, and more specifically, he has found 
himself obliged to reject any implication that there is in psycho-kinetic 
experiments some form of precise, moment to moment extra sensory monitoring 
combined with skillful computer-like computation to allow precise, effective 
application of the psycho-kinetic forces a view that has become increasing! 
unrealistic with the use in experiments of complex quantum-based or 
electronic random event generators, often running at fast speeds. More 
generally, as Stanford has noted, the subject’s ignorance of many aspects 
of the target situation in E S P tests does not impair results and this 
also weighs against any form of monitoring. . Many of these features are 
summarised in the apparent ’goal oriented’ character of psycho-kinesis 
to which he draws attention - the characteristic that ’they accomplish 
precisely what is needed in a given situation and do so in a way which 
seems uninfluenced by the complexities of the target situation or of the 
task ’per se’.’ Stanford refers specifically to much recent work on 
psycho-kinesis by Schmidt with random event generators where the successful 
subjects did not know the physical nature of the target system or how it 
functioned yet were able to influence its operation.
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Stanford has therefore found himself driven to formulate the .idea 
of 'conformance behaviour's this is the idea that the"'world may be built 
in such a way that in parapsychology, given some form of suitable random 
event generator, these events can be biassed so as to produce a state of 
affairs favourable to the needs or desires of another system to which it 
is linked# More specifically, if the brain generates a number of incomplete) 
determinate alternative states or events, then the contingent linkage to it 
of another system such as another person will bring about the state of 
affairs in the brain that the second person desires, regardless of any 
complexities in the target system or task and without scanning or feedback, 
being needed# Interesting as these ideas are, however, Stanford does not 
suggest the nature of that contingent linkage and this necessarily makes it 
difficult to translate his thinking into more specific terms#
The arguments that I have been presenting earlier are broadly in 
accord with those of Stanford and go some way towards showing how they 
oould apply in more detail# Taking first E S P  experiments, 1 have already 
stressed the need for the subject to be in a relaxed but alert state, 
preferably dissociated, and I have suggested that in such states many of 
the circuits of the semantic memory, though fully alert, will be disengaged* 
In effect, the brain then becomes a, random ©vent generator meeting the 
requirements postulated by Stanford# I have stressed also that minds 
are not separated from each other physically or by time or space and I havo 
suggested that E S P  occurs as a result of th© association of ideas through 
an interpersonal or collective unconscious# 1/hen, therefore the agent 
concentrates his attention on a target, perhaps having in mind also the 
subject, his experience of the target passes into the collective unconscious 
enriched with associations which not only give it meaning but associate it 
with theWbjects and if tho mind of the subject is suitably relaxed and 
particularly if he should think of the agent or target, then his thoughts 
may have strong enough associations to link with those of the agent by way 
of the collective unconscious and to . draw the experiences of the agent 
which have just passed into the unconscious into his own mind as if they 
were his own memories: or alternatively, parts or aspects of the experiences
may come into his mind instead# As Stanford claims, tho agent does not 
'cause* the subject's experience in any direct way# All that happens is 
that the agent and the subject both orient their minds in such ways as, 
in effect, to allow the transfer of ideas by way of the memory and the
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collective unconscious* and, of course, if tho subject for some reason 
consciously or unconsciously seeks to reject any events associated with 
the agent, then psi-missing may occur®
Can we then translate these ideas in terras of psycho-kinesis? The 
most difficult issue for most people is presumably to avoid thinking of it 
entirely in physical, spatial and temporal terms. We can approach the issue 
by considering why, when 1 am seated in an arm chair and will to move 
a polished stone on a shelf nearby, nothing happens® Some very exceptional 
mediums might be able to move it but I cannot® If we ask why not, perhaps 
the most natural answer would be that it is spatially separated from me®
But this cannot be a good reasons the ineffectiveness of m£ willing is 
unaffected by the size or weight of the object or by the distance of it 
from me? if spatial separation were itself decisive, it would rule out all 
cases of psycho-kinesis for which the evidence is now very strong? what is 
more, if the movement of the stone could be shown to be the effect of, say, 
electi’o-magnetism or sound waves, such separation would present no problem? * 
and, more basically, as I have sought to ehow9 space is simply a concept 
derived from, normal relationships between objects and events and spatial 
relationships are simply the way one object or event relates spatially to 
another; it is the normal organisation of objects that create the framework 
of relationships; and, as I have sought to show, these relationships are th 
outcome of the interplay of the normal natural forces of the world® The 
principle that man can vary these relationships by moving objects around 
is obvious enough® In psyoho-kinesis it is the processes or mechanisms 
involved that are difficult to understand® In particular, when I get up 
from my chair and pick up the stone, it is to be assumed that I am bringing 
into play in my brain minute forces which vary the patterning 6'f.the 
the neuronal discharges which a.re then enormously amplified in my body so 
as to enable me to move the stone® If, however, I simply will to movo 
the 3tone and do not use the amplifying forces of my body, the forces 
involved will be so minute that this of itself could explain why the stone 
does not move® Clearly, however, further clarification .is needed®
First, I have claimed that there is a physical component of mental 
events which, I have suggested, con be active or latent - a point on which 
I comment further later® Secondly, a.s Ryle noted, mind and mental events 
do not exist in space, yet, thirdly, their physical components do have
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spatial relationships. These last t;wo points appear to oonlractio h. The;v 
might therefore he reworded to say that though mind has no spatial relation­
ships, its physical mahifootatioiu do have. In terms of conceptual levels, 
spatial relationships occur at the level of the contents of our sense 
experiences, hut not at the higher levels of consciousness or mind. In 
ontological terms,.we can say that the sensory/ physical world exhibits normal 
spatial relationships in circumstances where mind plays no active role? 
but these spatial relationships in no way bind the sensory/physical world 
where it attains the complexity of organisation of living creatures and, 
broadly spealdng, the higher the level of organisation the more control 
of its spatial relationships it can exhibit. What is more, some aspects of 
mind have no physical component, notably episodic memories, except when 
they are brought into consciousness or to the threshold of consciousness: 
and there are certain states of &issoc5.ation, where, as the word suggests, 
mental events with their physical, probably electro-magnetic, component 
can separate from the body under the control of thought and identify with 
the sensory aspect of other events in the sensory/physical world. What is 
more, in such circumstances we could expect the thought and the sensory 
event to come together on the basis of associations which are necessarily 
involved in the very processes of meaningful thought.
How far, then, does this account explain both normal and psycho-kinetic 
events. It explains first the normal spatial relationships of the wo3?ld 
around us? it explains secondly our ability to vary those relationships 
using the amplifying machinery of our own bodies and thirdly, it opens the 
door for an explanation of parapsychological phenomena, including, in partic­
ular, psycho-kinesis. Obviously, however, I roust try to explain further 
the mechanisms entailed.
Very few people are able to produce detectable psycho-kinetic effects. 
This ability, as I have suggested, appears to be linked with some measure 
of dissociation of the relevant part of the mind from other parts concerned 
with other sensory and motor activities both at the higher and instinctive 
levels. It would seem that the greater the level of dissociation^ the 
stronger
borne out by the very strong psycho-kinetic effects produced by 'Philip* 
and by poltergeists for it is precisely these lower level abilities 
associated with the body which they lacks their ability to project is 
presumably therefore unrestricted.
are likely to be the psycho-kinetic manifestations and fthxs is
'k
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There mueb, however, he yet more entailed for? m  I have a'lrom'ly 
noted, there is an astonishing degree of selectivity which lies far beyond 
the conscious knowledge of the agent in many cases# As Bastin says: "The
evidence is strong that some psycho-kinetic subjects influence mechanisms
of all sorts, watches being only the commonest objects of their attention?
Ain a way that1 relates to the purposes of the maker of that mechanism* - 
To understand this selectivity and seeming purposiveness, we need to , .c:, . 
appreciate that when a subject sees, for instance, a broken watch and seeks 
to make it work, he not only 'sees' its he sees it in meaningful terms 
as al watch* The sense experiences of the watch and the concept of the watch 
come together* But as I have already shorn, the concept is built up from 
uniformities at many different levels# Mien, therefore, the subject looks 
at the watch and thinks of it as mended and functioning, the relevant 
experience does not lie only at conscious levels a structured complex 
of memories at many levels is evoked# Mils complex is d r a m  from th© 
interpersonal or collective unconscious, and,, though built up mainly from 
the personal experiences of the agent, it will also be built up from the 
continuous flow of associated sensory events related to the watch throughout 
its existence, and probably also from the memories of others who made and 
handled the watch at earlier stages# This many-levelled hierarchy must, 
therefore, be able to 'map-on to* tho object on the basis of associations 
and, when the subject wills some change in its form or functioning, there 
will be no resistance at those levels where will and object are in accord? 
but where the watch is broken, there will he resistance and it seems that 
the forces must concentrate there to overcome the resistance and to bring 
the broken part into line# In other words, despite the fact that the agent 
is aware of the object only at ce.btain higher levels, the entire conceptual 
hierarchy must map on to the object and must seek to overcome resistance 
where the hierarchy an:4 object fail to coincide#
The resolution of the main conceptual difficulties in seeing how, 
in principle, the agent's mind can influence objects and events depends, 
therefore, on appreciating that, as argued earlier, space in no way limits 
mind which can focus at different points regardless of spatial separation 
and. regardless of such factors as solidity or density# It depends, secondly, 
on the attractive power of associations which can ensure that mental events 
can identify with physical events and their physical components occurring 
at a distance and can thus ensure that this 'mapping on* process can
take place at many levels, notwithstanding that some of those lie ontoido 
the knowledge of the agent? and it depends thirdly on the selectivity o ■' the 
will which may he a selectivity, not only of location, hut also of the form 
of action® There is evidence that the forces involved, are often electro­
magnetic , but this may not always be the case; and if not, it may be 
relevant that though the basic forces of physics still await a unifying 
theory, it is the acknowledged faith and aim of physicists that thisj be 
achieved, and this implies that some form of conversion or interchangeabilit 
of the energies involved should be possible®
There is then the problem of the size of the forces available as a, 
result of the operation of the will for the forces involved in modifying 
the neuronal patterning of the brain must be assumed normally to be minute® 
Again, there are a number of facets to the resolution of this problem®
All matter, however static it may appear, has at quantum level to be thought 
of in terras of standing patterns of dynamic energy in continuous activity.
As Einstein showed, mass has to be thought of in terms of energy and. energy 
is itself a dynamic concept® What is more, this energy is continuously 
fluctuating at random and extra-large variations cause mutations® If, 
therefore, as the evidence suggests, the will can1 influence selectively the 
random fluctuations in the flow of events at quantum level, very large 
effects can, in principle, be achieved by very small forces® At higher 
levels of organisation, too, though some physical systems are, of course, 
very stable, enduring sometimes over millions of years, other physical 
systems are in constant flux® Thus the movement of the stone requires 
far more energy than the variation of an electric current or the movement 
of the molecules in a magnetic tape which is already recording 'white1 or 
random noise® The principle tha/b, other things being equal, far .less 
energy is needed to effect changes in a system in a state of random flux 
thus almost certainly provides one key to the understanding of psycho- 
kinetic e ffec tso
Whether P K forces can operate separately at different levels is 
not clear though it is a reasonable assumption® There is, however, a lot 
of evidence that it does occur at quantum level and it so happens that, 
though the mathematical formulation of quantum physics is well-established, 
its conceptual understanding is in a state of greqt uncertainty and dispute®
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Some of th© issues involved in this dispute are directly relevant, to issues : 
raised by psycho-kinesis# In particular, there is much discussion at the 
present time about whether mental influences over physical events are 
already allowed for within quantum theory# Whereas at the level of the 
ordinary world, the complete description of the dynamic state of a system in 
terms of classical mechanics would allow its subsequent states to bo .. * 
determined, at the level of quantum physics, there is an inherent uncertainty 
This uncertainty cannot be overcome by closer observation for this disrupts 
the system being observed* It follows that the role of the observer is 
inherent in quantum physios and despite many efforts to eliminate the 
observer from the formulae involved,^A these are generally regarded as 
having been unsuccessful# E H Walker has put forward an interpretation 
of Quantum Theory which on this basis allows psychic phenomena a place 
within the theory#^ .
Whereas the orthodox physical interpretation of 'the observer' is 
in terms of another physical system, normally an observing instrument, Walker 
regards the term 'observer'’ as a euphemism for consciousness and its 
directive will# He makes use of intensive studies which have been made 
in recent years to find, within the area of uncertainty, factors to explain 
how that uncertainty is resolved in quantum systems* Th© search for such 
factors has led to the postulation of 'hidden variables* which though 
inaccessible to direct measurement, ’cause’ the occurrence of the following 
specific state# Walker adduces theoretical and experimental arguments 
in support of his claim that consciousness directed by the will of the 
observer is on© of these hidden variables# The important point of this 
theory for psycho-kinesis is that these hidden variables have, according 
to the formulae, to be independent of location, spatial or temporal, and 
have to be the same for all observers# If Walker is correct, therefore, 
we have here a direct way in which, within the Quantum Theory, mind can 
influence the operation of physical systems at a distance#
As X have already noted, the conceptual foundations are in such flux 
at present as strongly to suggest that a solution cannot be found within 
our current paradigm# Not surprisingly, • therefore, Walker’s theory raises 
several important conceptual issues which need to be considered here#
PhysicsThe first is simply to note that the bringing in of the observer to Quantum/
even in the form of a measuring device, is.itself a source of ut\q a so to
some physicists: but it .is a vastly bigger step to think of tho observer
in the form of consciousness and the will and to thinlc of it playing such
a basic role in a scientific theory at the heart of physics. In particular,
it carries the implication that the physical world is not self-contained: of the efforts .whsfc, for instance, is the worth/of many psychologists to rid psychology
of mind if it turns up here? Secondly, Walker’s theory apparently involves 
a OwA t&t b? life FTthe coupling of the observef7ihto one system with, in effect, unconscious
feedback and monitoring by the observer: yet Walker’s theory still fails
adequately to explain the selectivity of psychic phenomena.
Whether the first issue - the intrusion of mind, into physical theory - 
is regarded as acceptable depends largely on the view which one holds of 
the relationship of physical and mental. To most people operating within 
the current Western paradigm, where mind is seen as deriving from or as 
separate from the physical, such an intrusion must seem disturbing. Such a 
role for mind is, however, quite in accord with the views being presented 
here'for the laws of physics are seen as uniformities as they occur in normal 
circumstances without any intervention of mind? and the physical is seen 
as an aspect or component of the sensory/physical world - a component whioh 
can be active or latent and whose uniformities can be modified by the self- 
intimating and partially self-regulating systems of the sensory/physical 
world which are living creatures and, in pariiciilar^human beings. • The 
principle that such modifications occur is implicit in/idea that the will 
can modify the neuronal patternings of the brain and if this is accepted, 
the question whether such modifications can occur elsewhere becomes more 
a question of fact than, of principles and the factual evidence is very 
strong.'This, of course, does not necessarily imply that , the mode of operatic? 
is as Walker sees it, but, in the very nature of the argument being 
presented here, we should be able to substitute in Walker’s argument, for 
references to consciousness, references to its physical aspect or component; 
for, ’ex hypothesi!, whether or not an event in the sensory/physioal world 
is self-intimating does not of itself alter its behaviour.
The second point about the coupling into a single system of the 
observer and the physics,! system being altered by psycho-kinesis, raises 
other issues. In the case of E S P , 1 have suggested that no such direct 
coupling need be involved for the memories in the collective or interpersonal 
unconscious play: an.intermediate role, between the m-jnds. of' M e : agent and 
the subject. It could be argued that in view of the forces involved,
and the rarity of psyoho-kiruMiis in comparison with I' 8 f' , kho difforonoe 
must be more than one of degree; and certainly, in some poltergeist oaoew, 
as I note presently, very large forces are involved® On the other hand, 
as Stanford notes, no form of scanning or monitoring or feedback appear 
to be involved, and the claim that associations account for the selectivity 
and seeming purposiveness. of psycho-kinesis and the fact that psycho-kinesis 
sometimes occurs after a period of fruitless effort when the attention 
of the subject is directed, elsewhere, suggest that the same machinery may be 
involved®
It seems possible that psycho-kinesis may operate in different ways 
at different levels with different subjects® At quantum level presumably 
only very small forces are, involved, and it is noteworthy that Walker's 
theory apparently accounts only for very small forces - seemingly too small 
to account even for quite modest psycho-kinetic ©vents; though Mattuck 
has sought to show that the forces can be magnified, somewhat if the energy
7is applied in small pulses, as is sometimes found®-i; It would seem, however, 
that the very large forces deployed by poltergeists in moving large and 
heavy articles of furniture cannot be accounted for in quite this way®
In particular, not <jnly are the forces larger but they would, seem to operate
at a different orglsational level which again is presumably another examo]e 
of the selectivity of psycho-kinetic forces® Such poltergeist activity 
can take many other forms such as rappings and the disruption of electricity 
and telephone circuits® They ore typically found in association with 
children and young people who are unaware of their role but are disturbed 
in mind and subject to considerable stress® Repressed aggression is a -
common characteristic® As Roll says5, such poltergeist events are psycho­
physical, expressing patterns which are at the one time physical and mental; 
indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that the things in a poltergeist 
house are at the same time the thoughts of the people who live there and 
that when an investigator enters the space surrounding a poltex-geist agent, 
in a literal sense, he enters that person’s mind; a. suggestion which is 
consonant with what is being argued here® Important evidence relevant to 
the character of poltergeists and to psycho-kinesis is given by the rernarkabl 
case of ’Philip’ to which I have referred earlier®
’Philip1 was a ’ghost’ who was created by a group of members of tho
Toronto Society for Psychical Research# A full account is given in a
8book by Mrs I Owen, ’Conjuring Up Philip’#.., Briefly, the group set out to 
see if it was possible to create such an entity# They wrote an imaginary 
outline biography of Pnilip whom they saw as a seventeenth century cavalier 
in England# They ’gave* Philip an English country house that actually 
existed, a wife and mistress# They built into his biography a number of 
deliberate anachronisms to ensure that any ghost could be seen to be their 
own creation# They then had a number of group sessions where they concentrat 
on various aspects of his life: and in the process they built up a close,
relaxed and high-spirited rapport within the group# They then began to 
ask questions and on the basis of a ’yes, no, don't know'code of rappings, 
they began to receive intelligent answers to their questions# Philip's 
raps were .in furniture and walls and there were other poltergeist effects 
such as tables being moved# Philip was in this way well able to converse 
intelligently and demonstrate emotion, showing clear signs of pleasure and, 
on occasions, sulking# The account of Philip deserves to be read in full 
but the most important point for this study is that he appears to have 
achieved a considerable measure of life and consciousness and intelligence 
independent of his creators; and though he appears not to have produced 
any information not already in the minds of the group, he comes across to 
the reader, as he did to tho group, as an intelligent, generally benign, 
living person# More specifically, Philip appeared to occupy the point in 
space where his physical manifestations occurred, e g in the table, though 
he was obviously free to move around: in other words, a mind phenomenon
occupied physical material and was able so to move it as to produce various 
physical manifestations#
What appears to have happened in this case is that the experiences of 
each member of the group were focussed on the life of Philip and the 
experiences passed into the collective unconscious with strong associations 
which, as 1 have suggested earlier, must have been fostered not only by 
the strong group rapport but by their relaxed attitude# The memories must 
then have begun to cluster in the collective unconscious and when the 
cluster attained sufficient structured complexity, it began to manifest 
independent signs of life and intelligence# It is noteworthy th&t Philip
was not soon though there was a slight mist or haze on one or two aooan i.onsu
All communications to him were apparently by voice though he appears to
have been able to anticipate speech, which suggests telepathic understanding.
All replies were by raps or other physical manifestations# The absence of
visual manifestations of Philip is probably to be explained by the less
concentrated attention given to the group to the appearance of Philip than
to his personality, though they had a head and shoulders sketch of him to
aid their concentration#
On this basis, a similar explanation lies to hand for the Enfield
poltergeist which was the subject of a report to the Second International
S P R Conference in March 1978# As I have noted, poltergeists normally
appear to be associated with one person, often a somewhat disturbed teenager*
with deep feelings of frustraction and aggression which cannot otherwise 
9find expression#O In this case, however, the poltergeist appears to have
have /been linked to several members of the family ana to/acquired the same sort 
of independence-as Philip# Characteristically, the family appears to have 
had fairly strong emotional disturbances and it is noteworthy that the 
poltergeist appears to have been much more malign than Philip# This is 
borne out by the surly vocal communications from the poltergeist which was 
able to use the larynx (but not the vocal cords) of one of the girls#
An apparition was seen on several occasions#
The strong psycho-lcinetio effects caused by Philip and by poltergeists 
form part of the pattern of psycho-ldnetic effects as a whole# It appears 
that in ordinary psycho-kinesis, the subject produces these effects at a 
distance by partly detaching a part of his mind or memories and allowing 
it to identify with the objects or events which he wants to change# In 
the case of Philip and the!poltergeists, the counterpart of the detached 
part of the subject’s mind is the highly developed complex of memories of 
one or more persons which apparently achieve stronger internal associations 
one memory with another, than each has with the originating personality#
It is reasonable then to surmise that the reason why such ’discamate’ 
personalities can achieve such strong physical effects is becauBe, effectively 
the whole of the complex can identify itself with the physical object 
whereas in most incarnate subjects, the greater pant of their minds continue
to be occupied with the normal activities of controlling the body and 
responding to it, thus limiting the extent of dissociation possible and 
available to bring about psycho-kinetic effects® Whereas the normal 4 ‘ 
incarnate personality has physical manifestations in the body which reflect 
and control the disciplined development of the personality as a whole, 
these discamate personalities lack the entire mental and physical sub­
structure® Also they appear to be parasitic for there is evidence to 
suggest that Philip, and probably the poltergeist personalities, too, 
exist only when sustained by their originators® As Roll notes, for instance, 
there are generally no poltergeist disturbances when the agent is asleep®
Mrs Owen has recently reported that subsequent work by the Toronto
MOgroup has shown that they can establish such improbable comm/Lcators as 
a raven-haired beauty from Venus, a talking dolphin and the Artful Dodger 
from Dickens® It seems that any four members of the group can. produce 
such results and visitors can be added® The essential ingredient for 
their success appears to be strong group rapports they need to have spent 
much time with each other, to have emotional sympathy or empathy, and 
to have a common object of attention® Mrs Owen reported that members 
apparently acquired a degree of telepathy within the group® As for the 
content of messages, the entities appear unable to produce any information. 
not already known to some member of the group® Hie Pb.ilip experiment was 
wound up in the autumn of 1977
(?There are many parallels to the aohievenjhte of this group® When
R Hodgson was working with Mrs Piper, the famous medium, in 1895? the day
after he had been reading Scott’s ’Life anc^Letters’, and thinking deeply
about them, ’Sir Walter Scott’ communicated speaking quite fluently and
plausibly, but he failed lamentably under cross-examination® ■ ■ Walker
reports that when Charles Dickens was engrossed in writing ’Martin Chuzzlew.it
one of the characters, Mrs Gamp, became so real that she would accompany
him to church and whisper in his ear so he was unable to control himself
and would burst out laughing® This became so embarrassing that he threatened
12to have nothing to do with her if she did not behave® Walker notes 
also that a number of Eastern sects have developed the art of creating 
thought-forms by intense meditation® As he notes, Alexandra David-Neel • 
who lived and worked in Tibet and discusses such thought-forms or ’tulpas’
in her books, created such a tulpn in the form of a, jovial Tib©ton monk*
At first he was a welcome companion on her journeys and was accepted by 
other peor)le as a genuine monk. But he began to develop out of her control 
and became more menacing. It took some six. months of intensive effort on 
her part to dissolve him/! 5 The various physical manifestations of various 
nineteenth century mediums appear to have been very similar, though much 
more transitory. Baron von Schrenck Hot zing reports on many of these • I
with many striking photographs as well as, for example, laboratory reports 
of the composition of the traces of ectoplasm<Afy
In broad terms, therefore, the picture that emerges is that for 
E S P to be received, a relaxed mind is needed and sensitivity is likely 
to be much greater if some measure of dissociation is achieved, thus 
allowing much greater sensitivity tojideas reaching it from the unconscious* 
Presumably when these ideas enter the mind their hitherto latent physical 
component is activated and, it may be conjectured, forms part of the 
electro-magnetic field which effects liaison with the brain. Such events 
are not, of course, ’in’the mind and it may be further conjectured that 
the threshold of sensitivity of the sense mechanisms has evolved at a 
level which normally excludes all such extra-sensory stimulation. In 
psycho-kinesis, it seems that dissociation is more extensive, thus allowing 
more of the mind a greater, measure of autonomy: which in turn gives it
the ability to identify with and to ’map-on’ at many iwele to physical 
objects and events* In the case of poltergeists and Philip, the dissociation 
goes much further in that, though the entity is sustained by the individual 
or group, its freedom from any instinctive or motor roots in the body, 
while making it parasitic, enables a much fuller identification with physical 
objects and allows much larger physical effects to be achieved. It will, 
of course be appreciated that all this is consonant with and, indeed, 
is built on my earlier claims for a double aspect theory of mental and 
physical deriving from a, sensory/physical world which, as I shall show more 
fully presently, is itself a manifestation of the collective or interpersonali
unconscioxiSo
I need now to show that when even fuller dissociation of the personalit, 
from the body is achieved, out-of-the-body experiences can occur and these 
give us reports, as it were, from the ’inside’, of such highly developed 
states of dissociations and when all links' with the body are severe!.,
thoro is strong ovide.noo pointing, not only to the fact, but to tho 
character of survival after death# As I shall show, each of these di.fforent 
fonns of psychic phenomena can be seen as points on a spectrum of mental, 
activities involving varying measures of dissociation from the body and 
from sense experiences 2 and the fact that they can be so viewed obviously 
adds strength to the credence of each form individually and to the argument 
as a whole# The seemingly very radical idea of dissociated elements of 
the mind being able to identify with physical objects and events to 
bring about psycho-kinesis, does not therefore stand alone and gains 
support when it is seen how the underlying principles can account for a 
much wider range of phenomena# I need now to show this in the case of 
out-of-the-body experiences, apparitions and survival of death#
1 An up to data account of peycho-kinoois io givon in Advances in 
Paransyehologlcal Rosearch vol 1 ed* 8 Xrlppnor
2 See 0 g H Puthoff & R Targ 'Physics*, Entropy and Poyohc-kinooio5 end 
tho folloTzing discussion in Quantum Phyoien and Parapsychology
ed# L Oteri (1975) PP129-150
3 R G Stanford 'j^ortoontal. .^^hq/ldjiOQip * in Handbook of 
B B Wolmon, end ^PoraMmaioss in PoHand9 in Tho Philosophy of 
Parapsychology ©do® B Shapin & h Goly pp 1-18 from which thooo 
quotations are taken® .
4 This quotation io from a talk on 'Psycho-kinesis and Physios * by 
E Dastin at tho Sooond International Conforonoo of tho S P H  at 
Cambridge, April*, 1978®
5 Notably by Poppors see 'Quantum Mechanics without tho Observer' in 
Quantum Theory and Reality (1 9 6 7)
6 Walker's thoory io oot out in ; Quantum Physics and Parapsychology 
eda L Oteri (1975) whoro there
documentation#
7 W G Roll's article on Poltergeists, which is roforrod to horo, io in 
Handbook of Parapsychology od0 B B Wolmaa® This artiolo providoo
a valuable up to date summary of tho evidence and has a full biblio­
graphy®
8 Published by EitsHenry and Whiteside# 1976
9 So© W G Roll Tho Poltorgoiet (1976) p 144 and A R G Owen Gan Wo 
Explain tho Poltergeist? (T964) PP 368-38?
10 Now Horizons Sopt® 1978 2 issue 9
11 *Thb Psychology of Mrs Piper's Trance Phenomona' Mrs H Sidgwiek Pjgoo® 
S P R Vol XXVIII 1915 P 85
12 B Walker Beyond tho Body (1974) P 131
13 A David-Nee! With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet (1936) pp 284-5
14 A von Schrenck Motsing Phenomena of Materialisation (1923/
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There is now a large {body of testimony to oases where people have 
left their bodies temporarily® / For most of these people, their experiences 
have occurred only once or twice in their lives but for some the experience
i •
has been more frequent and a few people have had the experience frequently
and to some extent at will® Surveys suggest that the experiences are less
unusual than might be expected, occurring to .perhaps 101' or more of people
at some time in their lived0%Y" Some of these out-of-tfoe-body experiences
have been associated with an accident or serious illness and in these and
other cases, the person undergoing the experience has often been able to
see his own unconscious body below him and to see and hear what is being
1 ' i
done and said by other people including cases where they are trying to
revive it® Sometimes it has been possible to confirm observed events later®
Many out-of-tfae-body experiences occur when the subject is unconscious or
asleep or just lying down but in a few cases the subjeot has been engaged
in normal activities which have been carried on, apparently unimpaired®
Those who have been able to leave their bodies on a number of occasions
and have learned to control' their movements in this state have found
themselves able to travel further afield at will® They, too, have been
able subsequently to report; on what they have, seen and have sometimes been
able to check on these events® In some well testified oases they have been„
seen as apparitions in the place where and at' the time when they have
purportedly been visiting and exceptionally,, psychokinetic effects have
been observed®iYU There is’ also experimental evidence for these experiences®
Those undergoing the experiences are unanimous that they are of quite a
different character from dreaming® The cumulative evidence for the objective
reality of these experiences is therefore by now weighty®
Though the reports of these experiences have a remarkably large number
of features in common, ther^, of course, many detailed differences,
particularly in content, not only between one person and another, but also
between one experience and another? and there are differences, too, of
interpretation, notably about the nature of the body i n ‘which of ten,
though not always, the person undergoing the experience finds himself®
It is not my purpose here to try to analyse the by now large body of reports
to try to interpret and reconcile them on a common basis; though the wider
arguments that I am seeking to establish should help towards that end.
Rather, I went to concentrate on some of the wider implications of some 
well-established features of the experiences and to use these to illustrate 
and take further these wider arguments.
The first and most basic point is that ih:.these experiences, the 
person has the clear awareness of having left the body. When 5m this 
state the personality appears in a number of ways to be enhanced but 
otherwise to be unchanged. Thus the person’s sense of his own identity is 
unimpaired and so is his memory? his powers of reasoning appear exceptionally 
clear and his experiences of the world around him are from a specific point 
in space? they follow normal laws of perspective in most canes but have 
exceptional acuteness, clarity and vividness. So long as he remains in 
this state and confident of his powers, he can translate himself, sometimes 
over great distances, almost instantaneously, by so willing, yet he cannot 
normally move physical objects such as electron light switches, as his hand 
goes through them, and he is normally invisible to, and cannot be touched 
by, people who are around him. He has, however, as I have said, a clear 
sense of his own location and surroundings and usually he is aware of being 
in a second body complete with normal clothes: though there are some reports
of being completely disembodied.
, In this state, it seems clear that the sense mechanisms cannot be
j employed and this, of itself, suggests that the subject’s perception must 
I be by some form of telepathy or clairvoyance. The world is seen, largely 
as normal yet it is seemingly a world of thought construction. This is 
emphasised by Muldoon who had many such experiences: everything in
the astral plane seems to be governed by thought - by the mind of the 
projector. As a man thin}.cs, so he is I ... as one in in his mind he becomes 
in reality when he is in the astral b o d y . T h i s  power of thought can 
be reconciled with tho apparent normal structuring of the world if we think 
of the whole thought world in this state as deriving from the collective 
03? interpersonal unconscious into which tho sense aspects of the normal 
world are continuously passing complete with their dense network of■ aasociat- 
-ions: the network which allows for th&r recall in cases of clairvoyance.
i
It appears, therefore, that firmly to think one is somewhere when out of tho 
body is to find oneself at that plane, but if one resolves to travel there 
one has the experience of so travelling. As Kuldoon says: ’If you ever
learn to project consciously, ... oven before ybu/complete a thought,*, yon 
have already attained what you are th.inJ.cing about.' ■ And In a later book 
he quotes a reports ’Then I thoughts nI wonder if I can leave this room", 
and almost instantly I sailed along and outside into the street.
In other words, it seems that the controlling or' directing of one’s own 
movements and the controlling or directing of the chain of events being 
experienced are not clearly distinguished but within such general direction, 
each feature is linked to the,next by its associations established in the 
normal world. This is borne out by the fact that on occasions, the 
associations can apparently assume their own momentum. This happened witli 
the dream of the falling chandelier quoted earlier, and Gelia Green quotes 
a case where a man undergoing an out-of-thegbody experience succeeded 
in rising through the roof of his house and saw a chimney stack in a 
position where it might have been expected, but which, on inspection next 
day, he found was not there. . . That we are dealing here with experiences 
in whioh associations play a major role is further borne out by Muldoon’s 
account of an experience which took place when he was visiting the home of 
his aunt. When he found himself out of the body, he found himself above 
his bed at home and it warn the absence of the body on the bed and his 
desire to find it quickly which translated him to his aunt’s home where it 
lay in bed. As he sayss 'In any projection, the astral body will always 
"project" with much more ease to a familiar place than to a strange place; 
in fa.ct, the astral body, when exteriorised and unconscious, will be found 
to meander about in the subject’s familiar haunts very much of the time - 
going through activities which had become habitual to the subject. And 
this applies not only to temporary, projected phantoms but to permanently 
disembodied phantoms also (phantoms of the dead).’®"' These features can 
be explained on the basis of the relative strengths of established trains 
of associations and the expectations of the person undergoing the experience.
How far the freedom of those undergoing these experiences extends 
is not clear, for only a few have the experiences often enough to gain 
confidence and courage to range widely. As I shall note, there are quite 
full reports which are reasonably consistent, of subjects being able to 
move on to other p l a n e s  of existence and meeting the spirits of those who 
had died. As I shall show, claims for the existence of such other planes 
and about their character find a coherent place within the overall argument 
which I am presenting here. There are reports also of subjects so identify!? 
with plants as to he able to uenetrate within and move around in their
9 .cellular structure. . Perhaps the most conspicuous absence from reports
of which I am uwuxo to of experiences of the tuHliuury world in pnc I or 
future states® It is not clear whether this is due to some limitation 
of principle or to the relative weakness of associations in relation to 
available cues, or to a lack of motivation of those undergoing the experience 
As for the degree of separation from the physical body, this appears 
in these states to be complete apart from an infinitely extensible cord 
between the person undergoing the experience and his body® Reports of 
this cord are remarkably frequent, its having been noted as early as 
Plutarch’s ’he Sera Numinis Vindicia’® So long as the cord is intact, 
the subject can return to the body but any break implies death® The link 
is normally reported as being from the physical body to the subject’s 
second or astral body which, as I shall note, is itself claimed to have 
physical attributes® 'These physical attributes are claimed to be of 
exceptional fineness in comparison with the grossness of ordinary matter 
and are frequently suggested to be electro-magnetic in character® This 
could be correct if my earlier arguments are accepted, for I claim that 
the physical is a component of sense experiences? I suggest that the 
liaison with the brain lies in the electro-magnetic ft* eld associated with 
neuronal discharges? and, of course, that field extends throughout the 
body, though in less concentrated form® In principle, it should be possible 
to observe and measure these fields in the out of the body state but 
bearing in mind the minute strength of the field and the evidence that 
there is no transmission entailed between the subject and his body in this 
state (unless this could be the physical basis of the cord), the chance 
of such observations is very slight® There is, of course, no transmission 
involved for, as I have sought to show, mind stands outside - at a higher 
conceptual level than - the physical world and in principle can enter it 
at any point without intermediate passage® As I note later, however,
Munroe reports that when he underwent an out~of~the~body experience when 
in a charged Faraday cage, he found himself trapped by the field as if it 
were a flexible but impenetrable rneshs and he obviously found it very 
unpleasant® He also reports that on another occasion , having separated 
from his body.and willed to go elsewhere, he found himself travelling 
along a nearby road above some power cables which retained him until he 
returned to his body®1^ In general, therefore, the persistent claims that 
the second body has an electro-magnetic component appear consonant with 
the argument being presented here and there is some limited evidence to
support the claims s. but more complex: attempts to classify the character 
of the body in these states have been put forward, and while broadly in 
line, they axe in detail difficult to classify#
As for the character of the body itself, as distinct from its 
physical component, it may- simply be noted that if the world around the 
out-of-the-body subject is basically a world of thought, based on memories 
from the collective or interpersonal unconscious, then it is reasonable to 
expect the second body to be of this character, too; and this would go 
some way to explaining why, though the second body normally appears to the 
subject fully clothed and in its usual form, there are some reports of 
the subject seeming to be disembodied# Fortunately, for the purposes of 
this study it is not necessary to try to resolve these issues and it 
suffices to draw from the discussion the following specific points#
First, these experiences testify to the ability of the personality 
to withdraw from the body and still retain its essential identity and 
character# Such evidence is fully consonant with my earlier argument 
that the physics,! is an aspect or component of the sensory and that mind 
io neither limited by nor is it a manifestation of the physical# The 
evidence is therefore in line with the explanations which have emerged, for 
other psychic events but it is, of course, incompatible with arguments 
that mind i3 identical with certain aspects of brain or is dependent on it 
for its existence or identity#
Gocon&ly, there is the evidence that experiences in those states 
are typically of greatly accentuated vividness and clarity# This, again, 
might be expected, if, as I argued earlier, the sense mechanisms provide 
what is in effect a reproduction of the sensory/physical world of which 
we are parts, and if, in this state, the mind is freed from its preoccxipation 
with sense and other experiences associated with the body and can respond 
with the whole of its resources to these experiences# There is a close 
parallel here with eidetic memories which apparently occur mainly with 
young children and primitive peoples; I comment on these later#
Thirdly, there is the evidence that experiences in these states ore 
of a telepathic and clairvoyant character# This is almost a necessary
conclusion, given the separation from....the^  sense mechanisms# As I shall show,
the evidence also coats light on. the possibility of other planes of existence
Fourthly, there is the evidence Mint bhough. tho sub jeo i, In, t.Uo ort oh 
the body state cannot use his hands to move physical objects, for they 
simply pass through them, he can in some circumstances achieve psychokinetie 
effects® They evidence for these effects is clear but they are not frequent; 
and it seems probable that,this is because not maaiy have tried or achieved 
the skills necessary, rather than any limitation of the powers as such® 
Finally, there is a small but well testified body of evidence that 
those undergoing these experiences not only have been able to observe 
events going on around them but that they have been seen there in the form 
of apparitions® These apparitions have, therefore, been of conscious, living 
but. otherwise disembodied persons® There is, however, much evidence that- 
many apparitions have a d-ifferent character and origin® I want, therefore, 
now to turn to these and other features of apparitions for they, too, 
cast light upon the wider argument being presented here®
Many of the problems of understanding apparitions stem from their 12very varied characteristics which seemingly preclude a unified explanation. 
Thus apparitions appear wearing normal clothing, which has led to the common* 
that if ghosts have clothes, clothes must have ghosts® What is more, there 
have been cases where apparitions have appeared to friends or close relations 
in clothes previously unknown to them which have subsequently proved to 
be theirs® Not only, however, do apparitions appear fully clothed: there
are well testified oases of their appearing complete with, for instance, 
coach, coachmen and horses® Sometimes these apparitions are of tho dead 
but sometimes they are of the living® Indeed there is a class of case in 
which people appear as apparitions to themselves and in one well testified 
case involving Goethe, he not only appeared to himself but was wearing 
distinctive clothes in distinctive circumstances which’were to come to pass 
only some years later® Sometimes apparitions appear to all the main senses 
but sometimes only to one or more of them® Thus in one case, an 
apparitional cat on a number of occasions jumped on to a bed and curled 
up by the legs of the occupant; it was felt through the bed clothes, the 
bed was appropriately indented and the cat could be heard purring yet it 
could not be felt or seen directly® But perhaps the most mystifying 
characteristic of apparitions lies in the fact that while some appear to 
only one person of a group, others appear to some or all of a group? and 
while some appear as almost transparent, others appear fully solid? and 
while some appear as still, shadowy, unresponsive figures, others appear
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as normal, responsive living people, even on occasions speaking. To add M 
to the difficulties, these can then fade away, becoming in the process 
transparent.
Not stirprisingly, the most serious problem facing those trying to 
explain such apparitions is to say whether they are completely subjective 
hallucinations ?in the mind’ or whether they are objective occurrences 
’in the external world’. The evidence is that they are sometimes the one 
and sometimes the other and given normal dualist assumptions, this almost 
precludes any consistent explanation.
Of itself, this is not a serious problem if the double aspect theory 
for which X have argued earlier is adopted. Our concepts of mind and of 
the external world are built up from consistencies in our sense and other 
experiences which are themselves in neither. Apparitions can, therefore, 
be treated as events which when they reach the field of consciousness can 
have characteristics departing from the normal and having uniformities 
typical both of subjective and objective experiences: which we knows but
this then becomes an explanation of ivhy they do not fit our normal dualist 
classification.^ ^
In seeking to explain apparitions, it seems reasonable to assume, firs 
that in the case of static and unresponsive apparitions, these events 
occurred earlier in that form and that they ha.v© been retained meanwhile 
in the collective or interpersonal unconscious. Such apparitions often 
appear to one sense only - being seen but not heard, for instance. This 
is in keeping with the fact that our memories are often of one sense but 
not others. Thus we may recall seeing some events but retain no memory 
of the associated sounds and smells which were part of the original 
experience. Tills of itself supports the kinship of psychic events and 
memory for which I am arguing.
Between the person observing the apparition and the person represented 
by the apparition, -there will normally be an associative link. Often this 
link will he one of place, as is of’ten found with hauntings, but with 
other apparitions, particularly those linked to crises, the association 
will often be personal. Normally, the mind of the observer must be relaxed 
if the apparition is to rise into his consciousnesss and as with telepathic 
experiences, it seems that some -apparitions may lie in the unconscious
*until the mind is suitably relaxed, presumably hold by tho associations * 
the question then arises why one particular incident or episode should
• ' A . ■present itself in the <form of an apparition, out of, say, a person’s< : *
entire life# It would seem first that this normally must depend oh the 
interplay of associations and the receptivity of the person or persons 
observing# Secondly, some episodes will create far stronger associations 
than others, notwithstanding that the episodes may he trivial in themselves* 
This is what we often find- in memory for recall of some person or place 
may bring to mind some incident or scene which is in itself in no way 
remarkable® Somew times, however, the .incident may be of strong emotional 
significance and I have already sought to show how strong emotion can bring 
about strongly enriched associations - though these can be so strong an 
to bring about their. repression as too disturbing® It seems likely that 
all these factors can play a role in apparitions: they may be trivial
incidents that are replayed; or they may be events of high emotional 
significance for the person who was then involved: or, regardless of his
emotion, the incident may be such as deeply to disturb the person who 
sees the apparition - which can presumably lead to the repression of the 
representation of the scene itself and its emergence in consciousness in 
some oblique or symbolic form® The relationship of apparitions to various 
forms of telepathic communication must therefore be very close®
As regards the form taken by apparitions, some obtrude into the normal 
sensory scene in a fully natural manner, observing perspective, avoiding 
furniture and so on# Yet other apparitions pass through furniture and closed 
doors and walk above or below ground level®- Again this can be understood 
on the basis of associations# Apparitions, like other clairvoyant images, 
if they are strong enough can superimpose themselves upon scenes reaching 
consciousness through the sens© mechanisms: in this respect they are
similar to eidetic memories which I discuss presently# We could then 
expect the sequence of events arising from the collective unconscious to 
associate itself automatically with those parts of the sensory scene where 
associations remain® Where the originating events took place in, say, a room 
whose form and furnishings. were substantially unchanged, the sequence of 
events would flow having regard, to them# But if there had been changes 
of furniture or structural changes, the associations would lie with the 
features which were unchanged and would have no regard to subsequent 
changes, so leading the apparition to appear quite out of context® Thus
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a friend • of • mine Imv tin m y o m X  oooasiono' about duiik the apparition of an 
farm labourer come through;.one trail of the room and pass out of the other, 
walking above, floor level. ■ where ' the surface of ;the field had formerly lain®
Many apparitions, as; I have noted, appear passive in the sense;that 
they appear not to see the observer or the place they are passing through.
The observer is seeing only a replay of events as they must onoe have, 
occurred, and, of course, this, gives no evidence of survival of death® Hie 
apparitions are, however,: sometimes much, mpre dynamic® Some of these 
cases can be understood in terms of stronger, more active, clustering of 
associations® We know such clustering takes plane in the personal unconscioi 
to form complexes and in extreme cases to give cases of multiple personality. 
I have claimed that the difference between events in: the personal unconsclour 
and events in the collective unconscious is primarily in the closeness of 
the associative-links®. What is more, the evidence of ’Philip’ and of some 
poltergeists confirms that: suoh oomplex&ityo;^ occur in the collective 
unconscious® From there they can, in principle, be drawn into the mind 
of any observer whose mind' is suitably .receptive and for whom the associative 
links are strong enough links which may be entirely personal or may be 
related primarily to time; and place® Hie necessary associations may be 
highly specific or may be more general' mid .so more easily satisfied by a 
wider range of people® What is more, the apparition may be a relatively 
we ale event superimposing itself on the background but not obliterating it, 
or it may have a strong, three-dimensional 'form and it may bo passive or 
have a personality of its own® Its personality in those cases will 
presumably be based on past collective memory sequences but its power of 
life will be drawn from -the observer or observers § which can, perhaps, 
more easily be understood when it is appreciated that such entities are 
not physically separated from the minds of the observers and that both 
the apparition and the mind of the observer are, in a sense, products of 
the same, non-spatial unconscious® As for the appearance of such apparitions 
to several observers at the same time, since spatial separation and so 
spatial identity are not involved, the requirements appear only to be that 
the necessary associative links should not be too speoific and that the 
observers should be receptive® :v"; *
* l* , £ ’As I have already shown, however, there are also cases of apparitions 
of people undergoing out-of-the-body experiences and this strogly suggests 
that some apparitions can b© of living but discarnat© xieoiDle® This in turn 
suggests that human personalities are not fundamentally different from
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ontitioa puaix as B U I  ip but that suoU ontHios laofc miffioimrl; ntruiUuml 
complexities to bo self-sustaining and self-dove1oping and to manifest the 
entire range of human attributes. Finally,• there are cases of apparitions 
of those who have died whioh are extremely difficult to explain as other 
than appearances by persons who have survived death - notably where the 
apparition conveys information not known to the observer and there appears 
to be a clear sense of purpose.14 Such, for instance, was the Chaffin will 
case. This was a case where a father made a will leaving his farm to one 
of his four sons and left nothing to his wife or other sons. Subsequently, 
he made another will dividing his property equally among his four sons andI *•
confiding their mother to their care. This will he disclosed to no one 
and he placed.it in the family Bible at the 27th chapter of Genesis. He 
stitched a message to this,effect in the pocket of an old overcoat. On 
his death, the first will was unconteated but some years later one of the 
disinherited sons began.having vivid dreams Of his father in which eventuall 
the father appeared to speak and give a message about the will and the coat 
which led to the later will being d i s c o v e r e d S u c h , for instance, also, 
was the case of the father who appeared to a husband and wife apparently 
to warn the former against’entering into financial transactions of a 
fraudlent character which would have ruined him and his family.46y SuchA. : j ' ’
cases become more comprehensible if, as.X shall seek to show, the objections 
normally levelled against survival of death are misconceived, if there is 
other evidence to support touch survival and, in particular, if survival 
out of the body is not affected as such by the breaking of the ’silver cord' 
to which I referred earlier.
As for the incidence of apparitions, this too has characteristics 
which need explanation. First, it seems that the further back in time the 
originating experiences, the less likely there are to be apparitions. This, 
however, needs qualification. . We can divide most apparitions into two 
classes: those whose main’links lie with persons and those whose main
links lie with places. Necessarily, the latter can be more durable, and 
reports of hauntings over several hundred years are not unusual. It would 
seem, therefore, that the key factor is the cues which, in the case of 
places,- may remain essentially unchanged for long periods notwithstanding 
the tendency for cues to become more and more attenuated over time, and so 
for apparitions to become less frequent. .
Secondly, it... is generally accepted that there ,1s a oonoiderable • 
clustering of apparitional appearances around tho time of death or of . 
some personal crisis® .'.-What', is more, a high proportion of such appearances 
are to close relatives or friends® Again, the characteristics of associallo­
in the collective unconscious can explain many of these cases® Where two 
people have strong ties of affection and many shared experiences, it is 
almost a truism to say that there must he strong associative links®
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that almost everything that happens 
to one such person carries' some associations for the other: and as such
events pass continuously into the unconscious, these associations will 
form, as it were, a subpons clous undercurrent to the other person’s life*
At a time of crisis or death, however, whether or not the person undergoing 
the crisis calls the other', person to mind and thereby makes the associative 
links stronger, the very nature of the crisis will evoke subconscious 
conflict with the on-going’preconceptions of .the friend or relation and 
this, in turn, will tend to evoke some form of emotional response which 
may lead to its obtruding into that person’s consciousness, sometimes only 
as a sense of depression or fear, but sometimes as an apparition® The form 
of the obtrusion will depend on circumstances depending on the associative 
channels open® No conscious volition on the part of the person undergoing 
the apparition is therefore needed® ‘Ex %pothesi', the associations endure 
permanently in the colleotive unconscious though the cues may dissipate 
and weaken® •
As for pre-cognitive apparitions, they appear to be very rare® Again 
the explanation is in principle fairly clear®' As I have sought to show 
and as I shall argue further, the collective or interpersonal unconscious 
lies outside time and carries with it a record of events, future as well 
as past® Such future events will carry associations but since they ha.ve 
not at that time been experienced, they will not have been enriched by the 
associative processes of the semantic memory® They can therefore carry 
associations in the subconscious of anyone concerned but they will be weak 
and their obtrusion into consciousness will require that the person y 
experiencing them be exceptionally sensitive or that the associations be 
exceptionally relevant and usually, exceptionally alarming: and it appears
true that a high proportion of precognitions are of disasters and rarely 
can they be of such strength to evoke an apparition®
One particular class of apparition is of apparitions of the self®
These appear to raise no greater difficulty of principle than any other 
apparitions the problem is to explain their distinctive character from 
memories® Whereas memories for most people involve the relatively weak
i .
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rooall of events whioh are quit© distinct from sense trrporienoos, most 
apparitions ere more akin to sense experiences and have the .further 
characteristic of having an objective character rather than being; just as 
once seen by. the pea on. experiencing the qmemqriCBn® There is, however, 
one form of memory, known as eidetic memory, which provides a great puzzle 
for those psychologists who have noted it and which has close similarities 
to apparitions® . , ! . . \ .
The study of eidetic memories in modem psychology is in some disarray® 
Some psychologists identify eidetic memory with photographic memory but 
while this identification ha,s regard to the completeness of recall, it 
appears not to have sufficient regard to the objective character of that 
recall® Other psychologists have sought to explain eidetic memory in terms 
of pathology though this appears to have been unsucessfuls and in any 
event, though pathology might explain its occurrence, it could hardly 
explain its character® And yet other psychologists have sought to explain 
it as differing from normal memory only in degree®$7 None of these appears 
to do full justice to its character®3.8k For present purposes, the essential 
characteristics of eidetic memory are their clarity and detail, their 
’perceptual1 quality and their apparent localisation in space® In particular 
those so remembering hold the object stable in front of them and ’real’ 
from it, with th© appropriate eye movements® Thus Allport reported that 
English speaking children with eidetic memories could recall a complex 
picture of a street scene in which a, to them meaningless, seven teen-let. ter 
German word appeared as a detail, on a sign? yet they were able to recall 
the picture and hold it before their minds so that they could read off the 
word, spelling it out both backwards and forwards® Eidetic images are 
apparently difficult to summon up unless the stimulus picture has a, 
coherent structure and interesting material - in other words, unless it 
evokes strong and coherent associations® Not all parts of an eidetic 
memory need appear at once and they typically fade away unless a break in 
attention causes them, to vanish® Some subjects can make their eidetic 
memories move realistically so as to study them more closely, and they 
can be combined with visually perceived backgrounds® Stromeyer reports 
that one subject could make the chin of a beardless man disappear beneath 
an hallucinated beard® His report in ’Nature’ appears to be of especial 
significance®-1!?:" It is noteworthy that eidetic memory appears to be most
frequently found, amongst .young children and pviwttlvo peoplea p ml, .1$ 
seemingly the case With psychic abilities, boob, as I have already noted, ;
'r ' " ■ ’• "K-c. •/., . ’ ' ' . •found eidetic.,.imagery usual amongst Nigerian rural people, but rare amongst 
those of the same tribe who had moved .to the '.towns.
As with apparitions, eidetic memories appear to defy division into 
events ’in’ the mind and events ’in’ the external world. Yet if we assume 
a double aspeot theory and that young children arid primitive people have 
less highly developed and defined conceptual frameworks, then it becomes 
intelligible that a far larger proportion of - the semantic networks and 
their associated episodic memories axe available to respond to each such 
event entering consciousness: for, of Course,. the range of sensory expeniemc
experiences to which a child or primitive person is subject is not necessariJ 
much more restricted than than that of a Western adult, but the extent of 
the meaningfulness seen in: those experiences, notwithstanding losses, is 
probably much larger. I n ‘boraparison^itll^eidetic memories, apparitions 
can., of course, appear to Mature and highly educated people? but apparitions, 
I have suggested, are the outcome of complexes of memory associations 
with associations sufficiently rich to mobilise a substantial range of 
semantic networks. In both oases, therefore, similar processes appear 
to be involved and there appear to be great similarities in the experiences 
themselves. It is noteworthy also that apparitions appear easily to 
dissociated mediums and can also be summoned into consciousness of those 
undergoing hypnosis, where1 again dissociation is involved.^9
In general, therefore, notwithstanding the tentativenoss with which 
these ideas are put forward, it will, I hope, be apparent that the double 
aspect theory when combined with the idea of a collective or interpersonal 
unconscious, allows for a reasonably coherent and consistent interpretation 
of the seemingly conflicting accounts of apparitions and out-of-the-body 
experiences and opens the door for them to be Understood alongside a wide 
range of other normal and less normal experiences. What is more, the door 
is- opened for consideration of the evidence of survival of death free from 
the deeply prejudicial misconceptions of our current Western paradigm.
The evidence for survival of death derives from four main sources.
All present a remarkably coherent and consistent picture. There is first the 
evidence from those who have undergone out-of-the~b ody experiences. Their 
reports, which I have already considered, include also reports of other 
planes of existence and of meetings with those who have died. Secondly,
there are the reports of those close to death of what l;hoy »o© and there Is
21the evidence of thefer changes in their states of mind®/ Thirdly, there 
is the evidence of those who have clinically died or almost died but who 
have been revived/?.^-And fourthly, there is the evidence of mediums, 
including purported communications through them from those who have died®
Of these, the last are probably the most widely recognised, yet they are 
in some ways the most difficult to assess on account of the prevalence 
of so-called, ’false communicators’ to which I have already referred and 
which, in principle, resemble ’Philip’®
Whereas attempts to reconcile the evidence of apparitions start from 
the assumption that, hoirW'bver they may be explained, they do occur, 
discussions of survival of death often fail to get to the point of looking 
at the evidence and concentrate on whether siach survival is possible in 
principle® In large.:part, the difficulties that are seen stem from the 
materialist or dualist assumptions of our current Western paradigm, though 
there is also difficulty sometimes seen in admitting survival of death 
without admitting also existence before death - a difficulty not wholly 
met by the growing evidence of the occurrence, perhaps exceptional, of 
r e i n c a r n a t i o n ® I t  is not my aim -in this study to pursue far the issue 
of survival but I want to set the .idea of such survival within the context 
of my argument as a whole and to show how they bear on each other®
Obviously, survival of death and out-of-the-body experiences aliko 
must, almost certainly, be precluded by those accounts of the bo&y-mind 
relationship which are characteristic of our paradigm and which link mind 
to body indissolubly or identify them® I discussed earlier several forms 
of such theories® There is, for instance, the so-called identity thesis; 
there is the Rylean view that a mental state is essentially a disposition 
to behave in certain ways; and there is the view, supported by, for instance, 
Williams, that a body is essential for identifying a person and is thus 
essential for knowing whether that person still exists at a later t i m e # 24 
As Lewis says, ’If we hold some form of what is often labelled today as 
the corporeadist theory of persons, then the fact of death itself puts • 
an end to further debate® ’ And in discussion with Shoemaker, Lewis 
agrees with M m  that ’We are reduced to &epp.frate straits, in seeking
to make n earn for immortality, un'losa m  oau flrrfe mXn out ft m m . for 
dualism’ and he adds; ’I would Indeed go further** 1 do not think that 
any case for immortality can begin to get Off the ground if we fail to
Ofmake a case for dualism® ’t;,- The reason for Lewis's view is clears whether 
or not, as some Christians believe, the physical body will eventually be 
reconstituted, either the personality must disintegrate with it after death 
or it must in some way part company with it® Thus it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that some form of dualism of body and mind is a ’sine 
qua non® of survival® It is, however, implicit in my earlier arguments 
that assent to this view does not require us to hold that such dualism of 
body and mind entails dualipmiof/physical and mental nor that such dual?sm 
of body and mind is ultimate®
I have marshalled what I believe to be strong and wide-ranging 
arguments that not only psychic phenomena but also memories are not confined 
by the body and involve the interpersonal unconscious® I have suggested, 
too, that the personality has some form of field component of an electro­
magnetic character which provides liaison with the brain but is separable 
from it® This field is created by the interplay of the patterns of discharg­
ing neuronal networks in the brain and it extends, though in less concentrate
f o m  throughout the body® ? That there is such a field is not open to question
\ .
for its massed variations are measured dairy. as elecfcro~encephd ograans in 
hospitals throughout/the world® The three dimensional variations .in that 
field cannot, however, bo measured, not; only because of its minuteness but 
also because of difficulties of access, for it penetrates throughout the 
body® By implication, though the field is created in the first instance 
by the body, in its association with the mind it becomes self-sustaining®
I have claimed that sensory and physical events are not ultimately two 
different kinds of event but different aspects of the same events® Although 
we cannot observe the sense aspects- of all physical events which we know of 
only indirectly, nor can we observe in detail the physical aspect of our 
sense experiences which presumably lies in the brain, I have yet sought to 
argue that there is a sense aspect to physical events and. a physical 
component of all sense events® It appears therefore, that the minute field 
which we know to be associated with neuronal events in the brain must have 
a .sense aspect and our sense experiences must have a physical aspects
and since tho field must take the form governor’ partly by t;bo Inpula from 
the sense mechanisms end partly (assuming the will can vary the patterning 
of the neuronal networks) by the will, the case for assigning that the 
field combines both roles is strong®
I have also suggested that the field must have a close kinship with 
the astral body which is so widely reported® The astral body itself is 
presumably constituted bjr collective memories, as I have suggested, and will 
seek to' show further® The ;memories, however, when brought to mind,have 
presumably a physical (field) component if they are to influence the body: 
the suggestion that the astral body has a field component is, therefore, quit? 
coherent with the remainder of the argument® The necessity for the astral 
body to have a physical component has been the subject of discussion between 
Flev/ and Lewis® As Flew says, ’The crux is that it should possess corporeal, 
characteristics of size, shape and position; and that - though eluding 
crude, iontutored observation - it should nevertheless be in principle 
detectable# If it were not in this minimum sense corporeal and in principle 
detectable, it would not be relevantly different from the Platonic-Cartesian 
soul# If it were not in practice excessively difficult to detect, no one 
could with any plausibility suggest that such a thing might slip away 
unnoticed from the death-bad®*^7 And Lewis says, ’If the notion of an astral 
body is worth considering at all in this connection, as a distinct idea, 
it must be on the basis of its having physical properties of some sort 
or being detectable in physical s p a c e # T h e  main objection to such an 
idea seen by Flew and Lewis is the lack of evidence for such a body# If, 
however, we can identify the physical component of the astral body with 
the field, then there is ample evidence for it in the normal, living body#
The question is whether the field can exist apart from the body®
I have already sought to show that the personality can exist apart 
from the body in out-of-tho-body experiences but the evidence about a field 
component of the separated personality is meagre® I have already quoted the 
two reported experiences of Munroe when he left the body in a Faraday cage 
and when he found himself trapped by the cables over the road® And, of course 
there is the evidence of psycho-kinesis which is often, perhaps always, 
basically electro-magnetic in character; and such psycho-kinetic events 
can, apparently, be brought about when the agent is out of the body#
As fox' the normal objection to the idea of electro-magnetic iimvlvom^ut 
in psychic events, this is: that no transmission is observed and there is 
no clear decrement with distance. 1 This, however, I havo sought specifically 
to explain for mind is not bound by spatial limitations yet can enter 
into physical relationships at any point without, transmission being involved. 
What is more, given the acute discomfort felt by Munroe when he was in 
the Faraday cage in an out of the body state, it is not impossible that 
a departing spirit would seek to avoid or be guided to avoid any measuring 
equipment. In all the circumstances, therefore, a failure to detect a 
departing astral body is perhaps not surprising, but certainly, in the 
absence of such evidence, the case for an antral body with a physical 
component is weakened. ; ■
It will, however, be apparent that if such a field or astral body 
can .indeed separate from the physical body, then the body-mind relationship 
cannot be synonymous with the mental-physical relationship. Hie first is 
a dualist relationship - as it must be if there is survival after death: 
but the mental-physical relationship of ;the field to its sense counterparti
involves two aspects of the one event: a, form of double aspect theory -
which is, indeed, in some form implicit in the Flew and Lewis discussion
though it is not spoken of directly. /A
If, then, we allow in principle that the personality (with its physical
component) can survive death, we now face a 0erl.es of questions about the 
possible nature of life in this new state. One important question concerns 
evidence of personal identity to others. In our everyday lives we rely 
heavily on the body for our recognition of others yet this cannot be so, 
it seems, in a future state when the bodyyis destroyed. On what, then, does 
recognition depend? There appear to be two answers to this question.
First, as I shall show, since the next world appears to be a world 
constituted from memories end thought, human bodies take their appropriate 
form in just the same way as other furnishings of that world: in a way
which I have already discussed in connection with out-of-the-body experiences 
But, secondly, since awareness of others takes plane not by* the senses 
but by telepathic and clairvoyant processes, such knowledge appears to 
carry the mark of their personalities whether or not quasi-seneory clues 
are present. Thus Mrs Willett, the famous medium, writing to Mrs Verrall 
in 1909 about a previous session, said? ?I got no impression of appearance, 
only character, and in some way voice or pronunciation (though this doesn’t
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mean that my ears hoar, yon know I) »<>« I don’t feol a sense of seeing* te=«r»nA«.-CTO» r v '
an intense sense of personality, like a blind person perhaps might have - 
and of inflections, such as amusement or emotion on the part of the speaker*
rnund GtimeyJ/ is speaking and 
not F ¥ H M /fF ¥ H Myers// , I can’t exactly define, except that to me
it would be impossible to be in doubt for one instant - and with E G !  often
know he is there a second or two before he speaks®
As for the wider nature of the next world, as in out-of~the-bo&y 
experiences, it appears, as I have already suggested, to be a world of 
memory and th.ou.ght, and it so happens that in an important address to the 
Society for Psychical Research in 1952, Professor II H Price sought to 
describe and meet objections to just such a world. »/5.9 The world that he 
described closely resembled the accounts that have come from the four
sources to which I referred earlier® Price, himself, noted that the
view which he was putting forward was much like the views put forward by 
Vhatley Carington in his book ’Telepathy’ and by G J Ducasse in ’Nature,
Mind and Death’s and he also noted that there are close parallels in the 
Hindu conception of Kama Loka (literally the world of desire) and in 
Mahayana Buddhism®
Price started his lecture with an acknowledgement of tho strength of
survival evidence, much of it otherwise inexplicable without attributing
to the embodied human mind supernormal cognitive powers vastly more 
extensive and accurate than we can easily believe them to be® Yet he also 
acknowledged, the existence of many sceptics who find the idea of survival 
unintelligible® He therefore addressed himself to the idea of making the 
idea of survival intelligible® Hie picture that he so presented is, as I 
i have said, is broadly in line with the evidence and is in line with the 
| arguments being presented here®
Price suggested that the next world, might be a world of mental images„ 
He showed that such a world could appear as real, to a person experiencing 
it as our ordinary sense world® ¥hether or not such experiences are 
linked to a physical body, what matters is whether there are after-death 
experiences linked to each other and with ante-mortem experiences so that 
personal identity is preserved.® And, of course, there could be experiences 
which could, appear to be of the body without there necessarily being
If you asked me how I know when F G /ySd
a physical body® Hie next world would then look liko our ordinary world 
hut, particularly if the will had greater power, it would hehave rather 
differently; but it would still be possible for someone to be dead without 
realising this for quite some time - a situation for which there is much 
testimony® In such a world communication would he by telepathy®
Price than asked whore such a world might be® He pointed out that 
mental images including dream images have a space of their own, and that 
it makes no sense to a,sk how far a dream image is from the foot of the bed. 
Hie question where in the physical world such a world of dream images is, 
does not arises (though, I might add, we might answer that in a sense it is 
in the collective or interpersonal unconscious®)
As for the criticism that such a world would be purely private and 
that there would be a multiplicity of private worlds, Price noted that 
if telepathy were constantly occurring, such a world might become the joint 
product of a group of telepathically interacting minds and public to them 
all® Such a world based entirely on our desires might seem attractive, 
but assuming the inhibiting forces of the unconscious no longer operated, 
repressed desires would be admitted and such a world for some people might 
then become nightmarish; and they would have to face and overcome their 
conflicts for it to improve® As for the simpler and more mundane pleasures 
of ordinary people, if they desired these, they would build that sort of 
world for themselves® But everyone might become sated with a world of their 
desires and seek further creative developments though on this Price declined 
to speculate®
As I have already noted, the picture sketched by Price fits with 
a lot of evidence from a lot of sources® Miat is more, it fits closely 
with the picture which I have been building up here® Hie implications of 
this picture are, of course, radical and far-reaching and they point 
towards some overall synthesis concerning the nature and ultimate destiny 
of the world® Hiis, however, would raise fundamental issues concerning 
religions and, more particularly, Christian theology. These I hop© to 
pursue later but I need now to draw together the threads of the argument 
presented in this study, and while declining to pursue those deeper 
implications, I need to show how the argument as a whole fits together®
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THE WORLD AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
I want now to draw together the main features of this study and, 
like explorers who have been on a long journey and, at its furthest point 
have reached a ridge line, I too want to look ahead and, tentatively and 
speculatively, point to some of the more prominent features that appear, 
notwithstanding that on this occasion they cannot bo adequately explored 
or justified® None the less, this tentative look ahead should give some 
wider bearings for this study notwithstanding that, if I am able to explore 
further on a later occasion, these features will have to be explored afresh 
in much more detail and, where necessary, corrected®
I sought to show at the outset of this study how the drive towards 
a unified understanding of the world was meeting fundamental problems both 
in the heart of science itself and in efforts to reconcile it with, and to 
incorporate within it, concepts of life and mind® In the main fields of 
science, the impetus of scientific discovery was still largely unchecked, 
but at some points within these fields and outside these fields our current 
Western conceptual framework or paradigm was breaking down® The signs of 
this lay in the apotheosis of pluralism, the attempts by philosophers to 
rid us of the desire to ’explain’, the tendenoy for more and more people 
to turn inwards in an effort to find release from creative tensions on the 
therapist’s couch and in the proliferation of ’ism’s’® These were, I 
suggested, the symptoms of the breakdown of a paradigm, probably wider and 
deeper than any breakdown sinoe the Renaissance, but paralleled many times 
in the field of science, as Kuhn had shorn® CThe heart of the problem lay, I claimed, in the relationship of physica
A
to mental, body to mind, which had been the most important problem in 
philosophy, at least since the time of Descartes, and which now seemingly 
had reached impasse® But, as I sought to show, the possibility of a way 
through was now emerging®
From the work on genetic epistemology of Piaget two points had come 
out clearly; that we had developed our concepts of body and mind, of 
physical and mental, from uniformities in our sense experiences, and that the 
concepts so built up were at many conceptual levels which needed, therefore, 
to be carefully distinguished® I pointed to the confusions of conceptual 
levels involved in thinking of a separate physical world ’causing’ our 
sense experiences and claimed that the concepts of, on the one hand 
consciousness and mind, and on the other of the external and physical worlds,
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wore built up from our oonso and othor experiences yat that thoao conooptn 
needed, at a more basic level, to be supplemented by the idea, of a sensory/ 
physical world of which we ourselves were parts and which in us was self- 
intimating® Though I distinguished these three main conceptual levels,
I sought also to show that ontologically there was one evolving sensory/ 
physical world of which we were parts and of which consciousness and mind 
and the external and physical worlds were aspects or features® It was in 
these terms, foreshadowed in the work of Spinoza,, William James and, at one 
stage, BertraiMRussell, a,s well as Piaget, that I claimed the impasse 
could be broken and the relationship of body to mind, of physical to mental, 
could be explained®
Yet , as 1 also sought to show, there were aspects of the body-mind 
relationship which could not be explained within this context® These 
aspects involved the unconscious and its manifestations, notably in memory 
and in the various phenomena of parapsychology®
It was Freud who first focussed attention on the role in our lives 
of the personal unconscious and it was Jung who extended this role in terms 
of a collective or interpersonal unconscious® M o dem academic psychology, 
with its concern for observation and measurement, had tended to ignore 
the personal unconsoious which, despite its explanatory power, was not 
easily quantifiable; and this notwithstanding that it could in principle^ 
(though I believe erroneously)^bo thought of entirely in terras of brain 
activity® Th© idea of a oollectivo unconscious, however, could not be 
reconciled with the idea that all mental events, conscious or unconscious, 
had their counterparts in our separate brains and itfcri3 not, therefore, 
surprising that this fundamental aspect of Jungian psychology had tended 
also to be passed over by most academic psychologists® As I sought to show, 
however, modem academic psychology was largely the creature of our Western 
paradigm and, despite many important achievements, had been limited and 
to some extent crippled by its progenitor®
In this study I claimed a wider role for the unconscious; a role 
partly freed from the functioning of the brain® I sought first to show its 
role in explaining both memory and the distorting influences of the personal 
unconscious® Secondly, I sought to shoi* how an understanding of its role 
enabled me to explain, at any rate in principle, telepathy, clairvoyance 
and psycho-kinesis® I sought thirdly to show its wider character and role
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in the light of evidence from out-of-theTb ody experiences, from psychic 
entities such as ’Philip'r poltergeists, tulpas and 'false communicators' 
as well as some apparitions® And fourthly, 1 sought to show more about 
its character by pointing briefly to evidence about the first plane of 
survival after death, and 1 referred to, though X did not seek to pursue, 
evidence pointing also to higher planes of survive,!® Whereas, therefore, 
in our current Western paradigm, mind was seen largely as subordinate to 
brain and the unconscious was seen largely as an irrational periphery of 
mind, I sought to show th© conscious mind and the physical world as 
evolving from and as produced by the processes of an unconscious to which 
neither the Imitations of time nor space applied®
As I showed, the evidence of premonitions and precognition was too 
strong to be passed off® Furthermore, this evidence was in keeping with 
my claims that our concepts of space and time derive from consistencies 
in the content of our sense experiences and that we cannot, without a 
confusion of conceptua.1 levels, apply them to the unconscious itself®
It was difficult to avoid the conclusion, therefore, that future events 
are in some form present in th© unconscious? and I claimed that memory, 
itself, clairvoyance and various forms of ratro-cognition, including 
psyohometry point to a record of all past being retained there, too® *
This suggested, therefore, that vast as the universe was, its very transience 
suggested that it was but a phase of the even vaster processes of the 
unconscious® In conceptual terms, therefore, 1 claimed that the unconscious 
lay at a deeper level than the sensory/physical world which was a 
manifestation of it®
It is difficult to visualise the relationship of our normal physical 
world to the unconscious without recourse to analogy? and as with all 
analogies, their relevance is limited, so that, if the search for relevance 
is pushed too far, they become misleading® None the less, it may be 
helpful to think of the unconscious as a vast and boundless sea and to 
think of our physical universe in terms of a wave crossing it® All th©
©vents making up the history of the world, future as well as past, would 
then correspond to the unite, say the molecules, of water® As is well 
known, these molecules do not themselves travel with the wave® The wave ! 
is a wave of energy which as it reaches them, activates them into a circular 
motion and as the wave passes, they return to their former state and position*.
It is, perhaps, helpful to think of the physical world in rather 
similar terms® The transience of the physical world has "been recognised 
from earliest times® In the fifth century B C , Heraclitus, the so-called 
’weeping philosopher’, spoke of all being in perpetual flux and nothing 
abiding and his aphorism that one cannot step in the same river twice was 
improved by a successor who asserted tha,t one cannot step in the same river 
even once® The same thought, more relevantly developed, lies in the 
Mundaka TJpaniBhads ’As from a blazing fire, sparks of similar form issue 
forth by the thousands, even so, my friend, many kinds of beings issue 
forth from the immutable and they return thither, too®’ Such insights are 
borne out by Einstein who showed that all matter has to be thought of in 
terms of energy; and energy is itself a dynamic concept® The durable 
features of the physical universe need, therefore, to be thought of in terms 
of standing patterns in a continuous dynamic flow of energy®
Whereas it is from the consistencies in the changes in these standing 
patterns that we derive the concept of time, the underlying changes are 
themselves so rapid as probably to have to be related to the indeterminacy 
of quantum theory® As for future events, we need to think of them as in 
some sense lying latent in the unconscious until they are reached by the 
dynamic wave of energy which activates them; and as it passes, they return 
to their latent form in the unconscious® What is more, it is this dynamic 
wave of energy which constitutes the present® Any past or future event 
drawn into the present by precognition, memory or retro-c ognition is thereby 
activated to the extent necessary for body-mind liaison to ooours a point 
of outstanding obscurity on which I have already commented® To put all 
this another way, there appears to be a meaningful relationship between 
physical activity and the present for we can hardly conceive of past or 
future events being activated out of their proper time sequence except 
by being drawn by associations into th© px^esont, whenever that may be® 
Whereas, however, the passage of the sea waves leaves tho sea 
essentially unchanged, this is not true of the unconscious, for the very 
process of physical activation brings the units together in more and more 
complex physical relationships as evolution proceeds, and, as a result, 
more and more associations are established between the resulting patterns of 
energy which constitute the events and objects of our normal world, including 
persons® In particular, this evolutionary process implies that there is 
no necessary pre-existence of persons as a complement of survival of death®
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This evolutionary process points, too, towards changes ofton
extending over long periods of time, many of which we are hardly aware
of® Yet ouch changes provide part of the ground-plan of our lives#
We are, of course, now well amre of the slow geological processes
involving the drift of continents and tho building and erosion of
mountains; and we are aware, too, of the ever-present threat of the
onset of another ice age® Yet, despite ouch vast changes throughout
the history of the earth, life has survived and developed, notwithstanding
that very small deviations in the environment of such factors as chemical
balance and temperature could have destroyed all life® As Lovelock has
pointed out, ouch stability of the environment seems against all 
1probabilities® Ho suggests, therefore, almost certainly rightly, that
not only are living creatures individually open systems, but that the
living world must operate as a whole to regulate its own
environments an idoa with startling implications! in many fioldo, not
least in the field of population control® Tho whole concept is oho
which makes the idea of reducing all scientific laws or regularities to
the laws of physios seem even more remote®
As evolution proceeds new long-term trends and now relationships
come into play and of most of these we are probably as yet unaware, for
man has left too scanty a record over too short a time for thorn to stand
out clearly® Yet some historians are already reaching out to find thorn#
Braudel, for instance, distinguishes and ie concerned with tho interplay
of 'histoire 6v6n©mentiollo8, the history of transitory, short-term
eventsS ®f“ 'conjoncturos®, the medium term, often cyclic changos, notably
in societies and their economies! and of 'hiotoir© structural©6, the
2features of the longer term which change only very slowly® And here 
and there one comes across (hints of knowledge apparently available to 
primitive and early peoples, knowledge whosQ acquisition appears so far 
beyond their skills or the duration of.their culture as to bo totally 
inexplicable and which suggests that the revolution taking place in 
archaeology as a result of carbon dating and the growing realisation of 
th© knowledge of astronomy entailed in temple building, may be but tho 
harbinger of even more disturbing evidence® More and more, it scorns that, 
far from being masters of our fates, we are parts of a process whose 
origins and destiny have b©en lost sight of in our current anthropocontrio 
and materialistic Western paradigm®
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This, however, still leaves th© question how tho complex events of 
our normal world can he foreseen in advance of their “being activated by 
the physical processes which constitute the present® The process as a whole 
must, of course, lie outside time, for time is, a,s it were, created “by the 
process® And I have already sought to show that mind, too, lies outside 
time “but can, in principle, enter it at any point; which can b© regarded 
either as mind drawing past or future events into©the present, or as mind 
entering past or future sequences® The implication that all future events 
in the world lie as yet unrealised in the unconscious, whence in exceptional 
circumstances they can b© drawn into the present, at once raises the 
spectre of pre-determination®
A distinction needs, however, to be drawn at this point between 
’foreseen5 and ’pre-determined’, a distinction made possible by the earlier 
discussion which sought to establish the priority of mind over matter®
The evidence suggests that future events can be ’foreseen’, for this can 
be understood as a mind process, and mind itself lies outside time® On the 
other hand, ’pre-determined’ normally implies a physical process and physica 
processes, J. have suggested, take place in their natural order and are 
the product of the processes of indeterminacy and chance mutations® It 
would seem, therefore, that ©vents in th© physical world can be foreseen but 
are not pre-determined for, as I have already sought to show, the natural 
order of ©volution implies ths/fc there is not on© evolutionary path but a 
range whose outer limits are th© limits of viability® The same freedom 
within the limits of viability is to be found in human beings® As I have 
shown, we can in principle see in the concept of the ’norma,!’ mind one path 
of order, rationality and love, s,ll three of which occur, I have.claimed, 
as facets of that one states and I have pointed, too, to the emotional 
implications of movements towards and departures from that state® But, 
in practice, hereditary and environmental forces warp that development so 
that each person deviates in some measure from that norm up to the limits 
of viability® This suggests that the freedom that we have is freedom to 
deviate from a norm that represents the best possible state of affairs 
within the parameters of the universe of which we are parts® ¥© can mar 
the endowments that are found in that norm but we cannot improve on them; 
and, of course, such warpings affect equally our understanding, behaviour 
and emotions® As to why the evolutionary process should have such 
indeterminacy and freedom as an integral feature of it can here be suggested 
only most tentatively but it appears to follow from the very nature of the
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system which, being dynamic, creative and necessarily unoonotxainod by 
anything beyond it, can evolve towards self-consciousness only by letting 
the dynamic and creative forces take each creative step without constraint#
To justify these claims and to explore further the workings of the 
system as a whole would take me far beyond the limits of this study, but 
it will be apparent that the principle of such a unified, dynamic and 
creative system ought to be capable of being conceptualised in some form of 
top-level concept whose internal dynamics would be capable of explaining 
the processes as a whole without internal contradiction® Such a top-level 
concept would, of course, have close affinities with the concepts of God, 
Allah and Brahmans it would, indeed, in principle satisfy the five principle 
of God's existence given by Aquinasg God as unmoved mover; as first cause; 
as standard and source of perfection and being; as necessary being; and as 
providing the ultimate purpose of the universe® And, of course, such a 
concept would not itself be open to explanation, for to seek to explain it 
would be self-contradictory as it would require an even higher level concept* 
Yet such a top-level concept would seemingly be at variance with most 
usual interpretations of the Christian God, not leant because, as with any 
scientific concept, it would be open to falsification if it was inadequately 
formulated® It would not, however, be at variance with all such interpretat­
ions and it is perhaps worth further extending the proper limits of this 
study briefly to show this® I could claim support for this oontenteiMon 
from Roman Catholic, Anglican and Russian Orthodox theologians but it may 
suffice here to quote Tillich who conveniently summarised three ways of 
interpreting the concept of the Christian Gods 'The first one separates God 
as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above 
which he has his existence® In this position he has brought the universe 
into being at a certain moment ®®® , governs it according to a plan, directs 
it towards its end, interferes with its ordinary processes in order to 
overcome resistance and to fulfil its purpose, and will bring it to consumm­
ation in a final catastrophe®' This view, which Tillich rejected, treats Go 
at the same conceptual level as the world® It is the God of much Christian 
orthodoxy and is open to philosophical attack on a number of points of a 
fundamental character, as was shown by, for instance, Ayer®- Tillich's 
second way identified God with the creative ground of the universe and so 
again treated God as at the same conceptual level as the universes a view
which Tillich rejected also® Hie third way which he put forward accepted 
much of the closeness of the relationship implied in identity yet claimed 
that ’God as the ground of being infinitely transcends that of which he 
is the groundo ® ®• To call God transcendent in this sense does not mean 
that one must establish a "superworld" of divine objects® It does mean 
that, within itself, the finite world points beyond itself®’-,. In other 
words on this interpretation the world is seen as a manifestation of God 
and God himself is seen as a top-level concept, thereby preserving and 
keeping in balance the Christian claims to his transcendence and immanence® 
These quotations from Tillich give the basis of an answer to one 
criticism that might be levelled at this study? that as a monistic argument 
it necessarily encroaches on the field of theology and conflicts with 
Christian concepts of God and with the long tradition of Christian philosophy 
and theology® It can, of course, also be argued that all/monistic theories 
lead to an ’attempt to preserve absolute categories or ideals at the 
expense of human lives ’ s a quotation from Sir Isaiah Berlin which I referred 
to at the outset of this study® This criticism, too, I would claim to be 
quite unjustified if levelled at this study? indeed, I suspect that it is 
true only of those monistic theories in which conceptual levels have been 
telescoped or inverted® This failure to distinguish conceptual levels has, 
however, vitiated and confused much else in Western philosophy and theology, 
as I have sought to show? what is more, as is im.plioit throughout this 
study, it has led to false and artificial distinctions between philosophy, 
science and theology® On the other hand, I have also sought to show that 
proper respect for these levels opens the door, however tentatively and 
fallibly, towards a monistic account of the universe which is at the one 
time potentially fully rational and indeed scientific, while leaving full 
scope for human self-realisation and freedom®
Also implicit in this study, however, is an attempt to show that, as 
one facet of our Western paradigm, we have greatly over estimated the 
extent of that freedom and the control which we have over our lives®
Largely as a result of the materialist pre-conceptions of our age, mind has 
been regarded as in principle finite and brain-based, and probably on the 
analogy of the computer, as potentially wholly rational and self-determining? 
and the unconscious has been identified largely with various unfortunate 
forms of neurosis® The picture presented here, however, has quit© other 
implications® The unconscious is seen as having a rationality and wisdom 
manifest not only in the order of the physical world but in ways even Jung
hardk graspqd® Tliie Is perhaps hest soon in tho work of oroativo people® 
Storr no toe that 'Creation is not simply a matter of a highly gifted person 
sitting down, thinking hard, and then writing, composing or painting 
something® There is an element of passivity, or dependence, even of 
humility in the creative process; and this element is indeed a surprising 
finding in a man of notable ego-strength, who is used to relying upon his 
will® For new ideas cannot be conjured up voluntarily? they come to people, 
and though it is possible to arrange life so that they are more likely to 
make their appearance, there can be- noTguarahtee that they will do so® '*
This accounts for the widespread sense of such people of being but a 
channel or vehicle for their works that it is not they who write or draw 
but that it is some force working through them® And it accounts for a 
certain deep humility before the facts that marks them® The same need for 
mastery of the relevant skills yet the same passivity at critical points 
enabling the unconscious to take over, charanterisos many of those who reach 
the highest levels of sports of skill® Another quotation from Storr brings 
this point homes 'Self-realization, so far as anyone achieves it, is 
manifested in the widest exercise of the individual's potentalities 
combined with the attainment of a mature relationship with others® 
Subjectively, it seems to be attended by a sense of being fully adapted 
to, rather than attempting entirely to direct, the course of one's own 
development® This latter attitude is, in the wide sense in which Jung 
uses the word, x'eligiouss for it implies that the individual is aokoowledgir 
his ultimate dependence upon forces which may be depicted as either inside
or outside himself, but which are nevertheless not of his making®' '■.
This search for self-realisation lies deep within each individual 
yet it is dependent on the structuring of the personality which in turn 
depends not only on hereditary and other personal factors but on the 
rationality of the cultural paradigm within which he develops® Vfe are all 
products yet captives of such paradigmsfrom which we cannot wholly escapes 
yet we can, though with great difficulty, develop them and change them®
The development of such paradigms involves the development of the personality 
and vice versa® As Neumann says? 'Th© integration of tho personality is 
equivalent to an integration of the world® Just as an uncentered psyche
which io dispersed in participationo sees only a diffuse and chaotic world,
00 tho world constellates itself in a hierarchical ordor about tho 
integrated personality. .I This' correspondence, between ono’o view of th© 
world and th© formation 
to the highest®9 It is thio correspondence IjM oIf loads any aitompt to 
rovioe or restructure our paradigm to bo oeonby somo people as an attack 
on tho integrity of their own personalities fend, as Kulm has shown, to 
thoir defending it accordingly® And tho greater the dogreo of irrationality 
in the paradigm or personality, tho groator will bo tho sense of insecurity 
end th© more deoporate will be th© resistance to tho threat® Yot to some
it may come ao a release and bring a sens© of liberation® Both responses, 
on reflection, loo© thoir intensity; a now paradigm may in many ways 
be bettor than its predecessor but it will havo its own limitations .
To have pointed to a now paradigm, oven in a preliminary way, io to point 
to a mountain lodge and not to its summit® Yot tho scaling of tho peak 
goes on; th© summit is there and can eventually bo reached, as mystics 
of all ages end cultures have claimed® la this study I havo sought to clear 
a narrow path through its foothills and its lower roaches® In a lator 
study I should like to play somo rolo in charting that climb to which, 
ao part of th© evolutionary process, wo are all committed®
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